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ABSTRACT
Most environmental policies express explicit commitments to consider how public
choices will affect the welfare of future generations. This is often one of the primary
rationales for public action. At the level of principle, this consensus is broad and largely
unchallenged. Efforts to translate these commitments into practice, however, invariably
highlight the same tensions and ambiguities that characterize theoretical discussions. This
thesis examines two efforts by public agencies to address intergenerational ethics in the
context of practice.
The Department of Energy's effort to translate principles of intergenerational equity
into a formal, analytic approach to making policy decisions failed. Their experience
highlights the indeterminacy of policy principles under conditions of uncertainty and
value pluralism, and the need for public involvement to reach a politically legitimate
interpretation of intergenerational obligations.
The efforts of the Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority provide a distinct
contrast. They also emphasized public involvement, but chose to create an interactive
forum that involved citizens directly in the evaluation of technical information, the
exploration of political obligations, and the shaping of policy. With an open set of
groundrules and help from a team of experienced facilitators, a distinctive form of
conversation developed that enabled participants to respond directly and intuitively to
concerns about future generations and the broader legitimacy of the process.
The Maine experience highlights a distinctive option that is open to administrative
agencies when they face concerns about intergenerational impacts or similar problems.
This process drew on and contributed to the competence of citizens. The Maine
experience underscores the importance of having an experienced facilitator who can
organize and manage this kind of complex conversation. It also highlights the possibility
that deliberative forums can be created in the context of administrative action with direct
implications for how intergenerational ethics and similar problems might be handled.
Thesis supervisor: Lawrence Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract 2
Acknowledgments 4
Chapter One - The Policy Consensus on Intergenerational Ethics
Overview 5
An emerging consensus on intergenerational ethics 7
From policy to practice 12
Chapter Two - Deciding for the Future 15
The context of administrative decision-making 16
NAPA's effort to derive practical principles 25
The problem is political 32
Chapter Three - Creating the Historical Present 40
Historical Context 42
Taking Responsibility for Ends 48
Consensus and Disagreement 78
Managing History 91
Conclusion 105
Chapter Four - Common Sense 108
Reason Giving and Conversation 109
The Importance of Conversation 110
Reasons Promote Understanding 114
Reasons Opened Proposals to Scrutiny 116
Play and Justification 121
Justification and Validity Claims 130
Keeping an Open Mind 134
Common Sense and Constitutional Reason 137
Future Generations and Conversation 145
Addressing concerns about future generations 145
requires an appropriately shaped dialogue.
People need a model of how to speak to the future. 149
Agencies and citizens need help organizing and 150
managing such conversations.
Intergenerational dialogues should be draw on and 154
develop the reason and common sense of citizens.
Common Sense and Conversation in a Research Society 157
References 160
List of Interviews 164
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I want to first thank my advisors Larry Susskind, Martin Rein, and Josh Cohen for their
insight and generous support over the long course of this project.
Beyond this there are so many people who have helped that I have to apologize to those I
have left out but I must thank a few. Mike Wheeler who is always a source of insight,
Marjorie Aaron for helpful comments, Ambuj Sagar for many helpful discussions. Peggy
Levitt for thoughtful comments and support throughout. Kathleen Merrigan, Rob Beattie,
David Thacher, and many other colleagues at MIT contributed to the development of my
ideas. Analia Penchaszadeh contributed editorial help at a crucial time.
I owe a great debt to my family and especially my wife Diane for her patience, support
and understanding and my daughter Emma whose energy and curiosity and have been an
inspiration.
Finally, I want to acknowledge two debts that I am unable to repay. First, to Don Schon,
who contributed so much to the development my understanding of these issues. Second,
to the citizens and others actors who made the Maine Citizens Advisory Group work.
Any credit should go to them, because they made the story.
Chapter One
The Policy Consensus on Intergenerational Ethics
OVERVIEW
The point of departure for this thesis is the consensus that future generations should
be given consideration in the design and implementation of environmental policy. This
consensus is apparent in policy makers' consistent reliance on future generations when
they must explain why they believe environmental problems demand public attention.
In this chapter I highlight this consensus and the tie to democratic legitimacy that
makes it especially pressing. This consensus reveals at least a strong "overlapping"
intuition that questions about intergeneration ethics are not just a matter of private
conscience or morality.' They are part of the subset of moral questions that constitute the
political sphere in our democracy. When questions about future generations come up
they raise questions about the foundations of political legitimacy that and must be
addressed in a way that is consistent with this status.2
This consensus opens rather than closes the question of what this commitment means.
Figuring out what we have said in making these commitments now involves making the
bridge from policy to practice. The "practical social task" of resolving questions about
intergenerational ethics at this practical level opens questions about the role of
institutions and the basis for legitimacy in a democratic society. These, in turn, shape the
' In the sense that Rawls uses overlapping in his discussion of "overlapping consensus." See Rawls 1993 p.
38 f.
2 "While a political conception ofjustice is, of course, a moral conception, it is a moral conception worked
out for a specific kind of subject, namely, for political, social, and economic institutions." Rawls 1985.
P.224
efforts of actors, like administrative agencies, who must find a way to implement these
commitment along with their other responsibilities.
I want ultimately to contrast two approaches to this practical social task. In one the
responsibility for articulating this consensus and exploring its implications was retained
by the administrative agency. In the second, the agency shared the responsibility for
articulating and interpreting the practical force of intergenerational legitimacy with a
group of citizens. Here the foundation for legitimacy moved from the agency to the form
in which citizens reasoned freely with each other over controversial questions that the
policy raised.
In this first chapter I characterize the existing consensus about the significance of
intergenerational ethics for environmental politics by reviewing a variety of policy
statements. A set of examples illustrate this consensus. They are taken from the early
stages of policy-making in which actors describe the rationale for public action.
References to intergenerational ethics (obligations, fairness, responsibility .. .) are
common. I also want to highlight a second characteristic of these statements. They
speak about intergenerational ethics with a confidence and command that stands out
when pontrasted with the uncertainty with which these issues are treated in the context of
practice. I conclude this section with an explanation of why these references are so
common, or at least how we can understand the political significance of the existing
consensus.
AN EMERGING CONSENSUS ON INTERGENERATIONAL ETHICS
The concerns of future generations have become difficult to avoid when talking about
the goals of environmental policy. Whether we look at national policy-making,
international treaty making, or local politics, intergenerational relationships provide a
touchstone that people use to gauge the meaning and significance of the choices they
must make. Over a range of specific problems, like air pollution, wilderness protection,
and climate change, intergenerational ethics has consistently proved useful to people who
are trying to capture what they feel is important about environmental problems or say
why public action is needed. Even those who hold widely different views about
environmental policy often share the insight that our relationship to the future is both
significant and problematic.
The most compelling statement on this subject has been that made by the World
Commission on Environment and Development (i.e. the Brundtland Commission). They
turned to intergenerational relationships when they defined sustainable development as
"development that meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs." This statement combines concerns about
equity and freedom in a way that has influenced many subsequent statements of
environmental policy.
Its echo can be heard, for instance, in U.S. Executive Order number 12852 which
established the "President's Council on Sustainable Development" and defined
sustainable development as "economic growth that will benefit present and future
generations without detrimentally affecting the resources or biological systems of the
planet." 3 It also provided a point of reference for the "collective opinion" recently
presented by the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. This statement drew explicitly on the
Commission's definition when it identified intergenerational equity as one of the two
principles that "must be taken into account in assessing the acceptability of strategies for
the long-term management of radioactive wastes."4 Two of the "Principles of
Radioactive Waste Management" described in this document specifically address
intergenerational issues. Principle 4 states that "[r]adioactive waste shall be managed in
such a way that predicted impacts on the health of future generations will not be greater
than relevant levels of impact that are acceptable today," and Principle 5 state that
"[r]adioactive wastes shall be managed in such a way that will not impose undue burdens
on future generations."
While the Brundtland Commission's statement has been the most influential, it was by
no means the first. Indeed almost every important piece of environmental legislation in
the U.S. has turned to intergenerational relationships to explain its purpose and goals. The
U.S. National Environmental Protection Act, for instance, declares that it is "the
continuing policy of the Federal Government... to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic,
and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans." The Act goes
on to describe the need for public action to "fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as a trustee of the environment for succeeding generations." The Clean Air Act warned
that "current and future generations of Americans will be adversely affected by delaying
3Executive Order No. 12852, June 29, 1993.
4 Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD. 'The Environmental and Ethical Basis of Geological Disposal of Long-
Lived Radioactive Wastes: A Collective Opinion of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee."
1995.
measures to remedy the problem" of acid rain. In establishing the National Wilderness
Preservation System, the U.S. Congress declared its policy "to secure for the American
people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of
wilderness." 5 The Nuclear Waste Policy Act mandates that "appropriate precautions
must be taken to ensure that . . . Waste and spent fuel do not adversely affect . . .the
environment for this or future generations."
Awareness of intergenerational ethics is not restricted to statements of national policy
or special issues like radioactive waste disposal. Citizens also refer to them in
articulating their views about the significance of environmental policy conmnitments.
Consider the following comments on the Endangered Species Act.
The recent Supreme Court decision supporting the Endangered Species Act is encouraging, but I
am concerned by congressional attempts to weaken and defund the act. The ESA requires us to
consider the ramifications of our actions and to mitigate environmental damage. We have no right
to destroy natural resources or ignore the needs of future generations. The ESA is vital to the
existence of the ever-increasing number of fish, bird, insect, plant and mammal species threatened
with extinction.6
5Examples are by no means limited to U.S. legislation. One of the explicit purposes of the New Zealand
Environment Act of 1986, for instance, is to "[e]nsure that, in the management of natural and physical
resources, full and balanced account is taken of . . . the needs of future generations." This responsibility is
also acknowledged in the Conservation Act of 1987 which lists one of the functions of the Department of
as "[t]oargue and publicize the benefits to present and future generation of the conservation of natural and
historic resources." See Janice C. Wright "Future Generations and the Environment," Studies in Resource
Management No. 6 Center for Resource Management, Canterbury, New Zealand. The most well known
international example is found in the Bundtland Commission's 1987 report Our Common Future. They
defined sustainable development by reference to future generations as "development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." A more
recent example is the "Collective Opinion" of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee of the
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, on "The Environmental and Ethical Basis of Geological Disposal of Long-
Uved Radioactive Wastes." This opinion identified intergenerational equity as one of the two primary
"fairness and equity considerations," (the other being intergenerational equity) and state that 'those who
generate the wastes should take responsibility, and provide the resources, for the management of these
materials in a way which will not impose undue burdens on future generations." (p. 13) This is echoed in
the "Principles of Radioactive Waste Management," two of which specifically address intergenerational
issues. Principle 4states that "[r]adioactive waste shall be managed in such a way that predicted impacts on
the health of future generations will not be greater than relevant levels of impact that are acceptable today,"
and Principle 5 state that "[r]adioactive wastes shall be managed in such a way that will not impose undue
burdens on future generations."
6 Anne Hafrey, Letter to the Boston Globe 7/12/95 at 18.
Let me turn now to a some example drawn from local politics that demonstrate how
issues at this scale also prompt individuals to turn to intergenerational relationships to
explain their thinking, to illustrate the significance of an issue, or to justify an action.
These examples are all drawn from ongoing debates in Nantucket Island in
Massachusetts. It is an interesting forum in which to consider these issues because there
is a both strong and cultivated sense of history and (it being a small island with a great
deal of development pressure) a clear sense of the future. These both permeate
discussions of local politics as the following example illustrates in formulating a rationale
for action.
"On a good day they could make half a mile," said Edouard Stackpole of the early
Nantucketers as they rolled their timber frame houses on logs with teams or oxen. Their decision
to move the original settlement of Sherburne two miles west to the town's present location on the
'new' harbor indicates a can-do spirit that is of this place, a spirit that may lend us perspective.
Today Nantucket face an equally tough challenge. Twenty years of growth have caused a
range of problems that today have put this fragile place we love at risk. What can we do?. ..
Does a sense of stewardship of the land, of this remarkable place play any part in this discussion.
Or in retrospect, will we be the generation that dropped the ball? Can we overcome inertia and
make the changes to our system to effectively save the spirit of this place? Thinking of those early
settlers and that slow and steady pace of the heavy timber frame, central chimney and all, rolling
towards the new harbor.
Another resident sought to resolve an ongoing debate about the relationship between
political and physical community. In her view, when you contemplate the future concern
for one implies concern for the other. Future inhabitants are members of our comnunity
and deserve our respect, attention, and forbearance.
"I am dismayed by [the] comment regarding the new ConCom' [that] 'I hope here will be
some new voices who will say 'We care about the environment, but let's care more about our
community.'
When leaders in the community pit the interests of the community against the interests of
conservation, it gives legitimacy to the current movement to abolish as many environmental
protections as possible, and it sends a message that the 'environment' is an adversary, instead of
the support and base of a healthy community.
What could prove more caring to you community than protecting it for future generations?...
We need to teach our children and our community that some sacrifices are worth making to have
7Peter Matthews, Letter to The Inquirer and Mirror, 7/20/95
' i.e. Conservation Commission
a habitable and enjoyable environment. Future generations will face greater sacrifices than a
favorite fishing spot, just to have clean air and water. Perhaps we should start teaching our
children now that the small sacrifices are worthwhile, and then those future generations may not
have to sacrifice as much." 9
Finally, local officials sometimes turn to intergenerational relationships to justify
public investments, like the purchase of a parcel of land to guarantee unrestricted beach
access.
"We have to ensure that everybody's children and grandchildren and great grandchildren have the
right to go to the beach like we do. "1"
References to intergenerational ethics are common in discussions about
environmental policy-making. The examples above suggest some of the ways in which
the future, highlighted by environmental problems, intrudes in the present and reshapes
our understanding of political relationships. Whether individuals face this horizon as
legislators, national representatives, citizens, or local officials, the experience of standing
between a past with consequences that have only emerged over time and a future that is
uncertain, creates an intuitive basis for cultivating foresight and humility in making
judgments about environmental policy.
The sudden intrusion of the future (especially the distant future) into the present is
unsettling. It disrupts notions of fairness and legitimacy that give meaning to political
relationships in contemporary democracy. We want to preserve our sense that these are
relationships among individuals who are free and equal. Yet, we suddenly face the
prospect that others' freedom may be constrained by our actions and their equality
compromised by their inability to object to actions that threaten their welfare or restrict
the choices that will be open to them.
9Diane Swartz Letter to the Boston Globe. 1/6/95 at 1 OA Her views on the tie between endangered species
protection and intergenerational concerns are not unique.SMichael Meehan, "Town will take toads to Smith's Point," The Inquirer and Mirror, 8/31/95
This is the experience that I believe accounts for the persistence with which concerns
about future generations tug at the imagination. Future generations threaten a sense of
legitimacy that is constitutive of our sense of living in a democratic polity and raise
problems for political relationships that draw on and give shape to this common sense of
political obligations." We understand these relationships to be ongoing, yet suddenly
face choices with implications that could compromise the ability of future actors to
uphold them.' 2 For those involved in the exercise of the power of the state, the "specter"
of future generations interferes with their sense that they are acting appropriately. More
broadly it raises problems for the stability and sustainability of a democratic political
system as March and Olsen have described.
Unless a democratic system can solve the problem of representing the future, changing interests
of the unborn, it violates a rather fundamental underlying p1umise of democracy--that those who
bear the costs of a decision should have their interests adequately reflected in the choice. The
interests of such future citizens must be compared in a meaningful way with the interests of those
currently present." 3
FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE
In the chapters that follow I turn to the question of whether this experience, and the
insights it leads, to can be tied to action in a meaningful way. This, as March and Olsen
suggest, is a big part of the test that an intergenerational ethic imposes. The policy
statements I reviewed above speak with a confidence that anticipates a direct tie between
principle and action. Indeed the way the commitments are described in policy almost
' They may do other things as well, such as threaten our sense of what it means to be a caring individual or
a religious person. Because I am interested in public policy I focus on the rendering that makes the
political implications clear. In this section I am following points made by Rawls in his discussion of the
"principle of liberal legitimacy." He defines this principle as follows. The "exercise of political power is
fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essential of which all citizens as
free and equal may reasonable be expected toendorse in the light of principles and ideal acceptable to their
common human reason. Rawls 1993. p. 137. See also his discussion on p. 216 ff.
2See Howarth 1992.
3March and Olsen. 1989. p. 146
suggests that, if we state them clearly enough, action will follow automatically and
unambiguously.
I explore the tie between principle and action by looking at a two examples of
practice where government agencies tried to take intergenerational concerns seriously in
making decisions about environmental pnlicy. There examples illustrate different
approaches to translating the confident commitments articulated in policy into practice.
In Chapter Two I trace a recent effort by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to
address intergenerational concerns in making choices about cleaning up sites
contaminated during nuclear weapons production. The challenges this posed generated a
great deal of interest in and discussion about future generations. In the end, however,
staff were not able to make a judgment in which they were confident. They turned to a
broader political discussion. When they initiated this discussion, the DOE interpreted the
intergenerational challenge in a distinctive way. They wanted to capture the relationship
to future generations in terms of established, formal methods of decision-making. What
they were looking for, in turning outside the agency, was agreement on a set of rules that
would translate intergenerational ethics into terms they were familiar with as managers
and decision-makers. Despite a persistent effort to elicit these rules, however, they were
not forthcoming. The DOE ultimately turned to public participation to help them interpret
the meaning of commitments to future generations.
The second case involves the interaction between the administrative authority
charged with siting a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility in Maine and a group
of citizens it convened to advise it on framing and implementing siting policies. Here the
agency involved the public from the earliest stages of the process in direct discussion
about how intergenerational and other concerns should shape policy and choices about
action. This placed demands on the agency to provide technical support and someone to
manage the conversation, but ultimately led to a rich and nuanced discussion of the
implications of intergenerational ethics for practice.
The comparison of these cases suggests two ways in which intergenerational ethics
may take shape in practice. The first centers on the adaptation and development of
formal methods of decision-making and rules like discounting. Here the ultimate
guarantee of legitimacy is the robustness of the method and the skill with which it is
applied. The second ties legitimacy to the ability of citizens and administrative staff to
reason directly about the problems and dilemmas that intergenerational ethics pose for
practice. Both experiences highlight the importance of public participation in developing
a legitimate response to intergenerational ethics, but suggest different ways of organizing
the public discourse.
Chapter Two
"Deciding for the Future"
In this chapter I trace the experience of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
through a period of internal reflection on its practice. This reassessment was prompted
by the agency's effort to act on its responsibility for cleaning up sites contaminated
during the production of nuclear weapons. This activity had left a "legacy" of pollution
and contamination that would affect public health and the use of land and resources and
shape the government's responsibilities for hundreds of years. The extended and
uncertain implications of this legacy were brought to bear directly on staff who had the
responsibility for devising clean-up plans. These implications extended the horizon and
stakes of choice and confounded standard methods of assessing decisions. This was
experienced internally as a crisis of confidence.
The efforts of the DOE staff and its consultants to grasp and respond to this crisis are
instructive in at least three respects. First, they provide a vivid sense of the force and
character of intergenerational ethics when it is re-expressed in the context of
administrative activity. The efforts of the DOE and its consultants to bridge the ethical,
conceptual, and practical challenges that were raised, provide a fresh perspective on
questions like discounting and suggest a creative and practical response to some of these
issues. One surprising effect of the DOE's efforts was to focus attention on the
interaction between the agency and the public. Finally, the terms in which they
understood this relationship suggest one, distinctive, way of understanding the respective
roles and responsibilities of administrative agencies and citizens when questions about
values and the legitimate basis for public action are at issue.
In following their efforts to grasp and respond to this problem, I describe the process
in three stages. First, to help grasp the problem as the DOE experienced it, I provide
some examples that illustrate the context of practical decision-naking from which it
emerged. I try to give a sense of the challenge they faced that concludes with their own
summary of this experience which they provided when they turned outside the agency for
assistance. The second stage describes the effort of the National Academy of Public
Administration (NAPA) panel to help the DOE by developing a set of workable
principles of intergenerational equity that responded to the substantive character of the
problem and the decision-making needs of the agency. I conclude the chapter with an
effort to capture the distinctive character of the DOE's response to the political issues
raised by NAPA's effort, and contrast this with an alternative approach that I will explore
in greater depth in Chapter Three.
THE CONTEXT OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING
In the early 1990s staff at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) faced a mess.
Nuclear weapons production had
. . . left a legacy of widespread environmental contamination. Millions of cubic meters of
radioactive and hazardous wastes have been buried throughout the complex, and this has resulted
in extensive contamination of soil, sediments, surface water, and groundwater. A variety of
factors have contributed to the current waste and contamination problems: the materials
processing and weapons manufacturing processes are inherently waste producing; many of the
original waste management practices, intended as temporary measures, continued for decades due
to the urgency of weapons production and the secrecy demanded by national security."1
This presented the agency staff with the need to make literally thousands of complex
decisions. They were responsible for developing (and later overseeing the
implementation of) clean-up plans for thousands of "sites" that made up the nuclear
'National Academy of Public Administration, Issue Papers, 1994, p. 25.
weapons complex: "a sprawling industrial complex of production, fabrication, and
research facilities located on thousands of square miles of Federal land in 13 states." 2
Each of these plans would involve making judgments about technical issues in the. face of
substantial uncertainty and competing demands for resources. Moreover, these choices
constituted a huge public investment that would shape the responsibilities of the agency
and the conditions under which the many citizens would live for hundreds of years.
Two examples illustrate what this meant to staff at the agency. One common
scenario would involve them in making choices about what to do with buried wastes or
surface contamination at former test plots. The particular wastes involved would be
different in each case; they might be radioactive, heavy metals and other hazardous
materials, or a (sometimes unknown) mixture. The exact nature of the risks would vary
depending upon the particular materials involved and their condition. Often there would
be both an immediate (and perhaps persistent) threat from direct exposure, and a delayed
threat when, at some point in the future, another exposure vector would develop.
Radioactive material deposited on the surface of a former test plot might eventually leach
into a groundwater aquifer, for example. Or the problem might be estimating how
contamination already in an aquifer would disperse over time. DOE staff faced choices
about action that required them to weigh these different risks and assess their significance
over time.
Another prominent set of scenarios involved contaminated buildings. A particular
site might include something as extreme as a retired reactor building that still contained
the shielded reactor block and the spent fuel storage basin (without the fuel), as well as an
2 Ibid. Some of the major facilities were Hanford in Washington, the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, Savannah River in South Carolina, and Rocky Flats, Colorado
assortment of contaminated pipes and maintenance equipment, asbestos, and heavy
metals like lead and cadmium. The building itself might currently contain the
contamination, but its integrity over the lifetime of the contamination might be
questionable, particularly without active maintenance. Again the temporal characteristics
of these risks featured prominently in the DOE's reasoning about what to do.
The need to make decisions was driven by a regulatot y context that required the DOE
to "enter into binding legal agreements with Federal and state regulators to implement
remedial action" at literally thousands of heterogeneous sites.3 Each agreement would
reflect choices between altemative sets of clean up goals and programs. At any given
site, the DOE might decide to pursue a program of restricting use, controlling use, or
restoring the site for unrestricted use.4
The implications of these different programs had varied enormously. For a given site,
the projected financial costs might vary from $1.5 million for restricted use to $800
million for restoring the site to allow unrestricted use. More expensive programs were
generally more intensive and also implied greater risk to the workers involved in the
remediation effort. The programs that were less intensive in financial and engineering
terms were often more intensive institutionally, implying ongoing obligations to control
access to the site and to monitor the behavior of the materials.
Two things pushed the DOE to weigh these choices in an intergenerational time
frame. First, this scope was necessary to make sense of the choices they saw themselves
facing. The hazardous life of the materials was itself intergenerational. In addition, a
3 Henger, 1994, p. 34
4 Restricted use would mean leaving the contamination in place, controlling access to the site until
contamination falls to acceptable levels, and setting up a program of institutional control and monitoring
that could extend anywhere from two hundred to a thousand years or more. Controlled use, where
variety of regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as well as by Congress through CERCLA and the
Safe Water Drinking Act, mandated specific time frames and other requirements for how
the DOE had to go about making these decisions.5
Thus the first key to understanding the DOE experience is that they encountered
questions about future generations in the context of a program of binding decisions in
which intergenerational ethics were one consideration. They saw these choices as a
durable commitments to programs of action that would produce streams of benefits and
costs. The alternatives were characterized by the magnitude, character, and distribution
of these benefits and costs. A they tried to choose between goals and decide and whether
the "overall benefit to the public health and welfare" would be "commensurate with the
costs," 6 benefits and costs were the features that distinguished the alternatives.
The extension of the time frame to an intergenerational scale raised a number of
temporal issues that made these comparisons difficult. This was experienced internally in
terms of a heightened self-consciousness about methods of analysis and decision-making.
It highlighted first the uncertainty and subjectivity associated with estimates, and second,
raised problems with standard ways of assessing tradeoffs.
applicable, might restore the site to a level that would permit some form of use, say industrial use, but not
residential or agricultural use. Unrestricted use meant, of course, restoring the site to allow full use.
5 For instance, 1 OCFR 196, the draft EPA standards for radiation site clean-ups required that the "must be a
reasonable expectation for 1,000 years that the individual dose will not exceed 15 mrem/yr under a
residential scenario." If this was not possible with current technology then the "individual dose cannot
exceed 15 mrem5/yr under the conditions of active control measures and must be less the 75 mrem/yr under
a residential land use scenario in the absence of active control measures for 1,000 years."
1 OCFR 84 the "proposed DOE regulation on control, storage, and disposal of residual radioactive
material required that "interim management and storage facilities must be designed to meet applicable dose
limits for at least 25 years and 50 years if practical. Disposal facilities must be designed to be effective for
at least 200 years and, to the extent reasonably achievable, for 1,000 years."
10 CFR 61 the Nuclear regulatory Commission's specifications of disposing of low-level waste demand
that wastes must be packaged to be stable from 300 to 500 years depending on the level of radiation. They
must be either buried or "beneath an intruder barrier designed to last for at least 500 years."
Take the first point, in any given case the "offsite population may grow significantly
or may diminish over time," 7 with the effect that "expected cases of cancer could be
much higher or much lower than predicted." This was nothing new, but the greater
uncertainty and the greater variation associated with extrapolating models over long
periods of time combined to raise self-consciousness about the judgment involved in
making and interpreting these estimates.
The temporal context also stressed the indeterminacy of institutions and technological
development. These appeared as real questions about real choices. Just how long can
you reasonably assume that institutions can control access to a building or a field? Or, in
a case like groundwater contamination where currently technology is ineffective and
expensive, how optimistic can you be that "investment in research and development will
produce a new technology that can treat groundwater contamination more effectively,
cheaper, and with less risk to construction workers?"8 In extreme cases, even the "degree
of uncertainty cannot be quantified with current information." 9 This heightened
sensitivity that was associated with, and perhaps contributed to, an awareness that these
choices also implied a demand to estimate future attitudes toward risk. 10
Assessing Tradeoffs
6National Academy of Public Administration, Issue Papers, 1994. p. 26.
7 Henger, 1994. For instance in when of the scenarios the local population had grown from 35,000 to
400,000 in the preceding 100 years. How do you project that in a meaningful way, particularly one that
reflects the influence that the choice about a cleanup program may have on population growth?
8 Ibid., p. 41 "Current technology is ineffective for remediating groundwater. Implementing the second
clean up goal will cost inillions of dollars but will not succeed in reducing groundwater contamination
sufficiently to allow unrestricted use for many decades."
9 Ibid., p. 42
'
0 Ibid.
While this heightened awareness of uncertainty and self-consciousness about method
was problematic, the problem that figured more centrally in the DOE's approach was how
to compare risks, costs, and benefits in the present with those in the near and far future.
As public "managers," the DOE staff saw themselves facing choices "between options
having costs, benefits or risks occurring at different times" and to different groups. These
choices would shape the availability of land and threats to occupational and public health,
and affect the viability of basic resources like water supplies. The staff addressed this
new problem by extending their standard approaches to assessment, but this confounded
conventional approaches for evaluating the tradeoffs.
Take, for instance, discounting, which is the standard approach to assessing tradeoffs
between costs and benefits occurring at different times." Any kind of standard discount
rate would obscure risks, costs and benefits that occurred after much more than one
generation. The choices the DOE faced clearly had implications that extended beyond
this horizon. If the horizon of public protection was extended indefinitely, however, tiny
risks to many people in the distant future could "totally bias a decision" and justify
almost any investment in the present. With no discounting, however, you can "put the
costs up front without any certainty of benefit."1 2
Some of the staff at DOE and its subcontractors (particularly Battelle) grew
"frustrated" that "people [weren't] facing the balancing act involved in dealing with risk
" Discounting draws on the logic of investments and suggests that any investment must be evaluated
against alternative investments. The way to do this is to convert the streams of costs and benefits to a
common metric, present dollars. The discount rate for private investment is the rate of the default
investment, either the interest rate or the rate of return on capital. For public projects the choice of a
discount rate is much more controversial.
" This statement is a summary of the view presented by Andrew Wallo III of the DOE in an interview on
April 7, 1996.
shifting" that these choices invariably involved. 3 The most troubling form of "risk
shifting" occurred when management decisions could "push things around in a way that
you push risks to future generations."14
This frustration triggered a "crisis" of confidence and a period of internal reflection at
the DOE. As staff "wrestled" with these issues, they came to see that resolving the
problem meant finding a way to represent future generations. They eventually concluded
that "no one individual can represent future generations," and they lacked the resources to
do so internally. 15 They felt the need to ground their judgments about these questions in
a broader conversation among individuals "selected to represent the varied perspective of
the current generation," with the hope that these individuals could also "represent what
they believe will be the perspectives of future generations."16
The DOE turned to the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) for help
in organizing this broader conversation. They wanted NAPA to put together a panel that
could "undertake the development of an approach or approaches that will be useful to
13Telephone interview with Dr. Janice Longstreth May 7, 1996. Dr. Longstreth was with the Technical
Planning and Analysis Center at the Battelle Institute at the time the NAPA project was initiated and was
involved in the early conversations that led to the project..
4 ibid.
" Andrew Wallo III, Director Air, Water and Radiation Division, U.S. Department of Energy. Telephone
interview May, 1996 and letter to Dr. Janice Longstreth, December 30, 1993.
16 Ibid. Notice the dissonance that has crept into the DOE's description of the challenge the agency faced.
On the one hand the problem is "managerial:" how do you estimate costs and benefits and allocate them
between groups and over time? The problem of intergenerational ethics requires an adjustment in criteria,
but does not affect the core of the way the agency wer ' about its business. Contrast this with the view that
what is important is to engage in a conversation that draws on the ability of participants to take, animate,
and understand diverse perspectives, especially those of future generations. This notion does not fit easily
into the managerial framework. How will the perspectives be reflected in the process of aggregating costs
and benefits? My sense is that these perspectives were supposed to be on what is fair or what our
obligations to the future are. The hope was that these perspectives would converge in a way that could be
incorporated back into process through distributive criteria. They did not see that the problem of
intergenerational ethics could be understood to affect that conversation in a deep way or their ideas about
practice more generally.
decision makers when they need to balance costs, risks and benefits of environmental
management activities between current and future generations." 7
The DOE's charge to the Academy illustrates how they understood the problem
internally. It reflected their experience with making choices about cleanup programs,
where they faced the need to "assess [the] risks, costs, benefits, and impacts of operations
and alternative approaches to ensure that the one selected is, on balance, beneficial." The
key to accomplishing this balance was to identify a method "that could be integrated into
the overall decision-making process that will help DOE equitably compare current and
future risks, costs, and benefits."' 8
This emphasis carried through to the five categories of "needs" they asked the NAPA
panel to address. All but one was a different way of asking the question, "How should
we balance costs, risks, and benefits accruing to different groups at different times?" The
five categories that the DOE named were: 1) "making tradeoffs between current risks,
benefits, or costs and those of the future;" 2) a way to balance ecological damage in the
present against risk reduction in the future;19 3) how to "address alternatives that result in
different risks to different generations; 4) how to "consider the economics of risk trade-
offs;" and, 5) how to implement the "procedures and approaches" identified above.
The emphasis on tradeoffs was underscored in the comments DOE staff made to the
NAPA panel when they initiated the process.
" Andrew Wallo III, Director Air, Water and Radiation Division, U.S. Department of Energy. Letter to Dr.
Janice Longstreth, December 30, 1993.
18 U.S. Department of Energy, Charge to the NAPA Panel. No date.
19 "Approaches for considering the ecological damage cause by current activities to ameliorate future,
hypothetical risks." The meaning of this statement is clarified in the sub-questions: "How do we compare
or balance risks or damages to the ecology that result from actions to reduce risks to future populations?"
"How should we weigh ecological risks that are relatively certain when comparing them against
hypothetical future health risks with associated high uncertainty?" U.S. Department of Energy, Charge to
the NAPA Panel. No date.
We are trying to keep the discussion focused on the more narrow issue of intergenerational
weighting of costs and benefits . . . we want to focus on what to look at and how you weight the
intergenerational aspects and how you handle that part of it [i.e. the risk management process]. 20
The DOE also emphasized the need to present the findings as a "methodology" for
decision-making.
The ultimate goal of this work is to develop a methodology for making decisions which involve
tradeoffs between risks, costs, and benefits which have different temporal distributions. The
desired outcome of this work should be a methodology which incorporates . . . p artinent issues that
need to be addressed when deciding between options having costs, benefits or risks occurring at
different times.
And finally they acknowledged that something about the character of the risks
involved was important. This was summarized only imperfectly by remoteness in
time.
How do you compare risks over the next 100 years to risks that we calculate with our computer
model over the next 10,000 years?22
This framing carried over to the NAPA panel's restatement of the problem:
This project is about tradeoffs -- tradeoffs of risks between groups, tradeoffs between types of risk
reduction, tradeoffs between environmental clean-up and other human health concerns, tradeoffs
between spending money on risk reduction vs. other investments . . . [T]he core concern of the
project is how to make tradeoffs between the current generation and future generations.23
And in their effort to express the abstract ethical problem in a set of questions about
practice:
- To what extent is the present generation ethically obligated to make sacrifices--in money,
standard of living .. .or health--to protect future populations?
- [H]ow should the Federal agencies decide priorities in allocating limited resources fairly among
competing projects that have potential benefit to current versus future generations?24
This was summed up in the panel's assessment of what the DOE needed: "a well
documented, systematic process to help manage intergenerational risks fairly." 25
20 Ed Regnier of the D.O.E. addressing the NAPA Working Group, quoted in Catron, et al, 1994.
21 DOE charge to the NAPA panel in Catron, et al "Comparing Future and Present Risks, Benefits and
Costs: Discounting," in National Academy of Public Administration "Issue Papers for Deciding for the
Future," June 1994.
2 2 Andrew Wallo III of the D.O.E. addressing the NAPA Working Group, quoted in Catron et al
"Comparing Future and Present Risks, Benefits and Costs: Discounting," in National Academy of Public
Administration "Issue Papers for Deciding for the Future," June 1994.
NAPA'S EFFORT TO DERIVE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES
Finding a way to manage the tension revealed by these opposing views of discounting
became the central focus in the NAPA panel's effort to develop a method to assess
tradeoffs. The NAPA panel's investigation deepened rather than resolved this tension.
Some discussions suggested good reasons, beyond the practical demands of
administrative decision-making, for discounting. Something may be unlikely to occur
because it requires a number of specific preconditions to be fulfilled.2 6 The more remote
in time, the longer and more elaborate this chain is likely to be and the less likely it is to
be completed. Actions that are explicitly investments, should probably be treated as
such, and some kind of discounting used in evaluating them. To fail to do so, risks
distorting investment decisions in a way that will not help the future.2 7
Other discussions pointed out cases where discounting as such, leads to results that
are at odds with our intuitive understanding of the ethical issues at stake. The following
examples illustrate this side of the discussion.
When using a 10 percent discount rate, for example, we value 100 lives saved 30 years in the
future the same as 6 lives saved in the present. Thus, when a high discount rate is used,
23 Catron et al, 1994.
24 Ibid.
25This way of framing the mandate drew on a particular vision of public administration. The DOE staff saw
their central activity as the choice between options that provide different distributions of costs and benefits.
The 'signature' of this approach is the assumption "that it is possible for the policy analyst to estimate the
quantities of benefits stemming from a (usually governmental) project under alternative designs, the
quantities of things being used up or reduced, and the prices that should be associated with both ends of this
equation. Given this information, the analyst is to choose that design which maximizes the difference
between benefits and costs ... [T]he problem seems largely to be one of measurement, the conversion of
costs and benefits into some common denominator," and of aggregating these benefits with respect to a set
of decision rules. Tribe,1972.
26 For a more in depth discussion of this approach to discounting see Parfit, 1984. pp. 480-486.
2 7 This is the first half a view expressed by Norgaard and Howarth (1991). The focus of their effort in not
on characterizing investments, but on differentiating investments from another, probably broader, category
of choices about what they call "transfers." These are explicitly about equity and are distorted when they
are represented as investments. They cite Markandya and Pearce's analysis of the distorting effect of the
discount rate on investments (1998).
expenditures made to save lives in the future appear to be much less effective than expenditures
that will save lives today."
[A] complete loss of the world's GNP a hundred years from now would be worth about one
million dollars today if discounted by the present prime rate.29
Moreover, discounting, without some underlying reason that makes sense (such as
declining probability or marginal value of consumption), violates ideas about impartiality
in an unacceptable way. Anand and Sen state the issue clearly.
What is the basis for such an assumption [that future generations well-being should be discounted
at a positive rate]? Ramsey had himself " . . .assumed that we do not discount later enjoyments in
comparison with earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the
weakness of the imagination. Pigou felt that although "everybody prefers present pleasures or
satisfactions of given magnitude to future pleasures or satisfaction of equal magnitude, even when
the latter are perfectly certain to occur", "this preference for present pleasure . .. implies only that
our telescopic faculty is defective." Roy Harrod went even further and suggested that: "Time
preference in this sense is a human infirmity.. . On the assumption that a government is capable
of planning what is best for its subjects, it will pay no attention to pure time preference, a polite
expression for rapacity and the conquest of reason by passion. Finally, Solow argues that: "In
social decision-making . . . there is no excuse for treating generations unequally, and the time-
horizon is, or should be, very long. In solemn conclave assembled, so to speak, we ought to act as
if the social rate of time preference were zero (though we simultaneously discount future
consumption if we expect the future to be richer than the present)." . . . These arguments are
arguments about impartiality with respect to time: well-being at one point in time should not count
for more than well-being at another.
The NAPA panel's attempt to develop principles for decision-making is characterized
by an effort to respond to the tension raised by these apparently opposing views of
discounting. Several distinctions were critical in the development of their approach. One
was provided by Norgaard and Howarth who differentiated resource use as an
investment--which is appropriately judged by standards of efficiency using discounting--
from resource use as "intergenerational distribution" which is explicitly an ethical and
political question.31 This analysis was buttressed by observations like Lind's32 that "for
28 U.S. EPA, 1987.
29 Brown, 1991, in Catron, 1994, p. 130.
30 Anand and Sen, 1994, p. 66 Ramsey (1928:543), Pigou [1932: 24-25) Harrod (1948: 37-40); Solow
(1974: 9)
31 "The future will unfold from the choices, including sacrifices, made by our ancestors and those we make
ourselves. The ongoing discussion within the profession of economics and international development
agencies as to whether sustainable development and intergenerational equity can be addressed through ad
hoc manipulations of the discount rate are rooted in an inappropriate theoretical framing of the choices
long term policies, the benefit-cost rationale for discounting breaks down and must be
reestablished on principles incorporating intergenerational equity."
This distinction between investment and equity helped break the unity of discounting
as a problem, and facilitated a disaggregation of the problem into a more manageable set
of issues. This was an important step in the panel's effort to build a response that was
theoretically sound and responsive the practical demands of administrators. Once the
problem was disaggregated, they were able to differentiate classes to which they could
apply a more localized logic that responded to the character of the class. For instance
they separated human life and money--"It may be inappropriate to use the same discount
factor for money and for human life" and consumption choices for which substitutes were
available from ones where they were not.33 This was consistent with the panel's
conclusion that that it was not possible to resolve the problem of discounting as a whole
or as a matter of analysis.3 4
before us. Questions which are fundamentally matter of equity should be treated as such. If we are
concerned about the distribution of welfare across generations, then we should transfer wealth, not engage
in inefficient investments. Transfer mechanisms might include setting aside natural resources and
protecting environments, educating the young, and developing technologies for the sustainable
management of renewable resources. Some of these might be viewed as worthwhile investments on the
part of this generation, but if their intent is to function as transfers, then they should not be evaluated as
investments. The benefits from transfers, in short, should not be discounted. Limiting how we evaluate
choices with respect to the future to merely investment criteria could be a tragic mistake .. .The
relationship between economic and environmental systems must be understood to make effective public
choices about how income should be distributed across generations. By putting these environmental
considerations into the arena of public choice our framing assumes politically functional societies. We
would rather further the development of functioning political societies than presume this possibility away
through the derivation and imposition of environmental constraints imposed directly at the bureaucratic
level." Norgaard and Howarth, 1991, pp. 98-99. One of the subtleties of their argument is the
demonstration that "the interest rate itself is a function of the distribution of wealth between generations."
90.
Lind, 1990.
3 Catron et al, 1994, p.4
3 They cite D'Arge and Spash, 1991:"Because of classical and new problems in valuing public goods, it is
currently impossible to quantitatively estimate the amount of optimal compensation [to future generations
for environmental damage caused by the present generation]."
The NAPA panei's approach to the problem of devising practical principles that
could guide decision-making built on this logic of classes and drew on a similar logic in
cost-benefit analysis. They differentiated classes of risks, costs, and benefits and used
distinctions drawn from the discussion of discounting to develop rules for assessing
tradeoffs that made sense for the class. 35 For instance, "commercial/ material, ecological,
and aesthetic/existence values" would be discounted using different rates (including
zero).
For projects that affect the current generation, commercial/material benefits and costs can be
discounted, with the choice or rate depending of the project ... Similarly, ecological damage that
affects a single generation may be discounted, though the choice of rate is again problematic, It
may be inappropriate to discount aesthetic/existence values since their value may not be time
dependent and substitute goods may not exist.36
An important class in their taxonomy was a meta-distinction that invoked a
prohibition against discounting. This involved the application of the "Precautionary
Principle" to identify and give special consideration to actions that had potentially
irreversible or catastrophic effects. The intent was to identify and avoid, if possible,
actions that may have irreversible or catastrophic effects.3 7
This approach carried over to the recommendations that the NAPA panel made.
These recommendations took the extant discensus about the use of discounting as their
point of departure:
3 "As Cline (1992) suggests, benefits and costs should be separated into categories ... Intergenerational
equity issues aside, each of these categories can be discounted using different rates. These rates may be
determined in a variety of ways that reflect their relationship with time, markets and individual
preferences." Catron et al, 1994, p. 9
6 Catron et al, 1994, p. 9.
37 "First, the Precautionary Principle: Will the project impose catastrophic risks or damages on another
generation? ... If the answer is that there is no catastrophic risk, then Burton's method would be applied to
material/commercial and ecological benefits and costs, each using a different intergenerational and
intertemporal discount rate. However, if the answer is yes, there is catastrophic risk, then another question
must be asked: Can we take steps to substantially reduce risk without compromising our well being?"
Catron et al, 1994, p. 9.
"Given all these arguments we are left with a need to make decisions that involve balancing risks and
benefits between present and future generations without agreed-on, definitive analytic tools."38
Their "Proposed Intergenerational Equity Principles"3 9 acknowledged the "absence of a
viable and defensible discounting technique" but still attempted to "provide guidance
(though not 'definitive solutions') to decisions-makers." 40 This "guidance" was provided
by the "Equity Principles." These represent a creative effort to balance the tension that
characterized the discussion of discounting by separating cases where and way which
discounting may be appropriate, from others where not only is discounting inappropriate
but equity demands an affirmative response by the present generation.
The overarching principle in the NAPA approach tied an acknowledgment of
forbearance to a recognition exigency: "No generation should (needlessly) deprive its
successors of the opportunity to enjoy a quality of life equivalent to its own."4' The
"Principles" themselves develop this theme by fixing the responsibility of the current
generation as a "Trustee for those [generations] that follow," and then balancing this
sense of responsibility with the recognition that in some cases current needs and demands
will loom large. This elevation of the present will effectively discount the future.
This was counterbalanced, in turn, first by the demand to always look for catastrophic
effects, second, by the requirement to provide reasons when giving priority to the present,
and finally, by acknowledging an affirmative responsibility to fulfill ethical obligations
by making transfers. Thus the principles "should be viewed in relation to each other and
38 Catron, 1994. Professor Catron was Research Director of the NAPA project.
39 DOE/NAPA Principles of Intergenerational Equity, DRAFT, April 1995.
40 Catron, 1994, p. 132. The other half of the NAPA approach was to acknowledge the "vast uncertainty
about the far future" and to "focus on what we pass on to the next generation."
4' Ibid., p. 134. The word "needlessly" is bracketed to reflect "a fundamental point of disagreement
whether living generation are ethically permitted under any circumstances to knowingly deprive those yet
unborn of equal opportunity. Some believe that no circumstances would warrant intentional serious
degradation of the future quality of life, while others believe that, under some circumstances, the quality of
current life takes priority." Ibid. p. 135.
not in isolation, since some tend to favor the present over the future and others the
reverse." 42
This tension or interplay between the demands of the future and the present is clear,
for instance, in the second principle which acknowledges that "there is an obligation to
protect the future generations" but includes an escape clause, "provided the interests of
the present generation and its immediate offspring are not jeopardized." This theme is
carried over into the third principle which acknowledges that "near-term concrete hazards
have priority over long-term hypothetical hazards." 43 The "preference for the present and
the near future" is circumscribed, however, in the next principle when it is presumed to
be "reduced" when "questions of irreversible harm are concerned." This same kind of
balancing is reflected in the fifth principle which invokes a prohibition on actions that
"pose a plausible threat of catastrophic effects," unless there is "some significant
countervailing need."
This elaboration of the discounting problem reflects a general trend in the NAPA
process. First, by maintaining the focus on tradeoffs, it responded to the persistent and
strong preference at the DOE for resolving ethical questions in terms that were consistent
with their methods of analysis and decision-making. Despite this strong preference for
definitive criteria, the best they could do was to describe "policy criteri[a] that [are]
operationally decisive under a wide variety of circumstances." 44 The bulk of outcome of
the NAPA effort was probably better described as a set of principles that "required
further iteration to provide operational guidance to decision-makers" that "no matter how
4 2 Catron, 1994, p. 134.
4 Note that this principle tries to disentangle remoteness in time as a proxy for uncertainty from pure time
preference.
fully iterated" could never "be definitive in giving optimal answers." The NAPA panel
described the role of these principles as an "aid in judgment, not a substitute for
judgment." 45
Before moving ahead let me briefly describe the other component of the NAPA
panel's practical principles of intergenerational equity. The principles were also
distinguished by the effort to respond to the "vast uncertainty" that characterizes the
relationship between the present and the future, particularly the distant future.46 They
tried to capture this quality of intergenerational relationships in their notion of a "rolling
present." This rolling present is an acknowledgement that any effort to balance the
present and the future must address the "vast uncertainty" that characterizes this
relationship, particularly as it is mediated by predictive models. The NAPA principles
interpreted this uncertainty as focusing attention and decision-making on the more
immediate and tangible future in terms of the succeeding generation. 47 This attention is
qualified in an important way, however, by the recognition that the succeeding generation
has to be left in a position to fulfill a similar set of obligations to the generation that
follows it.48
"Catron, 1994. p. 138. He is discussing the Precautionary Principle here, but the goals he described in
treating this aspect of the criteria as desirable reflects the broader priorities of the NAPA/DOE project.
4 Ibid., p. 134.
46 This is a broad issue. See, for instance, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1991. This discussion also overlaps with
the analysis of "man-made" systems. See Wynne, 1988 and Pidgeon, 1997.
4 "Another strategy that recognized the limitations of our ability to 'balance' between present and future
because of vast uncertainty about the far future is to focus on what we pass on to the next generation."
Catron 1994. P. 132. (author's emphasis)
48 Here it draws on ideas developed by Howarth, 1992. Howarth describes each generation as facing
complex moral obligations to the generation that follows, where part of the test of meeting these obligations
is that they leave the subsequent generation in a position to meet its equally complex and moral obligations
to the generation that follows it.
THE PROBLEM IS POLITICAL
This reinterpretation of the discounting problem into a set of principles of
intergenerational equity and focus on the "rolling present" moved the NAPA panel's
definition of the problem further away from DOE's strong and persistent desire to capture
the problem in terms of decision-making criteria.49 The discussion moved closer and
closer to the view that what was at issue was not so much a "technical problem to be
solved, but a situation to be managed over time."5 0 Even as they sought to elaborate an
analytic framework, the terms in which the panel described the problem and their
recommendations became increasingly political and procedural.
This turn is apparent in their effort to outline an "ideal temporal decision process"
after a period of broader consultation they called a "DesignShop." They saw this as a
process that: "is open, transparent, and seeks out and utilizes public participation at all of
its crucial stages;" that can be trusted because it is "honest and realistic" and "includes
forms of evaluation and frank assessment of results;" that is "linked to current . . .
institutions and decision processes;" and finally that is "capable ofdealing with the many
values and interests involved and that will make explicit the values upon which decisions
are based."5 1
This attention to process signified an important turn in the NAPA panel's effort. The
outcome of their analysis was to frame intergenerational ethics as apolitical challenge.
Moreover, the way the political challenge was framed put the emphasis squarely on the
49 To the extent that they moved in this direction they were moving against the grain of DOE's wishes.
Interview with Andrew Wallo III of the DOE,
downstream side of the DOE's decision-making, particularly on its relationship with the
pt blic. The NAPA panel noted a number of areas in which the DOE should focus on its
upstream interactions with Congress and the Presidency, though not the courts.52 The
overwhelming focus, however, was on the downstream side, particularly on the
interaction with the public. This was articulated as a need to rebuild trust:
The overreaching concept generic to every discussion was that the process could succeed if
built on trust.
And a correlative need to involve the public in its decision-making:
A group consensus developed that the approach to removing ... public mistrust of the Department
of Energy was through aggressive, open and continuous public participation. Several participants
emphasized that unless this public participation is truly open and reflected in decision making, the
public will become increasingly cynical toward the participation process itself, further building on
the mistrust."
Notice that, as the importance of participation is acknowledged, the focus of
participation is to restore trust in the DOE. This suggests the distinctive way in which the
DOE and the NAPA understood participation and its tie to trust and legitimacy. While
the evidence is sketchy, I will try to bring out the character of thei aderstanding, since it
is interesting in its own right and provides a clear contrast to the case I will turn to in
Chapter 3.
Let me begin by recapping some salient characteristics of the DOE's and NAPA's
approach to the problem raised by intergenerational ethics. Throughout, they treated the
problem as demanding the extension and development of the methods that defined their
approach to public administration, but not as challenging them in a fundamental way.
so The quote is from summary of opinions compiled by the OECD from a 1994 Conference Proceeding of
an International Workshop organized by the Nuclear Energy Agency in co-operation with the Environment
Directorate, Paris 1-2 September 1994. Paris: OECD.
NAPA DesignShop Synthesis, 1994.
5 2For instance, they suggested that the Federal government should institute a requirement for a
"generational impact statement" for all major decisions.
5 NAPA DesignSHop Journal, 1994, p. 253
This was clearest in the effort to sustain the focus on tradeoffs and to summarize the
ethical problem in terms of decision-making criteria. The focus of the DOE's and
NAPA's effort was to find a way to represent the problem in the vocabulary of
established methods. Given the challenges the agency faced, particularly their need to
make multiple complex decisions in a situation where they lacked trust and legitimacy,
this focus makes sense.
I want to try to show now that the turn to a political framing of the issue was not a
turn away from this emphasis on method. Rather than repudiate their earlier efforts, the
turn to public participation confirmed the depth of the DOE's faith in administration as
the source of public agency and in formal method as the best hope for reason. The effort
to restore legitimacy focused on restoring trust in the agency and its status as the locus of
legitimate action. At each step, the political process was preceded and shaped by an
understanding of formal decision-making methods. Let me turn to some examples that
illustrate these points.
Consider the "method to genuinely involve the public in the evaluation and decision-
making process" that the NAPA panel outlined. 54 Step one is the "delineation of the
issue" which is shaped by the "public (including all stakeholders)." Step two is the
"definition" of "alternative solutions and criteria for evaluating those solutions" which is
done through a "collaboration" between the DOE and the "public." Step three is taken to
"help assure that decisions are legitimate and acceptable." It involves the selection of "an
independent review panel ... by the stakeholders -- not DOE." To guarantee the
legitimacy of the process this review panel "ensure[s] thatproper evaluation criteria
were used." (emphasis added) This panel then presents the results of its "analysis" in an
open forum, after which the DOE "makes the final decision" with the proviso that it
"fully ccnsider . . . the advice and information obtained through the process, and fully
explain the basis for its decision."
Notice that the guarantor of legitimacy is the "review panel" whose status is grounded
by its independence. The legitimacy of the process is based on assurance that "proper
evaluation criteria were used." This is the kind of deep faith in method I referred to
above. The status of method as prior to and shaping participation is also apparent in the
epilogue to this description of process.
The belief was, however, that the process could be streamlined over time as trust and knowledge
of values and attitudes improve, transforming DOE's consideration of generational issues into an
effective and efficient process through public debate. This long-term evaluative process should
have the dual effect of informing the DOE of stakeholder attitudes and generating public trust.5
The contribution of political participation is to build "knowledge of values" in the
administration and inform the DOE of "stakeholder attitudes." This knowledge
summarizes what is important about citizen participation. Access to this knowledge is
the key to reestablishing trust in the DOE. Once it is secure the process can be
"streamlined" to be more efficient. The DOE is the repository of this knowledge about
values and the locus of trust and public agency.
Let me turn now to a second example. Here the NAPA panel was trying to describe
the interplay between administrative decision-making and the interpretation of public
values that they saw as important and as underlying legitimate public action.
In addition to objective data and analysis, decisions affecting future generations are necessarily
based on values. When evaluating the risks, benefits, and costs involved in the various decisions
and actions taken consistent with these principles, it must be recognized that public values are an
integral part of those risks, benefits and costs; so they must befactored into the underlying
evaluation of the results of decisions and actions. It is necessaryfor the public administrator to
determine the range of societal values that affect a decision and incorporate those values in the
decision makingprocess. These values help interpret the specific meanings of the principles as
54 NAPA, DesignShop Synthesis, 1994.
* Ibid., p. 4
well as determine the relative weighting. The values used should be explicitly discussed and
explanation given for their choice and weight of relative importance. Doing so helps build public
trust and confidence in the process as well as increase public involvement and responsibility for
actions. 6 (emphasis added)
The key to understanding the distinctive character of the public role and the basis for
legitimacy is to note who is acting and how the public role is divided between
administrators and citizens. The administrator is the agent who tries to read or interpret
the "range of societal values that affect a decision" and then "incorporate those in the
decision-making process." The obligation this puts on the administrator is to use these
values to "interpret the specific meaning of the principles" and "determine the relative
weighting." Trust and confidence (and presumably legitimacy) are based on how clearly
these values are reflected in the administrative decisions.
Method is prior to participation, and the importance of participation is to ensure an
accurate depiction of the values required for the application of method. What is
important about citizens is captured in these values. To engage and understand these
values, the administrative method is extended beyond "objective data and analysis" to an
effort to elicit and record the subjective attitudes of the public. Method defines reasoned
action and shapes the participation of citizens.
This rendering of the interiction between decision-making and values is consistent
with a presentation made by Janice Longstreth, one of the primary organizers of the
DOE/NAPA project. She was responding to the need to "recognize and confront the
inseparable fusion of facts and values in ... risk assessment." There are strong
similarities between NAPA's characterization of intergenerational issues as an interplay
between objective analysis and the interpretation of public values and her depiction of
56 DOE/NAPA Principles of Intergenerational Equity, DRAFT, April 1995.
"human health risk assessment and ecological risk assessments" as processes that "will
continue to have values integrally intertwined with scientific facts." The key to making
"progress" which she identified resonates with NAPA's description of the administrator's
role and responsibility with respect to the public. This key is to improve our
understanding of "human decision-making behavior" in order to "elicit value judgments
in a way that will help us decide what we really want to do.""
This rendering is also consistent with the approach the NAPA panel used in their one
effort at public participation. The "DesignShop" they organized was intended to be an
open, communicative process, in which everyone was equal.58 It was intended to build a
better understanding of public values and of the substantive issues. At every step,
however, the interaction of the participants was shaped by a formal method which was
not open to review or amendment. This independent validity of method, which was
expressed by its status prior to participation, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of
the DOE/NAPA approach to public participation, to incorporating values into
administration, and to establishing the legitimacy of public action.
These examples give a sense of the way in which the political challenge raised by
intergenerational problems would be addressed. Existing methods would be extended to
capture subjective value judgments and represent them in the administrative process. The
focus of the effort throughout was to restore trust in the DOE and its status as the locus of
legitimacy. Once the status of the agency was restored the significance of participation
would diminish.
" Longstreth. 1992.
" These comments are based on my participation in the event.
Despite their strong predisposition to resolve the problem in terms of criteria, the
DOE's effort to engage intergenerational ethics in an administrative context reinterpreted
problems like discounting and the management of uncertainty in a way that demanded
discussion of "public values" and the involvement of citizens. This did not change their
understanding of substantive character of administrative action, however. They
interpreted the problem to demand an extension of established methods, which would
shape participation when it was needed.
Within these methods, citizens' status as free and equal would be reflected by their
opportunity to influence the specification of values that would, in turn, guide decision-
making. The test of legitimacy would be the agreement between the DOE's rendering
and the public's understanding of values and interests. This faith in method is thus a faith
in the separability, completeness, and stability of values. It is also, if not a pessimism,
then at least an agnosticism about the ability of people to reason directly about
complicated issues, to communicate with each other persuasively about their different
experiences of the world, and to devise appropriate tests for their understanding.
Let me try now to raise the significance of these commitments by briefly highlighting
an alternative understanding of the status of citizens and the role and importance of
participation. In this view, which I will develop in Chapter Three, it is precisely
individuals' ability to function as the agents rather than as the objects of reasons that
defines their status as citizens and shapes their role in the political process. 59 This role in
turn, opens a new way to understand legitimacy as rooted directly in popular
59 For more general discussions of this topic see Rawls 1985, discussion of the "conception of the person as
citizen." P. 240 f. Benhabib, 1992 pp. 4-17, and Frankfurt 1971.
authorization. 60 This, in turn, demands a reassessment of the administrative role and the
way in which questions about value that define the political process are engaged. At the
same time, it opens new possibilities for engaging questions about ethical responsibilities
that are central to the basis of legitimacy in a democratic state. In Chapter Three I
develop these possibilities through a detailed examination of a case that illustrates the
possibilities and difficulties involved in basing legitimacy in the deliberations of citizens.
' This is a broad topic of discussion that is known as deliberative democracy. One of the foundational
discussions is Cohen, 1989. Elster 1986, also offers a good summary of the basic insights. For a review
and critical discussion see Habermas, 1996. 287-328
Chapter 3
Creating the Historical Present
In Chapter Two I examined the efforts of the Department of Energy to address
concerns about intergenerational ethics in the context of their administrative practice.
Their effort focused initially on developing program of research that could guide
decision-making through the development of a set guidelines or principles for
intergenerational decision-making. This research only deepened the tensions they had
already experienced in practice, however. When they were unable to resolve these
tensions through research and analysis, they focused their attention on the need for
public involvement. They came to see engaging the public a necessary step in their effort
to reach an interpretation of intergenerational obligations they could consider legitimate.
The DOE understood the interaction between the agency and the public in a distinctive
way, as an administrative effort to read and capture a set of public values that should
regulate social choices.
In this chapter I look at a contrasting case. Here the administrative actor, the Maine
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority (the Authority) also turned to public
involvement when they faced a decision with strong intergenerational implications. They
took a very different approach to the interaction between citizens and adminitration,
however. The Authority created a forum that involved citizens directly in the review of
technical information, the interpretation of political commitments, and the shaping of
policy. Given the latitude to reason freely with each other and to engage policy issues
and problems directly, the participants invented multiple, overlapping ways to bring
concerns about future generations into their conversation. It would not be inaccurate to
summarize these tropes and strategies as an effort to have a Zonversation with the future.
A substantial part of this effort can be understood as an attempt to found their
conversation in a legitimate moral and political act that they were the authors of and were
willing to take responsibility for. This foundation of legitimacy was created in the way
the way people talked to each other and the way they treated the substance of the
conversation. It was expressed at the level of discursive practice..
The participants emphasized the intergenerational context in which their conversation
was situated from the outset. This, along with the open and flexible groundrules,
encouraged the participants to take responsibility for the terms on which their
conversation was conducted and its significance for future generations. This was
expressed internally in an emphasis reason giving, an effort to understand each other, and
an ongoing attempt to test substantive propositions, including a consistent effort to test
their implications for the future. There were similarities to Elster's description of
participants in constituent assemblies. Conscious that they were creating a "framework
for an indefinite future" the CAG members recognized the importance of impartial
argument (as opposed to bargaining).'
In this chapter I review four episodes from the history of the Citizens Advisory Group
(CAG). First, I describe the background atmosphere of crisis in which the CAG was
created. Then I turn to three episodes where the participants attempted to express their
self-consciousness about the historical significance their deliberations might have for
future generations, in the way they treated the present. In the first episode, they treated
goals and questions as potentially controversial and in need of being validated as self-
given. In the second episode, they treated technical knowledge as potentially corrigible,
and tried to reflect this prospectively historical sensibility i.; the way they framed the
discussion and the understanding they took from it.2 Finally, in the last episode they
reframed their understanding of the problem, from disposal to storage, to reflect their
sense that practice is inherently incomplete.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
What follows is an account of the deliberations of a Citizen's Advisory Group (CAG)
in Maine during the summer and fall of 1989.3 The CAG was composed of
representatives of a wide variety of groups in the state who were concerned with or used
radioactive waste or who might be implicated in some aspect of the management of a
radioactive waste disposal facility. I will focus on the early stages of these deliberations
when participants discussed their sense of the significance of this endeavor and
established the grounds on which they would move forward. Before turning to this
discussion, however, I provide a brief introduction to how the CAG came to be
established by the Maine Low Level Radioactive Waste Authority (the Authority).
The CAG's origin is in the 1985 Congressional Amendments to the Low Level
Radioactive Waste Act of 1980.4 The act of the Legislature of the State of Maine that
Elster, 1991. Pp. 4-5
2 On the idea of prospective reasoning see Wheeler 1987.
3 This Chapter is based on several sessions of the Citizen's Advisory Group. The quotes from the sessions
were transcribed by the author from audio and video records of the meetings.
4Low-level waste is a catch all term for radioactive waste not specifically classified as high-level waste. It
does not include fuel rods for nuclear reactors or radioactive wastes from weapons manufacturing. It does
include resins, filters, oils, sludges, and decommissioned parts from power plants, medical and biological
wastes, clothing and tools, and gaseous effluents. Low-level radioactive waste is differentiated into three
classes. Class A waste (90-95% of the waste shipped for disposal) is not required to be in structurally
stable form for disposal and is expected to decay to background conditions in approximately 50 years.
Class B wastes ((5-10% by volume) require disposal in a structurally stable form and in a manner that
prevents human exposure for up to 100 years. Class C wastes (<1% by volume) also require a structurally
stable form and a manner of disposal that precludes accidental use (anticipating that the site might be
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created the Authority in 1987 was responding to the 1980 Act and the 1985 Amendments.
The Congressional legislation transferred responsibility for low-level radioactive waste to
the states, set strict milestones, and threatened states that did not meet these milestones
with penalties.5
States could meet the federal mandate either by joining in a disposal compact with
other states or siting a disposal facility. Maine pursued both options. In Maine, the
Governor's office held the responsibility for negotiating a compact. Responsibility for
the in-state option of siting and operating a facility was given to the Authority by the
Maine Legislature.
This meant that the Authority, at the moment it was created, stood at the end of a long
continuum of federal and state legislation that set goals to require and create the
responsibility to site and design a facility in Maine. In addition, both federal and state
legislation set standards and conditions that the Authority would have to meet in fulfilling
this requirement.
The state legislation had a distinctive feature that complicated the Authority's task.
Any decision that the Authority made about where to site an in-state facility would have
to be approved in three separate votes. The most serious of these tests was the sixty per
cent supra-majority that was required in a local referendum. The law also required
simple majorities in a vote of the legislature and a state-wide referendum. Thus, the
Authority was given responsibility for coming up with a proposal that could meet these
tests and was given no coercive powers. Even the power of eminent domain was
abandoned) for up to 500 years. A structurally stable waste form is one that is capable of supporting for a
minimum of 300 years any material, waste or otherwise, that is placed over it. Mixed wastes in which low-
level wastes are mixed with other wastes that may themselves be corrosive, ignitable, flammable, or toxic
are also included in the general class of low-level waste.
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reserved. Any decisions the Authority made would eventually have to be able to win the
consent of those who would be affected by them.
The early history of the Authority is a history of discovering .ow difficult achieving
consent would be in the highly charged arena of nuclear politics in Maine. The issue had
been politicized by ongoing debates over the future of the state's sole nuclear power plant
-- Maine Yankee -- and previous efforts by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to
review (and eventually discard) Maine as a candidate for the federal high level waste
repository.
From the beginning, even the bodies that were responsible for creating and supporting
the Authority wanted nothing to do with it. In the words of one of its original members,
the Authority was from the beginning a "bastard child" of the Legislature, created
because they "had to come up with to something."6 From his perspective, the
Legislature did not want to have much to do with the Authority once it was created, nor
did Maine Yankee, which paid most of the Authority's bills.7
The Authority began by trying to get out and discuss their responsibility with citizens
in meetings across the state. A number of factors probably contributed to this decision.
They lacked the formal authority to push a decision through and clearly did not have the
political support in the Legislature to force a choice. They also faced quite explicitly the
need for local consent. The DOE's failures may have demonstrated just how difficult it
can be for an administrative body to make progress without public support. They were
also Maine citizens themselves. They may just not have been able to think of anything
5 These penalties were understood most seriously to include denial of access to existing disposal facilities
in South Carolina, Nevada, and Washington.
6Tom Easter, Authority Member. Interviewed on September 16 and 17, 1996.
else to do. The outcome was that the Authority members tried to go out to meet the
people of Maine, tell citizens who they were, and explain what they were trying to do.
These early attempts to start a conversation failed. The Authority members found
that either "people didn't care or they cared a whole lot." Their attempts to meet or talk to
people in general terms failed to generate interest. When they tried to provide information
or publicize what they were doing, they had difficulty attracting attention, much less
interaction. If there was any suggestion that their interest was specific, however, and
might foreshadow the siting of a low-level radioactive waste facility there was more than
sufficient interest. The problem was that this interest was expressed in a way that
preempted the kind of conversation they wanted to have. They would arrive in towns
where they thought people would never have heard of them to find a people interested in
meeting the "devil incarnate." The organizational tactics and rhetoric of opposition they
faced were corrosive of any possibility of conversation or mutual understanding.
Two incidents that occurred relatively close together in time and space illustrate this
problem as it appeared to members of the Authority. In an effort to provide the public
with information about radioactive waste disposal and to engage their concerns, the
Authority had organized an informational fair at the University of Maine in Farmington.
This event was intended to cultivate interest and provide citizens with information on
what low-level radioactive waste is, on what the Authority's responsibilities were, and on
the approach they were taking to fulfill these responsibilities. To promote the legitimacy
7Maine Yankee operated Maine's only nuclear power plant in Wiscasset, and was the state's primary
producer of radioactive waste. Since the Authority was funded by an assessment on producers that was
based on volume, Maine Yankee footed most of the bill.
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of this event they provided space for critics and invited some of the organized anti-
nuclear groups in the state to participate. Three members of the public showed up. 8
Less than four months after this nonevent, a farmer in Industry, Maine (a community
not far from Farmington) offered several hundred acres of land to the Authority for
consideration as a site. Shortly after the offer was made, the Authority scheduled a
meeting ir Industry to explain how they intended to proceed and to listen to local
concerns. Tom Eastler, a member of the Authority, remembers sitting at the front desk in
Town Hall as "all hell broke loose." People were streaming in, inflamed by the prospect
that a disposal facility might be sited nearby. He remembers a colleague from the
University with no background as an activist waving people in shouting, "Come in. Our
lives count on it. We're going to be destroyed." The conversation that the Authority had
hoped to initiate never got off the ground as the event degenerated into shouting,
sloganeering, and name calling.
The opposition did not stop at name calling however. The farmer who offered the
land, another couple who offered to provide the Authority with access to view the site
(after others had refused similar requests), and an Authority member who lived nearby
became targets for vandalism and personal attacks. The farmer's barn was covered with
epithets and tacks were scattered across a road at the place he crossed with his tractor.
The wife of the couple who agreed to provide access to view the site was followed to the
grocery store and booby-traps were placed behind her tires. She was then paged and told
her house was on fire; as she left the store in haste all her tires were destroyed. The
8 The actual figure may not be accurate. What it conveys is Authority members' sense of the relative
response and of their failure to get the kind of turnout they hoped for.
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Authority member, who voted against the Industry site, got up one morning to find his
barn covered with graffiti.
This is an extreme example of the resistance that Authority members met. They
consistently found themselves facing a public mobilized by the efforts of an organized
and informed network of anti-nuclear activists. This network had organized originally to
fight the U.S. Department of Energy's consideration of Maine as a possible site for a high
level waste repository. While the DOE eventually dropped Maine from consideration,
the influence of the experience persisted in an organized and informed grassroots
opposition.
As the pattern of these experiences became clear, Authority members came to expect
controversy and an "enforced public scrutiny" provided by the "ex-officio citizens group"
of anti-nuclear activists. This group shadowed or anticipated every move the Authority
made, yet was not bound by any commitments to make public policy. The CAG was an
effort to make this scrutiny explicit and provide a forum to engage it.
Facing an organized opposition and the need for consent in order to make progress,
Authority members decided they "had to get some credibility as an organization
attempting to do the best thing for the State of Maine." They decided to try something
bold and turned the process upside down from what most other states were doing. Rather
than make a decision and then consult with the public, they decided to "share the burden
of making decisions with as much of the population as they could."9 In hindsight, it
looks like the Authority was trying to create a political forum that would bring some of
the energy they had encountered as opposition to the prospective outlook they had been
trying in vain to create. They also sought to bring a broader group together that might
buffer the influence of antinuclear activists and share the charge they had been given by
the Legislature.
Rather than try to bring such a group together on their own, the Authority contracted
with an independent provider of mediation and facilitation services to help them set a up
and manage citizens' group that would provide advice on the decisions they faced,
interact with the Authority's technical consultants, and through its activities lend
legitimacy to the whole process. Invitations to participate in the CAG process were sent
to 172 different group in Maine. Sixty-four responded. Fifty-two said they would like to
participate; four asked to be kept advised. Only eight actually said no.
This brings us to the first meeting of the CAG in June of 1989. In the remainder of
this chapter I will take a detailed look at the first few meetings of the CAG when many of
the basic issues about political identity were resolved. The efforts of these individuals as
a group to identify and sort out questions about what they were doing and how to proceed
raised concerns about the relationship between the present process and future residents of
Maine and gives a practical sense of what it would mean to treat the present as historical.
TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENDS
In this section I will relate the story of the CAG's effort to establish an identity by
reaching agreement on its goals and internal standards of participation. The group's
refusal to accept the relationships, responsibilities, and standards that were presented as
given was the first step in constructing an independent basis for action that I will call the
historical present. The group's effort to articulate an independent vision of their role
reflects a commitment to take responsibility for the grounds on which they would act.
9Tom Eastler interview.
My account will follow the chronology of the process and trace three events: the tacit
framing of a role for the CAG with the introduction of the institutional context, the effort
of CAG members to confront and critique this identity, and the efforts by CAG members
to revise this identity by settmg their own goals.
The tacit framing began at the first CAG meeting. Three presentations made at this
meeting introduced the new CAG members to the administrative history and context in
which the CAG had been created. Each of these presentations provided an overview of
the legislative actions that created the Authority, articulated the mandate this set for the
Authority, and outlined the administrative process by which the Authority had interpreted
this mandate into a series of technical questions about siting. These questions that the
Authority was seeking advice on--about what criteria should be used to exclude
inappropriate areas and establish preferences among areas that weren't excluded, and
what kinds of benefits should be offered to communities that would consider hosting a
facility--were put forward as the mandate on which the CAG would be constituted.
These institutional facts were necessary background for CAG members to proceed
with a sense of history and of how their activities fit in the broader institutional
framework. The mandate framed by extending this chain of relationships was more
problematic, however.
In fact, the role that was framed posed a tension for CAG members. They were asked
to speak as citizens for the broad interests of the people of the state and the concerns of
those who would have to live with whatever facility was built. At the same time, they
were supposed to speak to a set of administratively defined questions put to them by the
Authority. Accepting the latter mandate, as such, would have meant accepting as given
everything that had been decided, assumed, or taken for granted in the administrative
chain. This would eventually raise a conflict with the former mandate as it came to be
understood.
This tension between CAG members standing as citizens and as administrative actors,
fueled a dynamic that led to members' refusal to accept the role initially framed for them
and to frame new goals and a new focus. These efforts highlighted their standing as
citizens, the status of citizens as representatives of an ongoing political association, and
the ties this created to present and future citizens who could not participate. The goals of
the group that were eventually agreed on shaped a focus on the concerns with broad
primary interests (like safety) and tied enduring relationships (that extended to future
generations) to CAG members' status as interlocutors in a deliberation.
The interplay that led to this interpretation was instigated by the tacit framing that
occurred as the exposition of administrative 'facts' began to shape a political identity for
the group by transferring assumptions, opening some questions and closing off others,
and suggesting standards that would govern the CAG's relationship to the Authority and
other administrative bodies.' 0
Opening the institutional frame to examination was difficult for the group to
accomplish (as it is to document) because so much of initial framing was tacit. Indeed,
the first challenge the group faced was transforming the conversation from a level that
emphasized the status of statements about the institutional context as facts to one that
emphasized their status as choices and commitments. This transition was necessary
before the group could explore the implications of the assumptions, agenda, and
standards of judgment it was being asked to adopt, and test these against members' views
about what was important about their participation.
The transition was difficult for a number of reasons. It was hard for the group to
surface assumptions, choices, and proposals in a way that would reveal their controversial
character." What needed to be done to transform discomfort with the mandate into a
critique was not obvious. The group had to conceptualize what was being asked of them
in a way that could help them identify what it was about this request that made them
uncomfortable. Then they needed to say why.
This presented a challenge because what they were reacting to was effectively a
shadow or negative image. It was doubly frustrating, because the exposition of facts that
constituted the positive image was internally consistent and made sense as such.
Challenges risked sounding absurd, yet were necessary to surface commitments in a way
they could be confronted. I will now try to show in more detail how this tension arose,
why it was difficult to confront, and how CAG members eventually managed to do so.
Confronting what is given - The framing of the group's role began with the letter of
invitation CAG members received. This letter invited them to join a group that would
"advise [the Authority] on key decisions that will needed to be made in the siting
process," beginning with "assisting[ing] the Authority in developing environmental and
'
0 A clear example of this is the convening of a trial where the exposition of the context sets a specific
focus and a strong set of rules that will govern the internal relationship ofjurors and their relationship to the
court.
"I want to be clear that in tracing this process I am not trying to, nor do I need to, suggest anything about
the motives of those who expressed this initial frame. Indeed, what is interesting is that this tacit framing
was expressed alongside a more open and self-determinate vision of the CAG. For anyone who feels the
need to assess motives, I think this latter vision, the integrity of which was validated by the convenors'
openness to the efforts of the group to reshape its goals and agenda, gives a much better reading of the
convenors' concerns and commitments. Indeed, they became active participants in the refraining effort.
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other technical criteria by which portions of the state will be excluded from consideration
as possible sites of a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility."12
Much of what was expressed in this statement was, in one way or another, a fact. The
Authority had the administrative responsibility for siting a facility and had specified a
broad methodology that specified the development and application of criteria for
excluding inappropriate areas. Moreover, CAG members needed to understand these
facts to function in their new role. Yet these administrative facts also began to shape the
agenda and the CAG's relationship to the Authority. The political identity constituted in
this relationship extended the administrative lineage of the Authority and the
accumulated "givens" that were expressed in the questions about technical criteria that
the Authority put to the CAG. The transitivity of administrative relationships implied by
this extension eventually came into question.
The administrative view was expressed again in the welcome an Authority member
gave the CAG members who attended the group's first meeting. She acknowledged that
'The Authority is extremely appreciative that so many Maine citizens and organizations have
agreed to volunteer their time, knowledge, and energy in this Citizens Advisory Group process.
The Authority's job, as given to us by the Maine Legislature, is to plan, design, and operate if
needed, a low-level radioactive waste facility in Maine within the framework of Maine laws and
Federal law and regulations. Within that framework the Authority seeks to attain the widest
possible consultation in order to assure that any Maine facility that is developed takes into account
the wisest possible technical information and the widest interests of the people of Maine. We are
aware that these decisions will involve extensive technical, environmental, and socio-economic
data. The Authority has retained technical consultants who will work with the CAG to develop
every possible answer to questions. We expect the work of the CAG to proceed at a reasonable
pace so that everyone can ask questions and learn what they need to learn to offer well-informed
and wise advice."13
"Maine Low-Level Radioactive Waste Authority, letter May 8, 1989. The letter went on to note the tie
between deliberation and the need for consent. "The Authority feels it is crucial that all groups with a stake
in this decision participate in each and every step of the siting process. Maine state law requires both a
local referendum and vote of the state Legislature in support of nay final. siting decision.
13 This quotation and those that follows are taken from transcriptions made by the author from video and
audio tapes of the CAG meetings made by the Authority. Copies of these transcripts are on file with the
author.
Again much of what was said can be taken as report on the set of historical facts that
described the situation in which the Authority found itself. This comment looks
different, however, when you consider what it would have implied for a potential CAG
member trying to figure out what it would mean to participate in this process. From this
perspective, a parenthetical like "Within that framework" implied accepting as given a
chain of commitments that extended through the Authority to the state Legislature,
federal regulatory agencies, and, eventually, to Congress. Disagreeing would have meant
breaking this chain and absorbing the burdens of supplying a critique and an alternative.
Moreover, it required finding a way to confront the implications of what are stated here
as facts about "the way things are."
The seeds of a contrasting view of the CAG can also be found in this opening
statement. This alternative vision suggests greater independence and was more explicit
about the normative questions that siting a disposal facility would raise. This new
mandate is found in the speaker's solicitation of the group to "learn" whatever they
needed to provide "well-informed and wise advice," to take account of technical concerns
and the "widest interests of the people of Maine;" and, to proceed at a "reasonable
pace." The breadth and depth of questions that could be taken up under the banner of
learning, wise technical advice, or the interests of the people of the state was
substantial.14
14 In conjunction these standards do not so much limit as extend each other. The "widest possible interests"
standard, for instance, extends the range of technical advice you might consider at first blush, by bringing
up, for example, questions about the interests of future citizens of the state. Setting learning as the other
central activity has a similarly expansive influence. The only brake on the system is given by the need to
proceed at a reasonable pace, but what a reasonable pace would be, given the other considerations members
are asked to take account of, is open to interpretation.
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This created some ambiguity about what the CAG should or could be. The
distinction between these views of the CAG was sharpened, and the ambiguity deepened,
in the opening remarks made by the facilitator. He also outlined the goals of the process
in terms that continued to frame an administratively conventional role for the CAG.
The goal I think, from the Authority's standpoint is to get the best possible advice they can get on
a series of questions that they have to answer if a facility is going to be sited.
He acknowledged explicitly the administrative background, pointed out the responsibility
for mastering it that the group faced, and reiterated the goal.
We will obviously be operating within the framework of federal and state law. You've received
some background material in that regard and you'll be hearing a little bit more in a slide
presentation about that federal and state legislative context within which we're operating . . . I
hope people around this table and others we may want to add will make the best effort to give the
best advice we can to the authority in making the decisions it is obiiged by law to make.
Additional layers of detail added depth to this picture of what the CAG should be
doing and the description of legal and administrative obligations tied the current process
to a line of action leading back to Congress.
The Authority does not have the authority, as I understand it, to determine whether a facility will
be sited in Maine. That decision rests more heavily with the Governor's office, because the
Governor's office retains the right to enter into a compact with one or another or several other
states should the State of Maine proceed in that fashion. But if no compact is entered into, then,
because of the federal and state laws that you will hear more about, the State of Maine needs to
proceed to select and, following the regulations that the state and a number of agencies represented
here have prepared with regard to regulations, select a site that respects the regulations set within
Maine and by the federal government. In that context I think the Authority is looking to this group
over the next several months--and we'll get to talk more about what our schedule might be--but it
will be very much up to this group what process you are prepared to participate in, to recommend
criteria for excluding areas and criteria for choosing amongst technically acceptable areas once
exclusion has been determined. I think the Authority will be looking to this group for advice on
how to communicate with potential host communities who may want to nominate themselves for
consideration. They will be looking to this group for advice on what would be fair compensation
to a community that might be willing to host such a facility.
This description fixed the group in a chain of relationships that set strict obligations
for the Authority and, transitively, for the CAG. Historical commitments to particular
technical terms like exclusion and preference criteria acquired something approaching an
objective status in this chain. They were the givens that defined the questions and
opportunities open to actors further down the chain.
A contrasting view of the CAG also continued to receive attention alongside this
conventional picture of administrative rationality. The facilitator's opening presentation
contained three significant departures from the conventional view. First, as is already
apparent in the quote above, the possibility that participants might have concerns about
the process and the need for their consent were both acknowledged. This reflected both a
general norm of respect and the need for consent that the Maine statute had written into
the foundation of the siting process. Second, an alternative relationship was described
that framed more substantial opportunities for the CAG. Finally, this role was tied to
internal standards of behavior.
Let me take these points in order. The first step was to distinguish the authority and
legitimacy that originated in the CAG members, from that which stemmed from the chain
of governmental relationships. The former was tied to the ongoing consent of
participants and was acknowledged by articulating and endorsing their authority over the
process. The parties' "concurrence" was requested several times in the facilitator's
opening statement. CAG members' control over the process began with control over the
facilitators.
The moment any of you feels that we're[i.e. the facilitators] in some way biased in how we're
behaving, please tell us, give us a chance to try to make a correction, and if we can't correct it then
we will bow out. Our job is for you to perceive us as neutral and we're willing to be held
accountable on that score. [and later]
You should feel free, at any point, if you have concern about how the discussion is going, to
interrupt the discussion and raise the point about the process. If someone feels that someone else
isn't being recognized, or you're not being recognized, interrupt.
The authority of members extended to taking responsibility for the composition of the
group.
We ask everyone here to help identify groups that ought to be here but aren't. 172 groups were
invited to send reps. 52 said yes. 8 said no. 4 said, "It's not directly relevant at this time, but
please keep us advised. We're prepared for the group to be as large as possible so that if an
informed consensus is reached it represents all the views of all the groups who ought to be
involved. Everyone is also invited to participate in meetings of the Authority.
This alternative view implied that the group might have a more open agenda. The
speaker noted that the CAG was being consulted before any the Authority had committed
to particular answers to the questions it had framed.
I would. . . point out that this is different from what's happening in other states around the
country, where because there's so much technical material that goes into choosing sites, in other
states the technical decisions are being made first, and then they are being presented to the public
for comment. We are proposing to turn that process upside down. We are proposing to engage
the entire community in deciding what are the appropriate technical criteria for choosing a site,
choosing a technology, evaluating the appropriateness of decisions concerning the siting process.
Shortly after this, the facilitator offered a guarantee that the conversation and
recommendations would reflect the concerns of the participants, not requirements the
Authority made going in.
My task is not just to convince myself but all of you throughout the conversations that I'm
working to ensure that everybody's voice is heard ant that collectively the voices on this advisory
group communicate a set of concerns to the authority in as clear and compelling fashion as
possible.
We [i.e. the facilitators] are not . . . in the public relations business. We are not in business --like
some-of getting hired on to suppress conflict, not in the business of steering this group toward
any one outcome.
The door was opened for the CAG to play a positive role in shaping choices and
commitments.
I think that this process that we're about to enter into with your concurrence, if that is to be, is one
in which we will be inventing policy suggestions, not merely responding to decisions made by the
Authority.
A guarantee was provided that resources would be available to make these opportunities
meaningful.
[We are ]prepared help you get whatever information you need to make participation easier or
fuller.
The process the facilitator described was consonant with this image of an
independent, self-determinant CAG. He described, for instance, a standard of open
communication for the process.
We do no operate by Robert's Rules of Order. We seek to talk to each other in the way that you
would normally carry on a dialogue: the only concern is the logistics, not the formalities ... [I]f
we don't agree within the group, then it will be our task to present the points of view and the
disagreements and the basis for them To the extent we reach an accord, we will present the views
of the group as an accord. We will not seek to take votes and present a view as the view of the
group.
The view of the CAG suggested in these comments is substantially different from the
conventional view implied in the opening remarks. It is more open, self-determinative,
and self-regulating. The third introductory presentation, however, returned to a more
conventional interpretation of the CAG's role. Since it was also the longest and most
detailed exposition, it set the tone for the beginning of the conversation.
The speaker was a technical consultant to the Authority. He told the group he was
there to "talk about low-level radioactive waste. What is it? And why are we here?" The
use of the first person plural throughout was consistent with the status of his presentation
as a briefing, welcoming the CAG members 'on board' in the siting process and letting
them know what had been done, what the terms of the conversation were, and what was
the next thing to be done.
The first thing he did was answer an implicit question, "What brought us here?" His
answer was the 1985 federal amendments that "put teeth into" the 1980 Low-Level Waste
Disposal Act and now "virtually force[d] [states] by penalties and possible denial of
access to existing disposal sites to get a site up and running by 1993." It was the ability
of this legislation to compel action that set in motion that process that created the
Authority and set gave a clear and strict mandate.
The Authority has been tasked with controlling and isolating the waste so that it no longer poses a
danger to the environment or human life. That's what we're here to talk about.
This process included a sequence of commitments that had increasingly tied the state
and the Authority to a course of action. A siting plan had been developed, submitted, and
approved. Within the next six months the governor would have submit a "certification"
to the federal government that would explain "how we're going to take charge of the
waste."
The technical vocabulary and standards parsed the problem in professional and
administrative terms.
Just to put everything in context we will be trying to show you relatively, "Is this bad? Is this
high? Is this low? Where does this stand in the norm of the type of radiation we get?"
This technical parsing of the problem enforced the adoption of a vocabulary and an
orientation to questions about the waste stream and the design and operation of a
facility.1" This closed nature of this process was reinforced by the momentum of "what
Maine is doing"'6 and the pace that the process would have to maintain. For instance,
members were invited to
Get into some of the engineering disposal technologies that are either in existence today or are
being planned to be used by other states, compacts, or counties. Shallow land burial is what is
being used today .. .This system relies solely on the geology and hydrology of the site to contain
the movement of radionuclides. The oniy way radionuclides can move off site is through the
groundwater.
" "In my view we have not made any decision on any disposal technology. The point of today's discussion
is solely as an educational program for you people to be knowledgeable of what technologies are being
looked at. These remain to be investigated as part of the low level program."
16 "What are we doing? We've formed an authority, we've developed a siting plan. We're in the
process of developing methodology. This is the first meeting of the CAG, we're moving ahead
aggressively with our contractors collecting baseline data statewide--geology, hydrology,
environmental and socioeconomcs--we're starting public hearings and informational meetings, and
we're working to get into a compact so we don't have to build one."
And even where the discussion was supposedly left open, the topics open to the
participants were limited.
In my view we have not made any decision on any disposal technology. The point of today's
discussion is solely as an educational program for you people to be knowledgeable of what
technologies are being looked at. These remain to be investigated as part of the low level
program.
While the no commitment had been made to a particular technology, there was an
implicit commitment to choose among available technologies. A similar pattern played
out in the discussion of the schedule. In one breath the speaker emphasized that "we have
made no movement toward selecting a site" and that Authority was "not going to be
locked into milestones and deadlines. We want quality work." In the next he
breathlessly described the schedule the program is on.
We developed the BEP (Board of Environmental Protection) rule last year. The methodology
development-- the exercise we're going through right now--is underway in the '89 early 1990
timeframe, followed by site selection leading into a detailed characterization. I say
characterization, as we identify sites we will have to go in and do exhaustive geotechnical
hydrological, and environmental studies of those sites, which will then require NRC licensing in
this particular case. We're looking optimistically at a construction completion in either late 1995
or early 1996, if all the approvals can be maintained. Any glitsch in any of those approvals will
obviously have a potential major effect on the overall schedule.
This summary provided a compelling picture of the wheels of progress moving
ahead. The process had direction and momentum and a clear end--the construction of a
facility. With the "teeth" in the federal legislation nipping at the Authority's heels, who
would have wanted to interfere with this schedule? This only reinforces the commitment
to the direction the process had taken. Not only is the lexicon fixed, but the schedule is
set. And throughout, each statement that contributed to the construction of this image was
made as if it was a statement of fact.
Redirection - At this point the CAG members got the opportunity to enter the
conversation by asking questions. The first questions committed the group to the
'conventional' interpretation of its role by taking up the technical focus and vocabulary
that had been 'suggested' as the appropriate dialect and context for the conversation.
These questions focused on details of the technical issues: "How much waste will go into
the facility?" "Should we discuss radioactivity in terms of curies or rems?"
Two of the questions began to open the underpinnings of the conversation to
examination and undercut their factual status. The first of these raised the disparity
between the commitments that were being contemplated and the scope of technical
competence. The question went to the conceptual designs that had been presented.
Is there any technology today that will isolate nuclear waste for thousand and thousands of years?
Because all the conceptual designs I've seen so far, once you dispose of it you're not going after it.
Do you have a conceptual design that will last for thousands and thousands of years to isolate the
waste that will be created from Maine Yankee?
The consultant's answer did not dismiss the notion of technical competence, but it did
suggest that employing it, entailed a 'professional' appreciation of the kind of
qualifications implied in building models, in setting "performance objectives," and in
describing the conditions under which the analysis is understood to hold and acceptance
of these limits.
That's a good question. It's a real good question for the engineering community to face. Again
one of the reasons a lot of people are tending to favor the below ground vault is because you're
using a multiple barrier system and if one fails you've got backups. And there's ways of modeling
the site to model the actual movements that--I'm not standing up here to say that we can design a
vault for 500 years. Nobody is going to say that. But what we're saying is that with the coupling
of an engineered structure with the earth facilities we can demonstrate that those performance
objectives could be met under certain condition.
The second question inquired in a straightforward way about the commitment
entailed in operating a facility. A member of the group wondered, "Do these facilities
require permanent staffing?" The candid answer that the consultant gave illustrated the
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kinds of choices that the administrative background comprised and grounds on which
some of these choices had been made. In doing so, the speaker exposed the provisional
character of the commitments that had just previously carried the force of facts.
The NRC requires that for a period after the facility is closed we go into what we call an
institutional control period. That period lasts up to 100 years in which the site must be monitored,
inspected, and any remediation would have to be undertaken. Anything more than 100 years--why
not 500 years, why not a thousand-it's sort of an arbitrary number that was put forth by the NRC 6
or 7 years ago as being 'a believable' number. Anything more than a hundred years, well we can't
really go that many generations ahead. We may well do, we in the State of Maine may wish to
increase our control of the facility for a longer period.
By illustrating the provisional character of a standard like the institutional control
requirement and the qualifications that accompany technical guarantees, these questions
and answers began to illustrate what the group was accepting by treating administrative
definitions and commitments as given. This discussion also began to reorient the
conversation away from administrative requirements and technical terms to a more
general framework and to questions about what made sense.
At this point the conversation headed back to the institutionally defined ground. The
facilitator raised a kind of "chicken-and-egg" problem that the presentation had
illustrated; the group would need to give advice on site selection before the members
knew what kind of facility would be built. This implied a reliance on what had already
been said.
The ways in which you operate without that knowledge, are, in part, a function of what the state
government and the federal government have already said about certain things that are utterly
inappropriate with regard to technical, environmental, or socio-economic constraints.
He went on to tie this conceptual problem to the choices about technology that had
been illustrated in the presentation just before. This also had the effect of returning to the
conversation to established ground of siting criteria and technological options.
But all those questions about above and below' 7 , or a combination, and the type and number of
barriers, clearly are going to be related to our decisions about whether you could put something or
should put something, in this kind of a place or that kind of place in so far as the geology, the
environment, the socioeconomic situation might be defined.
This prompted a member of the group to interrupt and challenge the turn the discussion
was taking.' 8
On that particular point .. . I would argue at great length. The type of containment we've seen
here is entirely irrelevant. Murphy's Law is going to work on every one of them and I think you've
admitted that . .. you don't know how long it's going to take to watch these: a thousand years or a
hundred and ten. I certainly would dispute you're saying that it is very clear they will have
something to do with the nature of the site that might be selected. I think they have no bearing at
all.
The facilitator engaged the question and asked the member to clarify the implications
of his comment for the CAG's mandate.
What would in your mind have the most bearing on the selection of sites?
The CAG member went on to say that technical questions about siting implied
normative judgments about whether disposal can meet standards of safety. By taking
these technical questions as their starting point, CAG members were skipping a set of
questions about whether disposal could be done in a way that would meet standards the
group would find acceptable. He felt he was being asked to take this step on the basis of
assumptions made or accepted by the Authority. His comment also began to tie
substantive notions like safety to procedural concerns about what is and isn't an
acceptable way for discussion to proceed.
I think you have not demonstrated, and we're a long way from being convinced, that there is safe
way to dispose of this. You're asking us today to make assumptions.
1 Referring to the three 'conceptual' designs that had been described: above ground vault, below ground
vault, or mounded earth bunker. Shallow land burial was prohibited in Maine because of the state's high
water table.
" Exercising the prerogative the facilitator had described earlier, "You should feel free, at any point, if you
have concern about how the discussion is going, to interrupt the discussion and raise the point about the
process."
With the next set of comments the direction of the conversation began to change. The
facilitator intervened and did three things. He helped clarify what assumptions were
being questioned. Next, he differentiated what the Authority had to accept from what the
CAG might be willing to accept, and pointed out the tensions this might raise for CAG
members. These two acts, first distinguishing the CAG as a potentially autonomous body
and then tying this back to a divergence in the kind of assumptions the CAG and the
Authority would each be willing to work under, would prove critical later. Finally, he
phrased his analysis in terms of a question that the group could take up.
Let me come back to that. I'm glad you raised it. The Authority has to operate as if there might
be a need to site a facility, because the state law and the federal law require them to do so.
[Participant ~Then the state law and the federal law had better convince us that they are safe.]
The question I think for the group is, 'Can you operat. in the light of the Authority's request to
seek advice on siting criteria, while holding your view that it would be preferable not to have a
facility or a need for a facility at all?'
The participant then restated the level at which his criticism was aimed. He had
already voiced his concern about accepting assumptions. Because of these reservations,
he wanted to reserve the ability to reject the questions rather than just influencing the
answer.
I think we're saying "none of the above" might be our choice. And also you reassured me, when
you first spoke, that we may say exclude. And you didn't say only one area. We might say,
"Exclude the State of Maine."
The next comment completed the turn in the discussion. Another CAG member
joined the conversation and accepted the facilitator's invitation to consider whether the
presuppositions that had been asserted for the conversation were acceptable. He
reinterpreted the invitation in positive terms, and extended it by suggesting that the group
explicitly take up the question of what its goals should be, instead of debating whether or
not the goals implied in a set of assumptions the Authority had to make were acceptable.
On your last question, I'm not yet certain I can participate in the siting evaluation or preference
criteria or anything of that, but I do think it may be an appropriate time when we come back to try
to decide for ourselves just exactly what the goal of this citizens body is. I have a proposal for a
goal for this body. If you would like to think about it and discuss it, my proposal would be that
the goal of this is to make recommendations to the Authority which will result in the safest
possible management of radioactive waste in the State of Maine. That would be my
recommendation. That means that other decisions of risk, of technology, all will fall out at a later
time after we have been able to obtain the information we need to make those kind of decisions.
This continued to differentiate the CAG from the Authority and made more explicit
the suggestion hinted at in the previous comment: that CAG members should decide for
themselves what direction they wanted to take and the grounds on which they were
willing to proceed. The grounds suggested were both substantive--extending to basic
concerns about safety--and procedural--asserting the right of members to control the
terms of the discussion.' 9
This formulation of the goals provided sufficient common ground with how the
Authority understood its responsibilities to gain the immediate endorsement of one
member who was present.
My impression is it [i.e. the goal] is more open but not inconsistent, as long as you give specific
advice. As an Authority member, the proposal is how I see the Authority's task. We're tasked by
law--right or wrong-- with siting a facility. We can't argue the goodness or badness of that. That's
to be done by you folks with your representatives. We are tasked with siting a facility. In so
doing, our objective is to find the safest possible way to dispose of low-level radioactive waste in
the State of Maine. So I would say that that's a very appropriate objective for any group that
concerned with the situation.
This comment again recognized the possibility that the CAG might operate on
different grounds from the Authority. More generally, the speaker endorsed that a
discussion of goals was an appropriate topic of conversation for the CAG. His
endorsement was provisional, however. It hmged on his ability to differentiate the
freedom the CAG enjoyed from the status of the Authority which was bound to its "task."
19 I want to flag an institutional issue here that I will return to later in the discussion. It is critical that the
process was open enough to allow this critique and "revolution." If the Authority had sought to cut off this
discussion it would have lost the legitimacy it was trying to develop. If the facilitator had tried to keep to
the agenda that the Authority wanted he would have been seen as its agent.
Moreover, he locates the responsibility for bridging this divide with the CAG by giving it
the responsibility to give specific advice.
GOALS
This exchange opened a discussion of what the CAG's goals should be. Throughout,
the freedom of the CAG was contrasted with the bound character of the Authority. One
implication that was not taken up explicitly was the notion that, to the extent that the
CAG wanted to be relevant, the group would have to acknowledge the Authority's
mandate and, to the extent they wanted to preserve their autonomy, they risked
marginalizing themselves.
Even though the question about goals had been framed explicitly, the discussion was
seldom direct. There was no agreement about what the grounds for fixing the goals
should be, so the conversation bounced back and forth between a set overlapping and
only partially defined themes.
The CAG's relationship to the established administrative context, in particular the
Authority, remained a central concern. This was re-expressed in concerns about how
external affiliations might influence CAG members' behavior inside the process. This, in
turn, raised questions about what kind of influences would be acceptable and how the
broader goals should be reflected internally, in norms of behavior.
Thus, the broader sense of the significance of the process that was reflected in the
discussion of goals became tied to a discussion about internal standards. This forced the
construction of a common understanding of the identity that underpinned CAG members'
sense of the significance of their participation. Citizenship eventually provided a common
ground that captured much of the external significance of the CAG and internal
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standards of participation this sensibility implied. This engaged the group in an effort to
interpret what citizenship meant in this context.
The thread of the discussion of goals is hard to follow. Participants struggled with the
ambiguity of their situation as well as with each other. Debate was ad hoc; views were
formed and revised as the conversation proceeded. The level at which the conversation
was being carried out shifted frequently. Moments of explicit reflection were broken by
assertions. Counter-assertions developed out of, and into questions. Proposals were
stated as declarations of belief. The force of these different speech acts was often
different from their explicit content. Finally, discussion moved between substantive and
procedural expressions of goals and was finally resolved in terms that confound a neat
distinction between the two.
The interplay between these themes began almost immediately. It became explicit in
a disagreement about how broadly the CAG should cast its net, that aligned with whether
the group would take up normative questions or not. On one side of this disagreement
were the members who came to the CAG as representatives of state agencies. They
preferred to keep the agenda closely tied to the administrative context, favoring
something like the conventional framing described at the outset.
The proposal to open the conversation to questions about safety and the management
of radioactive waste more generally implied shifting from a technical discussion
grounded in expertise to a normative orientation grounded in political relationships. This
made some members uncomfortable and they tried to reassert an administrative focus by
voicing concerns about their participation.
I won't say I can't live with it [the goal]. But I feel uncomfortable participating in broad ranging
discussion about the management of low-level radioactive waste. First, I have no personal
expertise and don't feel I could contribute in a meaningful way to a broad ranging discussion.
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I'm here representing my employer Bureau of Public Lands, which has concerns about what
happens on public lands but not necessarily concerns with the management of nuclear wastes. I
feel the management of that material is the responsibility of the Authority and I'm not comfortable
participating in that kind of discussion. I am comfortable, and think my employer would prefer
me to, to participate in the discussion of siting a waste facility particularly as that applies to public
lands. I will be reluctant to expand the scope and prefer to be more focused.20
This created a tension as "lay" members tried to push in the opposite direction. They
wanted to fix the discussion at a more exclusively normative level and explicitly resist
any commitments that would "professionalize" the proceedings. One speaker reacted by
criticizing the compromise he fit was implied by the standard of "safest possible." He
wanted the group to take on the burden of saying something about 'how safe is safe
enough,' and to acknowledge the historical character of previous attempts at waste
disposal.
I can't live with that [the statement of goals] and there's a reason for that. First of all, is there a
difference between a safe dump and the safest dump? The safest dump does not mean that it's a
safe dump. We might be going through a .. . list [and]. . .wind up going through 10 locations
where the town has voted it down. We might wind up at the 20th location and then finally find
somebody that wants this nuclear facility in their backyard. Does that mean that the 20th
location is now a safe dump? No, it is the safest and the last that is found.
No, I cannot go along with that proposal. Professionals in the past have never been able to
produce a nuclear waste dump that will last as long as the nuclear isotopes. They've been
nothing but sheer experiments, in fact we've been pushing these experiments on through the
ages And I cannot live with buying into the safest dump.
Another CAG member tried to stake out a middle ground. He wanted to embrace a
broad interpretation of the CAG's role and, at the same time to accept responsibility for
creating a bridge to concerns the CAG shared with the Authority. He tried to frame a
pragmatic vision of the CAG's goals that endorsed the relevance of questions about safety
but disputed their lexical2 priority to questions about what to do with waste.
20 Another member made a similar comment: "I have to raise the same issue that Steve brings. As a state
agency rep. I anticipated my participation would be as reflected in letter we received. that was to advise
you on issues concern the cost of siting. and I would differentiate between siting and mgmt, I have no
expertise to offer on the issue of management. Siting, in particular the ... I have something to offer."
21 A dictionary is an example of a lexical (or lexicographical) ordering. Words that begin with 'A' come
before words that begin with 'B' no matter what the value of other letters. Similarly, in the comment above
I think the speaker was trying to assert that questions about safety have to be answered satisfactorily before
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The goal is the safest possible management of nuclear waste in the State of Maine. I don't know
that, I'm certainly not convinced that an in-state facility is the safest possible management of the
low-level radioactive waste in the state. I'm not convinced that the continued operation of Maine
Yankee is the safest possible management. I don't know yet that a compact is the safest possible
management of the waste we have in this state. I think that remains to be seen. But I think that
the goal of doing the best we can with that waste is what we should be shooting for.
The tension between these different views of what substantive questions the CAG
should take up was expressed soon after in an exchange about procedure. A state agency
representative characterized the importance of his professional ties by distinguishing
what he might say speaking as an individual from what he was willing to say as a
representative of a state agency.
Some of us are here representing an agency with specific expertise and, as a representative of that
agency, have to be more focussed. I'm not here as an individual. I'm here as a representative of
an agency. I'm being paid for that. So I have to be more focussed in what I perceive as my
responsibility here. And I see my responsibility here as being primarily concerned with
developing exclusion criteria as they relate, in particular, to the bureau of public lLaids, but in
general to the State of Maine. And that is what I would prefer to focus on. I don't think that or,
let's put it this way, if I were here on my own, maybe my opinions and soforth might be different,
but because of that, I prefer to see the second goal22 remain as it is and I prefer to concentrate on
that second goal. (emphasis added)
This declaration confimed the fears of some participants that professional affiliations
would subvert the independent and open exchange which they felt obliged to uphold and
recognized as the source of the group's legitimacy. It drew quick criticism from a member
who saw it implying a partitioning of reason that was an affront to the process and
suggestive of why professional standards were inappropriate.
When a person says, 'my view expressed as a state agent might be different from the one I would
express as a private person' I think that person has impugned his own integrity. And I believe that
the Authority should dis-sponsor the testimony given [under such] circumstances. And I'm willing
to [suggest] that whenever the opportunity arises we [remember] that professionally hired advice
is not necessarily unbiased. On the record it's been very poor. Given that, I think its worth
any other concerns could be entertained. This explicitly reserves the option of concluding that the best is
not good enough.
22 At this point two goals have been added to the initial one proposed in the comment cited above. The
second goal is "to assist the authority in evaluating potential specific sites in more detail using these
criteria--that is the one's from the statement above--and in assessing possible incentive and compensation
packages." The third goal that was proposed at this point was "to understand and share information about
this issue with interested groups of citizens in order to help the Authority reach the wisest and fairest
decision."
participating here. My group has discussed the question of whether we're being bagged, used . ..
On balance, we think we might do some good by being here and participating. And we'll trust the
mediator that he won't railroad us cynically.
This relationship between the views people held (or might come to hold) as
individuals and the restrictions they felt were required or appropriate became an
important theme. The boundaries of what was acceptable were explored again in an
exchange between a "non-professional" participant and the facilitator. This began when
the CAG member described some concessions he felt he had to make to participate in the
conversation.
The viewpoint that I have is that I categorically reject the concept that low-level radioactive waste
is a necessary condition in order for us to have a healthy and prosperous society. That's my bottom
line. However, if we accent it, I can sit down with you and I can come up with a good site for it. I
can do that. But basically what I see myself in is a position of, "Do I want to be boiled in oil, or do
I want to be shot?" I could pick that and I think that's what, that's the way I see the task of this
committee. And I'll be willing to work on that level.
This time it was the facilitator who responded. He suggested that such concessions
shouldn't be necessary and were, in fact, undesirable because they undermined the
possibility of the kind of conversation demanded by the nature of the issues and the
group's understanding of its political role.
I would hope you wouldn't give away so much. I would hope that you would feel comfortable, as
often as you can, of expressing the view that you have and the reasons behind it. People do change
their minds, people do learn things, people do convince each other. I don't think you should
abandon, I don't think you have to abandon the initial premise and say, ' Well since that's not what
the others think."
When the participant gave a cursory response--"All right, I haven't abandoned it." the
facilitator went on to describe how such concessions distorted the challenge that was
before the group. The group should not be thinking in terms of what compromises they
were willing to live with to get on with the process. The challenge they faced was to
invent a focus that would enable them to acknowledge the diversity of views that existed
and the strength with which some of these views (including their own) were held, and, at
the same time, acknowledge the common problem and the value of reaching agreement
in light of this constitutive "disharmony."
This might require suspending the "rush to judgment," but should not require
suspending sense. As the facilitator put it.
No, no. The way you said it. I wouldn't want anyone to feel that they cannot continue to be in this
room around the table and make the major points that they're really here to make, which might
include, 'I don't think you should have this problem, I think you should do these things to avoid the
problem, rather than work to solve it this way. And others are going to say, 'You don't understand;
it's not how we see the world.' And both are going to be true and Authority knows--its no secret--
the Authority knows those views are all here. And they're still looking for the best advice they can
and they're not just asking one side or the other.
The discussion had moved, at this point, to expressing goals in terms of their implications
for behavior in the conversation. This relationship worked in the other direction as well;
procedural concerns were tied to goals. This was rarely played out explicitly as the
following example shows.
The following exchange evolved out of a continuing discussion about the relationship
between participation in the group and external affiliation. The concern here is that
people's sense of what they think is right or appropriate will be shaped by their outside
affiliations. The contention or concern was (I believe) that there needs to be some test of
the character of the relationship with outside affiliations. Some kinds of influences are
unacceptable when citizenship is set as the standard for membership and participation.
This is the sense underlying this curious tug-of--war over who is and who isn't a citizen.
Participant (P) - It's the Authority's job to site a nuclear waste dump, it is not the job of citizens to
put a noose around other citizen's necks. It doesn't work that way. But of course this isn't a
citizen's group, and we all have to understand that. This is not a citizens group. Who we heard
from so far is Dr. Gannett from the very people who are going to be building the dump and Mr.
Cohen from CMP(Central Maine Power) who owns just as much stock at Maine Yankee as the
people in Connecticut. And we've heard from Mr. Alairia from the Bureau of Public Lands--a state
agency. These are not citizens.
FAC - They're not citizens?
P -They're r1,t citizens. They are representing the agency
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At first blush, these assertions seem almost absurd. Of course these people are
citizens. If, however, you treat citizenship as a way to represent a standard of
participation (instead of a definition of say voting status) the assertions can be understood
as a critique of limits external ties might create. The confusion is created by the way in
which the proposal is made, as an attack against particular members of the group.2 This
interpretation would explain why professional affiliations are grouped with economic
ties. Each threatens to stint participation in an inappropriate way. Citizenship seems to
demand an independence of thought and speech that is contradicted by getting paid to say
something.
F - But people can, I mean the definition of citizen is clear. You may say you prefer to have some
other groups represented who are also citizens. And we've asked and will continue to ask, are
there other groups that should be invited to be involved and what can we do to make it easier for
them to attend? I don't think impugning other people's standing as a citizen is going to help us.
P - How about saying some of them get paid to be here and some of us don't. Would that
differentiate between citizens and people who are getting paid to say what they're supposed to say
for the sake of their jobs and their agencies?
Once again the effort to describe goals and fix the identity of the group is expressed in
terms of procedural distinctions about what kind of behavior would and wouldn't be
acceptable: i.e. between people who are there to speak their minds and others "who are
getting paid to say what they're supposed to say."
To explore the significance of these procedural concerns a member tied them to the
significance of the CAG in the broader political process. His summary captured the
manner in which deliberative standards like independence and competence were being
used to make sense of what it meant to represent the "best interest of the people of the
state" as a citizen.
While I can sympathize with the uneasiness and need of the Authority to try to get some sense of
what to do--that's why they're asking us for our ideas and recommendations--when you ask
somebody for advice, you want to know for sure that you're getting the straight story. Whether
it's what you want to hear or whether it's not what you want to hear. The reason I'm
uncomfortable in specifically addressing disposal site criteria--exclusion criteria, preference
criteria, all that stuff--is because it's exactly what they want to hear. I think that this body ought to
keep itself aloof enough, independent enough, and become educated enough, that it can tell the
Authority what the Authority may not want to hear, if we deem it in the best interest of the safety of
the people of the state. If that means, ignoring the federally mandated time limits, so be it. That's
not what the Authority wants to hear because they're mandated to work under those state and
federal time frames and constraints. But I think we should be free to say, "That'sfull of beans and
you ought to do something about it." I think that's our role. I think we're supposed to reflect the
public not to be subsidiary staff to the Authority. That's how I sense the role that you want to
pick, is as subsidiary staff, in order, in other words when it comes around to fish and wildlife you
can say, 'Well these lakes are not good. This pond doesn't have any trout any more, so it probably
is a better site for a facility. That's what staff do. That's not what a citizen's advisory group ought
to do.
This statement rendered the themes of citizenship and advice giving that
characterized the process in broad, if ambiguous, terms in a more directed and active
ideal of deliberation. This interpretation was at once rigorous and colloquial. The
references to independence and education translated the connection with the "best interest
of the safety of the people of the state" to this ideal of citizenship as an active notion and
set a clear and demanding standard. "Advice-giving" was expressed in ordinary terms,
open to everyone, and clearly differentiated from the kind of answering questions that
"staff do". This fixed the appropriate context for the conversation in the common
experience and activity.
Moreover, the relationship constructed between experience, reflection on experience,
and action is itself an example of this ideal and demonstrates its relevance in the
situation. The effect of tying this ideal to a commonplace activity--advice giving--was to
locate the appropriate context for corversation clearly outside the technical and
administrative context that had been proposed earlier. The distinction made between what
staff does and what citizens should do reinforces this relationship.
'3 And a self-contradictory one at that, since it directly undermines concerns like respect and equality that
This is one of the clearest examples of the indirect process whereby citizenship
became a touchstone for what defined membership in the CAG and shaped expectations
about what the process should do and how people should behave within it. Citizenship
provided common ground-- it tied people with diverse experiences and background to the
process--and captured what participants thought was important about their participation.
An Authority member, picked it up later to emphasize the commonality between the
Authority and the CAG--they were just seven people looking to do the same thing the
CAG was, and were asking for help.
I'm sitting here listening to all this. There are seven of us on this Authority. We have a job to do.
It's not a pleasant job. I suppose I have bias. But I do, in spite of what Phil says, consider myself
a citizen of the state, and I know that the other 6 people who join me on the Authority want to do
the best possible job we can do. At least I can tell you from my point of view, I'm not driven by a
time table. I'm driven by doing the very best we can do. I may not agree with what you want to
tell me and I don't agree with what Bob tells me all the time, or Maine Yankee. But you're
throwing an awful lot of stuff at us in the last year and we're trying to assimilate it And we're
going to try to do the best job we can for the state, and you folks are here to help me. That's all
I'm asking for, give me some help, period.
The picture of citizenship that emerged knit together engagement with the problem
and with other citizens who may hold different beliefs. The challenge was how to define
terrain that would allow the group to make progress on the substantive and procedural
challenges they face. In addition to tolerance and a commitment to understanding, the
process was rooted in norms of informal speech--advice giving, helping. Citizenship
provided a point of reference throughout. It was tied to the willingness to work within
the diversity of views that exist and still be able to bridge those differences around shared
concerns to recognize and work within the diversity of view that exist, to "do the best
possible job we can," to try to understand each other, and to give each other help. This
view started to coalesce the resolution around a set of goals that included as a normative
would also be part of a notion of citizenship.
standard the safety of the people of Maine and that recognized the common challenge of
working with the diversity of perspectives that were around the table.
The final piece that led to an initial equilibrium about goals was a broad
characterization of the process
I certainly would take exception to the first one. (i.e. goal) I believe all of it is important, but not
so important as our getting on to what amounts to a debate of ideas. Specifically on the first item,
I see the phrase 'safest possible management' a phrase of reasonable effort to achieve reasonable
safety. That sounds like engineering. That sounds like a disaster coming along. First of all, if that
'safest possible' were changed to 'least harmful', it would reflect the view of a number of us who
are insisting that this stuff is a negative problem rather than an opportunity to make a lot of
money. I believe in our (fate) that we are divided among those who have a direct financial interest
or are employed by a state agency.
The resolution of these questions about what the CAG's goals would be and was
expressed in terms of expectations about participation. The final piece was added by this
characterization of as a "debate of ideas."
O.K. so on number 3 can we say this then? I liked what Bill said about debating, because that's
what this is and what it will be. That's what it is, whether people want to call it that or not. What
if we said, 'to debate and discuss this important issue and share these ideas with interested groups
and citizens in order to help the Authority and the people of Maine reach the wisest possible and
fairest decisions.
FAC - I think that's fine. Let's make it clear that the focus is to clarify the disagreements, the
debate to sharpen it. To illuminate the choices by sharpening the debate.
Is that ok?
FAC - I think that's fine. Anyone have a problem with that? To say that the focus is on the debate
and discussion as Nancy just read it?
With this formulation the discussion of goals reached an equilibrium. The CAG
members had clarified their sense of the significance of their activity and of the standards
they would endorse. These substantive standards reflected a normative concern with the
conditions of participation. Acting as a citizen carried with safety and that tied
participants to the broader interests of the people of the state. Future generations and a
long time-frame were consistently a part of the discussion, suggesting that these broader
interests were understood by CAG members to extend into the future at least as far as the
radioactive wastes did. Members also developed a fairly detailed sketch of what
citizenship implied for participation, so that this orientation had a practical effect.
The effort to confront givens set an internal norm of taking responsibility for the
conditions and assumptions under which the debate took place, as well as for the
substantive content. This remained an ongoing part of the activity of the CAG. It came up
later in the discussion of the health effects of low-level ionizing radiation.
Because we're new here, its important to me to know if the CAG accepts certain basic
assumptions. .. .and these basic assumptions are as follows:
1. We need nuclear power and we must continue to produce nuclear waste and prepare for a
dump site here or somewhere else.
2. Though the federal government has not demonstrated an ability to safely isolate
radioactive waste-either high or low level-on a long term basis, it is ok for it to mandate that states
must take responsibility for low-level waste.
3. It is ok for states to be made to take responsibility for waste produced by private, for-profit,
electric companies. And it is ok for the ratepayers to be made to pay for it
Now I personally dispute these assumptions. But I want to be here to represent my small group of
citizens who have volunteered so much of their time and personal well-being and ..., to learn all
they can about low level radiation and to help educate the public along with ourselves. We want
Maine people protected from Maine Yankee's radioactive waste to the fullest extent humanly
possible. . . . our basic assumption is this: this CAG will not work unless there's a concerted
effort to educate the public.
This continuing effort to engage the conditions of discussion demonstrates the CAG's
attempt to confront the significance of the task they faced, to surface the assumptions and
choices that led issues to be framed in a particular way, and to reframe the problem in
terms that they understood and accepted. This was closely tied throughout to an
increasingly vivid sketch of what the responsibilities of a participant were under these
circumstances.
Before moving on, I want to highlight the tie between these activities and concerns
with future generations, since it is indirect. First the participants tried to grasp the
significance of their situation by describing its implications for them in their common
status as citizens. They define this relationship in terms that suggest an open-ended
commitment to an ongoing association.
To accomplish this they first confronted and then challenged the conventional role
that was described for them by the Authority. The open institutional conditions that the
participants enjoyed were critical in this effort and in the articulation of a collective
identity that accompanied it. The participants' sense of the legitimacy of the process was
tied closely to the internal freedoms that allowed then to shape the agenda, the course of
the conversation, and the terms on which it was carried out. The way they went about
these activities with an attitude of respect toward each other demonstrated their
conviction that their task mattered.
They encountered difficulty because tacit assumptions and givens shaped the
conversation in way that were simultaneously apparent and elusive to them as
participants. Confronting these characteristics of the conversation demanded active
engagement and was a contingent achievement. Success depended on the institutional
opportunities that were open to participants and their individual and collective ability to
take advantage of these opportunities.
SITUATING THE PRESENT
This broad interpretation of goals had implications for what questions the CAG
would take up. The group's refusal to accept the administrative framework as given
meant that they would have to extend their competence to technical issues that were
bound up with the normative questions they wanted to assess. For example, the concerns
about safety reflected in the goals the group adopted, set an obligation to understand how
much of a threat to health was posed by radiation.
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By the end of the first CAG meeting it was already apparent that the concerns which
participants expressed in the debate over goals had expanded the agenda. The following
comment by the facilitator illustrates that this was clear to everyone involved.
I'm listening to what people are saying and feeling very strongly that if we were to say, Thank
you for listing all those concerns and now we will go along with the process of talking about
siting,' that it would be utterly inappropriate. So the only way I know to take on the broader issues
that have been raised is to structure the agenda, stretch it, divide it, and if we're going to talk about
it in a way that answers questions, we're going to have to get people in who can answer questions.
In this section I will focus on the CAG's effort to build their understanding of
technical issues in one area--the health effects of low-level ionizing radiation. Rather than
accept the summaries reflected in standards, the group sought to replicate the inner
workings of the committees that set standards and inform its judgements with an
understanding of the areas of agreement and disagreement that characterize the field.
They pursued what I call a researcher's perspective, and sought to understand the field as
motivated by the limitations, problems, and disagreements that characterize its "frontier"
rather than by its core consensus.
The group's efforts in this area characterize a second aspect of the historical present.
The "straight story" they sought to base their advice on was not a straightforward one. It
was clear, for instance, that beliefs about the health effects of low-level ionizing radiation
had changed over time. Moreover, the scientific literature offered different views about
the health impacts that might be associated with living near a low-level waste facility. By
approaching the field in light of the changes that had occurred and the potential for
further changes inherent in contemporary disagreements, the CAG members cultivated a
historical perspective, similar to what you would see if you imagined yourself in the
future looking back at the present.24 The CAG sought to inform their deliberations with
this complex understanding. Their response to the historical nature of their situation is
instructive and consistent with the broader pattern of that I am calling the historical
present.
CONSENSUS AND DISAGREEMENT
'Getting people in' to answer questions and give advice about health effects proved to
be a challenge. It immediately posed a question for CAG members about what the goal
of their inquiry should be. The group had already begun to articulate a strong internal
sense of the tie between goals and pragmatic standards for practice that would eventually
agree stress respect for the diversity of views and the need to work in light of this
diversity rather than to reduce it.25 The CAG set consistent standards for their effort to
get outside advice.
These standards were rooted in concerns like the following:
24 To illustrate the pertinence of this effort for intergenerational questions I want to show that it is possible
to derive the researcher's perspective directly from the notion of perspective taking in an intergenerational
context. In the intergenerational case, this means treating the present as history. Looking at an issue like
health effects, this 'situated' present will have a provisional character. New evidence is always just around
the corner that may disconfirm accepted wisdom and lead to a revision in beliefs and standards. In fact,
part of significance of experience in environmental health has been the development of understanding
through the effort to explain clinical evidence. Viewed through this glass, the present becomes dynamic and
complex characterized by distribution of viewpoints, disagreements, and unresolved questions.
25 For example, one member stated: "It means that this group should issue what has come out of a meeting,
including minority opinions. To me that is very important. Also to add 'minority opinions will also be
presented to the public."'
FAC - That, we can say it, certainly what we've said very clearly is all the opinions of this group will be
presented in the summary of what this group comes up with. There is no majority and no minority because
we're not going to vote. So we're going to record all the points of view. So there isn't a minority--there's
all. And if you look on how we're proposing to operate as decision-making, we're not going to take any
votes. So if we're not going to take any votes and we're going to try to present as clear a statement of the
views represented then all the views will at all times be represented."
You have to be very careful to either get somebody who's going to give us the straight goods, who
isn't biased--which I don't think you can find on that issue-- or get people on both sides of the
issue.
I had a concern last month and I still have a concern this month. And I've talked with Patti on the
phone a number of times concerning this. I'm still very concerned about the controlled focus of
the presentations. Will they create a mindset that nuclear waste isn't dangerous and maybe . . . it's
good there in the country where it might last for a couple of hundred years or whatever
The implication of such concerns was captured in a request that a CAG member made
to the Authority.
There's a commitment then that can be made right at the outset. I certainly would appreciate it
since I don't have any technical knowledge and background. When we have outside speakers who
are going to come in and present this to the CAG, that in those cases where there is more than one
legitimate point of view that both points of view, or if there are more than two, that a number of
points of view be presented so that the CAG can be fully apprised of various alternatives and
various perspectives. I would appreciate as one member of the group a commitment to do that
throughout the process.
This goal was endorsed by an Authority member who acknowledged that the
Authority shared the challenge described.
Are you speaking about making sure that a balanced--to the extent it's possible--viewpoint is
presented on whatever it is we're presenting? Is that your question? [Yes.] I think we are
committed to that. We do not have a point of view we are trying to sell to you. So you need to
help us get that down on.
The group readily reached agreement about what its goals were in looking for outside
help in understanding the health effects of ionizing radiation.
The goal was not to get someone to say what the truth was. The goal was to get someone to array
the debate and say this group over here thinks this because of that, but these people have these
studies over here and they think this because of that. And that means it's hard-or its easy to assess
the long-term risks. But on short term we have this ability and we know this health physics for
this reason works this way, but we don't know it here. And it isn't going to be a simple
presentation. But the hope was that it wasn't a partisan presentation.
This goal proved acceptable even to members who were skeptical about the ability of the
group to get (or scientists to provide) the 'straight story' because of the distorting
influence of economic and political interests.
I think there is a possibility it may work. In general I think of an NRC consultant is likely to be
[paralyzed] by the federal government's attempt to cover up the low level waste risks. On the
other hand on one particular occasion, much to my surprise, I talked to some NRC scientists, who
I honestly felt when I was talking to them were truly interested in science and reality and weren't a
bunch of salesmen. And I was very happy. And if we could get somebody on the medical aspect
who was like that I think it could be very good.
This goal also set internal challenges that were first recognized by members who were
skeptical about the CAG's ability to meet these challenges. One feared that the distorting
influence of strongly held positions would undermine the ability of the group to
understand the issues.
I just formed my point of view. The people in the room who are going to shoot down anyone,
whoever he is, and fight with him the whole time, and tell him he's crazy, . .Let them get
it off their chest now. . .
These challenges were also articulated by the facilitator who displayed more faith in
the ability of the group to meet the challenge of listening even when members
disagreed with what was being said. He underscored the opportunities that members
would have to engage speakers and to reach and articulate their own conclusions.
This, he suggested, should contribute to a willingness to listen.26
Well he or she [i.e. whoever the group contracted with] may wish they hadn't come after the
discussion or the comment. But I think we could count on everybody to give someone the
26The commitment to look at dissenting views and disagreements was reflected internally in a commitment
to provide support for members who wanted to share information with the group. This also had the effect of
sharing with CAG members the responsibility for ensuring that the group had access to the diversity of
views that existed. See, for example, the conclusions of the first meeting.
"I would like to go one better than that and suggest that there is shared information. I noticed when I
came in today on the table over the Authority's blue handout sheet which is quite misleading and not
totally accurate information. I think there should be some of table set up such that . . distribute."
Facilitator: "I'll go you one better. If you send us the information that you want included in mailings
we'll put it in the mailings. And each group around this table that has material that it wants sent out
that can be presented in a reasonable number of pages, send it to us and we will include it in the
mailings. Certainly if people want to array things here we will alert people to that. And that is the
case that stands for everybody here."
The ctive role that CAG members played in the development of material is clear in the following
exchange:
" Now there are a few other things on the table out there. We want very much for people to feel free to
present any information to folks that they want, so we've put it out there for you. I also feel it's important
to at least give people a chance to draw everyone's attention to what's there and what question it seeks to
answer or what point it seeks to make. There's another document out there."
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courtesy to make their presentation, if we guessed wrong and the person isn't doing what you think
is a fair appraisal, I wouldn't ask anyone to hold back afterwards and say what you disagreed with
and why. But I do hope we'll let someone who travels here to make a presentation, make a
presentation. But I wouldn't ask anyone to agree or not to disagree.
The goal the group had set turned out to be difficult to meet in practice. Problems
arose almost immediately. The first was finding someone who was knowledgeable
enough to provide a competent presentation, yet uncontroversial enough to provide a "fair
appraisal." The following endorsement of one candidate gives an idea of what the group
was looking for.
I said at the very least since he's been in the business as long as anybody and has never taken sides
that I know of, or testified on behalf of a private interest or a citizens' group ... this is what I
know Dave to be able to do. And nobody said no, because probably people hadn't heard of him,
because he's not a partisan and he hasn't been wheeled in by anybody to advocate their favorite
position.
Radioactive waste and nuclear power had a long and contentious history in Maine (as
well as in the nation). Most people who were committed enough to understand the issues
in depth had also become associated, at least peripherally, with one position or another
over time. This protracted strategic contest undermined the possibility of even the
provisional acknowledgement of reasonableness that is necessary to initiate the kind of
conversation the CAG wanted.
"[We] floated those names with several members of the Authority, as you know, and a number of
people said, 'Nope.' --ok you must have been out of that session.--We floated some of the names and
some of the people said, 'Nope, nope. Not that one. Nope, nope not that one.' And, for the reasons you
implied in your comment ' Oh I've heard that one before, that one's so biased, that one's so wrong, that
one's so this. No way I don't want to listen to that again.' And the other way around. 'That one's the
opposite. That one's this. Others will never go along with it. It won't be viewed as useful"'
It seems as if everybody thinks almost everybody in Maine has taken sides one way or another. And
the goal really wasn't to get the combatants to rehearse the combat. The goal was to try to get someone
to review the science without being involved with taking a position one way or another. And what we
wanted to know was, 'What are the health effects?'
27 In a way this is the converse of the situation described in the previous section. There, all validity claims
were treated as claims about truth. Here, all claims are treated as normative. The conversational handicap
posed by the inability to sort out these claims is equally, if not more, debilitating.
The consequence was that the CAG could not externalize the responsibility for an
even-handed summary of different views on health effects.2 8 It was difficult to find
acceptable candidates. The second problem was that those who were viewed as
competent and unbiased often declined so as to preserve the standing that made them
attractive in the first place. The speaker the CAG first turned to declined out of concern
that an association with the group might raise a conflict of interest in his role as a
member of the panel that would review siting proposals from the states.
Eventually a speaker was identified who had an appropriate background and wasn't
immediately culled by strong objections. Before this speaker had the chance to utter a
word to the group, his "objectivity" was questioned because of a previous association
with the nuclear industry. An article in a local newspaper highlighted some comments he
had made for a training film on safety issues that the nuclear industry had made. In this
film he had done exactly what the CAG was asking him to do: discuss what research said
about the health effects of nuclear radiation. Though he received no compensation for his
participation and nothing he said was challenged, this association alone was enough to
undercut his impartiality in the eyes of some members.
At the CAG meeting a member offered the following assessment before the speaker
had even been introduced to the group at the meeting.
I want to state that I have reason to believe that Dr. Webster based on my personal experience
takes a strong position on one side of the issue we're talking about and I'll be interested to see if he
can do an objective job.
28 People on all sides were unable to sort out different validity claims and felt, perhaps from experience,
that people were not able to respond to the different demands that different kinds of conversation make.
Once someone had made a political statement, everything they said was viewed as political.
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The third problem the group faced was that the speaker either did not understand, did
not agree with, or was not able to meet their expectations. What the CAG was looking
for was captured clearly in the facilitator's introduction.
The first question we asked him to speak to is, 'What does the scientific literature say about the
health effects of human exposure to radiation. What does the scientific literature say? What are
the points of agreement? And what are the points of disagreement? . . . Not what does he think.
What does the literature say? What are the points of agreement, what are the points of
disagreement on the human health effects of exposure to radiation ... We can ask Dr. Webster to
bend over backwards to be clear about where there are points of agreement and disagreement in
the scientific literature.
The second thing I asked him to do was to summarize for us what the different views are on
the nature of the risks associated with radiation, particularly radiation related to the kind of
facilities we're talking about. What are the risk assessments? What do they say? What are the
comparative or relative risks?
The presentation did not address these questions, however. From the outset the Dr.
Webster set a different goal for his presentation.
I regard it as a privilege to be here to tell you what I think is the consensus opinion about the
effects of radiation, not only in the U.S., but internationally.
This move to relating the "consensus opinion" effectively dropped the discussion of
disagreements that had figured so prominent in the CAG's goals. The speaker later gave
a clue of what he meant by consensus and how it was interpreted by the panels on which
he was basing his account of international consensus.
There was [a dispute].29 Of course there was. Dr. Radford wrote a minority report of one, one out
of 16. And Dr. Rossi wrote a counter-balancing minority report which said that not only was it
not linear, but that there's no effect at all down there at low doses. And they sort of cancelled each
other out and the other 14 people agreed. So we had a consensus and we have a report.
This view foreshadowed his emphasis on areas of agreement and understanding rather
than on problems or areas of disagreement. Where the CAG looked at disagreement as
symptomatic of the current state of understanding, Dr. Webster treated it as something to
be weeded out by experts and something that was being eliminated through the gradual
29 The dispute was over whether there was a linear relationship between exposure to radiation and health
effects. The dissenting views on one side hold that there is a threshold below which no effects can be
attributed. On the other there is the view that small chronic doses may have a greater effect.
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accumulation of knowledge as, for instance, the current generation of studies was
completed.
But we are getting fairly far along the line of the Japan study now, about half the people have died.
That study will go on to the year 2010, when the babies who were born at that time in 1945 will
be dying. And then we will have the complete story. So we will eventually know the answer,
from Japan, the complete answer. Right now we are only half way to it.
His presentation followed this framework. The first thing he did was to differentiate
his position as an expert from the public who lacked understanding.
I'd like to start by talking about how people feel about radiation and I experience that very much in the
position I hold. People are certainly worried about radiation. Of all the environmental risks which
surround us, some natural, some manmade, radiation is the one which most excites, in my view, the media
and stirs social protests, in evidence in this meeting. Yet the press and the public are, in my view, poorly
informed on the true risks of radiation.
He associated the popular understanding (and by a fairly direct extension the CAG's)
of radiation with the example of a tabloid headline: "Moms give birth to babies that look
like chimpanzees."3 0 He associated the CAG, somewhat more favorably, with others who
come to him with questions about the risk of radiation exposure, questions he was used to
answering: ("And I answer that question, because the radiologists refer the questioners to
me to answer that question.")
Having set this role for himself, Dr. Webster turned to describe some of the major
types of radiation and some of the analytic problems that researchers face in trying to
quantify dose-response relationships. He discussed, for instance, the statistical
difficulties involved in identifying health effects associated with natural variation in
background radiation. He devoted a substantial amount of time to discussing the linearity
hypothesis, that there "is no threshold to radiation damage, that there is a risk all the way down
to a zero dose, to the last photon if you like." This view was significant because most of the
30 One member captured this side of the presentations: "As Dr Webster has so aptly pointed out how badly
ill-informed we are on the nature of nuclear of nuclear waste and nuclear radiation, man-made in
particular."
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standard setting committees had accepted this as the most conservative view. He devoted the
remaining time to discussing other studies and the findings of various committees he had
served on.
Dr. Webster's efforts did not provide the perspective the group had requested. He
was not able to provide a 'view from nowhere,' nor was he able to animate the
perspectives of other researchers. Instead he reported primarily on core beliefs which the
groups he had been affiliated with had endorsed as standards.
Situating the present - After the presentation, CAG members had the opportunity to
interact with the speaker. The general tenor of their reaction is captured in the following
comment.
Frankly, through the past month what I had been expecting from your presentation was a rather
factual explanation of what the different positions were. In other words, this is the majority
position; this is the minority position on one side; this the minority position on the other side. I
didn't hear a single word on the minority position of supra-linearity: which is an increased effect at
low doses over other doses. So far Dr. Webster has been portraying the linear dose response as
entirely the most conservative.
They used the chance to talk to back away from the picture of consensus Dr. Webster
had presented and pursue the complex perspective they had sought initially, something
like what I characterized earlier as a researcher's perspective. The efforts of the group
were important; it is only because CAG members were able to ask questions and interact
with the speaker that they were able to put together something like the more complex
historical view that they said from the beginning they wanted.
One line that members pursued was to bring up studies that conflicted with the
consensus reported by Dr. Webster and ask questions about dissenting views.
Well I know Dr. Webster is familiar with Dr Alice Stewart's work and has brought out her work.
And he says he's not impressed with latest background study. And I agree and Dr Stewart herself
is not impressed with it, though she believes we need more information. But I wonder if he's not
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impressed with the study she did on one x-ray to the pregnant abdomen showing-given 16 million
subjects over a period of years-showing that one x-ray to the pregnant abdomen can increase the
chance of the child's getting cancer before the age of 10 by a great amount. And of course if the
x-ray is taken place earlier in the pregnancy by even more of the risk."
When confronted with direct questions conflicting studies, Dr. Webster was able to
comment.
Well the controversy has to do , the controversy has been raging ever since 1958 when Dr. Stuart
first produced her estimates of the increase in leukemia particularly in children before age 10
whose mothers had been irradiated by x-ray during the pregnancy. And there are, I actually did a
review of that whole study in a publication of mine in 1980 ... and the problem is that there is a
dispute from other studies. For example, there were 1290 women who were pregnant when the a-
bombs fell in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They were followed up for the first 10 years of their lives,
those children, and they found 1 cancer, which was cancer of the liver, which was an expected
number in those 1290 children. They would have predicted about 10 cases of leukemia I think is
the number if Dr. Stuart had been right and they didn't find 10 cases of leukemia. And nobody has
answered that question, 'why is there such a disparity between these 2 studies?' That's one. There
are several other arguments I could use.
Dr. Webster described the controversy as a disparity between two sets of results. The
way he treated this disparity is interesting. He displayed a low tolerance for ambiguity
and moved quickly to resolve the disparity by telling the group how to interpret it. He
chose one study as authoritative and didn't really say why. This is just the opposite of the
norms and goals the CAG had set for itself. The group viewed disparity as itself a piece
of information they needed to understand. Given such disparity the reasons for making
choices about what to believe were especially important.
Other questions exposed other choices Dr. Webster had made for the group. The
question of how this 'editing' had been done became quite explicit in a subsequent
exchange. A CAG member presented some evidence from an EPA document that
disagreed with the view Dr. Webster has presented that a linear relationship between dose
and response is the most "conservative."
A large body of plant and animal data showed reduced effects at low doses for a number of
biological endpoints including radiogenic cancer in animais, particularly rodents. However, no
3 This comment not only raises a controversy, but asserts a new kind of question. Are there sensitive
populations for whom we must be more concerned? It also, in contrast to Dr. Webster's view, treats
disagreement as a flag for concern. His tendency is to discard in the absence of confirming evidence, or
rather to treat disagreement as a form of disconfirmation.
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data for cancer in humans confirm these findings as yet. A few human studies contradict them.
Highly fractionated small doses to human breast tissue are apparently as carcinogenic as large
acute doses. Furthermore, small acute doses, less than 10 rads, to the thyroid are as effective per
rad as much larger doses in initiating thyroid cancer. Moreover, the increased breast cancer
resulting from chronic low dose occupational gamma-ray exposures among British radium dial
painters is comparable to or larger than that expected upon the basis of acute high dose exposures.
Only when challenged directly did Dr. Webster acknowledge the choice he had made
about the type of radiation to discuss and the possibility that the relationship between
dose and response could be influenced by characteristics of the dose.
Yes, that's different. If I could respond to that, since you've triggered something right away.
That's a different kind of radiation from the ones that I was considering. That's known as high L-
E-T radiation and we're talking there about alpha particles. And you're indeed correct. There's a
reverse dose-rate effect, not only for alpha particles, but also for neutrons which are a similar kind
of heavy particles. So its worse to get the radiation slowly for those particular kinds of radiation.
But not for the more conventional types of radiation, betas and gammas.
These exchanges eventually led to a question about how the choices of what to present
and what to leave out had been made.
But the point generally, "Are you leaving something out because you don't agree with it?"
No, I agree with that. I left it out because I was talking mostly about LET radiation. I can give you
another hour on high LET if you like. I didn't bring those slides with me, but I could do it.
This still did not get at the concern many people had about what else might have been
omitted.
The question is, "What are some of the other-if there are other- views about low doses, or low
levels of doses of various kinds of radiation that you may not have touched on that would lead
people to different conclusions perhaps?"
What emerged from this give-and-take was a much more detailed picture of some of
the prominent minority positions and an acknowledgment that at least one of these views
had influenced recent decisions about how standards for exposure should be set.
There are several. There are various minorities, some of them are very small minorities I might
add, but there's John Goffman, for example, who I know quite well who believes there's a
supralinear effect. He's put some material out on it. He put out something in Health Physics
Journal recently. But there's no mechanism and the data that in fact he uses is hotly contested. He
uses Japanese data and people say he uses it in the wrong way.
Now I can't speak to the negative personally because I haven't done that work. I haven't tried to
reproduce his graphs. But that's a fairly consensual opinion. Dr. Goffman is almost unique in the
world of American science. And some of his predictions as a matter of fact have come true, or
seem to be coming true. But not by any means the whole hog so to speak.
The exchange between the CAG and Dr. Webster also highlighted the disparity
between the norms that standard-setting committees follow internally and the norms that
Dr. Webster followed when he summarized the field for the CAG, and by so doing
endorsed the latter as the appropriate basis for judgment and action. The following
comment made by Dr. Webster, gave an indication of the open review these committees
conducted internally and which he had failed to capture in his report on 'consensus.'
Dr Sternglass incidentally, appeared before the BEIR Committee which produced this document in
1980, at his own request. We listened to him for most of an afternoon and we discounted his
ideas. We did not act on them because we felt they were basically hypotheses with no data, no
good data, and certainly no human data, to support them.
The exchange also highlighted the fact that understanding was based on the study of
mistakes which no one would want to repeat. This meant that the relevance of these
historical experiences for new situations, like siting and operating a low-level waste
repository, is always problematic. The group tried several times to bring this relationship
up as an explicit topic without a lot of success. The following interchange is
representative:
Participant: Yes but to get back to the point I made at my earlier time for questions. I was hoping
to have a discussion of a lot of the assumptions and other points of view that are implicit in these
kinds of projections, I wanted to discuss first a little bit more the A-bomb, the symmetry
anomalies. The fact that in the former estimate of those types of rays, it was estimated that most
of the dose in Hiroshima was neutrons.
Dr. Webster: No, not correct. 20%. 20% was originally thought to be neutrons. And of course its
now considered to be much lower.
Participant: But 70% of the leukemias and about 60% of the [colon] cancers were attributed to that
20% of the neutron data.
Dr. Webster: Well, I don't know about the exact percentage but certainly some percentage was,
yeah. It could be like 50% anyway, yeah. If you take 20% and you take into account the higher
effectiveness of neutrons, then you get to a relatively big, relatively high dose from the neutrons.
biologically.
Participant: So what we arrive at is the dose criteria we currently have for a waste facility are
based upon at least this one incorrect set of data.
Dr. Webster: Well they won't be now because there's been a revision of the entire dose situation,
which took about 5 years to do. It's all been published now. And there was a big meeting in
Washington for example, April of 1987. Which was just about 2 years ago, which put all of those
pieces together. And there's now a new dose system, which is considered to be more accurate,
and all of the new estimates of risk are coming out in terms of the new doses, not the old doses.
This exchange illustrates the different attitudes toward belief that characterize the
conversation about health effects. As he had with the disparity between studies, Dr.
Webster downplayed problems with the relationship between evidence and belief.
Previously, he had edited out differences, and moved quickly to resolve ambiguities when
members drew attention to disparities between different sets of findings. In this
exchange, he emphasized the certainty and downplayed the mutability indicated by recent
revisions in the understanding of the "dose system." The CAG members, by and large,
treated disparity as information and the relationship between examples and the situation
of interest as a significant concern.
Dr. Webster's comment also triggered the final piece in the characterization of belief
that emerged from the conversation about health effects. Standards, and indeed the
broader understanding of how to describe doses and their relationship to health effects,
were in flux. Dr. Webster had noted this earlier when he described the influence an
outlying researcher's findings had exerted on scientific consensus and policy standards.
I think we've gone part of the way to meeting [Goffnan's] factor of - I say we, I mean the various
comnittees, particularly the Japanese work-by having a new factor of about 3, an increase by a
factor of 3, that's a long way short of 50. And people have adopted his idea that the future cancer
risk depends on the underlying level of cancer in a population. That is, in other words that
radiation risk is a fraction and not a fixed number of cancer cases every year. And if you do that
you get a bigger number which is along Goffman's lines but nowhere close to that factor of 50
The CAG picked up on the potential significance of such revisions in responding to Dr.
Webster's comment about the reworking the dose situation. They wanted to know the
substantive character of the revisions. One member inquired about how the group should
take this into account in the way it treated standards.
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Participant: I'm curious to know whether any of the DEP and NRC regy have been altered in light
of this information. Or is that too early?
Dr. Webster: Not yet. Not yet. I think what happens is the wheels turn very slowly with
regulatory agencies and I think the first thing that has to happen is that the new BEIR report,
which follows the one I was referring to, has to come out. It's now at least 6 months late and it
will hopefully come out later this year though. And then the National Council on Radiation
Protection has to decide what they're going to do about it. And I'm actually a member of that
committee which will meet next month in Washington, in a preliminary way to see just what the
impact of those new dose, new risk estimates will be. And I already have a good feeling from the
UN committee of course, to what it will be.
Participant: What do you think, can you give us a. .
Dr. Webster: Well I think we will follow the lead of the British who a couple of years ago
tentatively reduced their occupational dose limits by a factor of about 3, from 5 rems per year to
1.5 rems per year as a working modus operandi so to speak. ... With the option that they might
reverse themselves. But I suspect they will not reverse themselves and that will probably stick. So
that already creates some kind of a precedent, and I suspect that the NCRP, national council in the
U.S., will go fairly close, they may not go down by 3, they may go down by 2, but they'll
certainly go down. I'm almost sure of that.
Participant: This would be important to keep in mind as we're looking at criteria for the disposal
facility that things as they exist may not be that way in a few years.
Participant: Moreover, this group might want to recommend that the authority take account of regs
tougher than what is required on the grounds that there is this scientific evidence moving in that
direction.
Setting their understanding of health effects in the context of this ongoing process of
development completed this round of trying to understand the issue.32 It contributed to
the group's effort to treat science as a complex and moving target. By highlighting the
differences in beliefs that exist in the present they tried to capture, in a snapshot, the
dynamic character that beliefs exhibit over time. Situating existing standards relative to
their history and to revisions that were being contemplated augmented this developmental
picture of belief.
The picture of health effects that finally emerged from this meeting was complex. It
met most of the goals that the CAG had set. The group got an appreciation of the major
disagreements that characterized the field, a sense of the found experiments that underpin
32 The group would revisit this issue later and bring in other speakers to who had different perspectives.
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the summary figures reflected standards, and a feel for the effort to revise that was
underway at the time.
Several things are notable about this portrait. It was an active construction that
hinged on the involvement of CAG members. The group could not externalize the
responsibility to provide the kind of portrait they felt was necessary. To construct the
kind of understanding they felt was appropriate, the group acted on internal norms that
resemble the internal standards of the committees whose findings they were reviewing.
This meant that they needed to understand a diverse set of views and how these had been
(and continued to be) revised over time. They also had gauge the relationship between
views at the margin and the center to try to get a sense of whether we are about to enter a
period in which belief will stabilize or a period of dramatic revision. Finally, they sought
to understand the relationship between the small set of historical examples that this
understanding was based on and the problems they faced. By taking responsibility in
these ways for the terms in which they understood health effects, the CAG was fulfilling
a substantive obligation. Their efforts contributed to what I have called the historical
present.
Managing History
In this section I want to examine a third reframing that completed the constitutional phase
of the process. This involved reinterpreting at a technical level the way the group
understood the problem it faced. The critical event in this refraining was a presentation
by Dr. Richard Charlesworth who worked at the Canadian low-level radioactive waste
facility at Chalk River. At the time of Dr. Charlesworth's presentation, the CAG had
already set the terms in which it was willing to act at both the broad political level and at
the level of practice within the group. It had looked at one of the questions of human
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health impacts and, as we saw in the preceding section, crafted a situated understanding
that captured the dynamic quality of belief. At this point the group turned to take a look
at what other groups who had dealt with low-level radioactive waste had found.
This set the stage for Dr. Charlesworth's presentation. In my analysis I will be trying
to bring out the aspects of his presentation that led to an explicit reorientation in the
group. This reorientation was articulated at the meeting that followed Dr. Charlesworth's
presentation and is captured in the statement below.
I think it would be foolish for us not to acknowledge the fact that the shape and the nature of the
conversation has changed in the last four months within this circle. It has. I think Dr.
Charlesworth's crystallization of it has altered everybody's thinking. The thing we're looking at
looks different from what it did before. And I think it's impossible for us not to keep this
distinction in our mind and wonder when we're asked about criteria or to consider proposals,
which is it we're talking about? Are we talking about disposal? Are we talking about short term
storage, intermediate term storage? What's the relationship between them?' It's just emerged. It
wasn't there before.33
The group looked at the problem of radioactive waste in a different way after Dr.
Charlesworth's presentation. This was tied to other things changes that had occurred in
the group. The CAG had differentiated itself from the Authority, viewed its goals in
different terms, and had articulated internal standards of participation. The group had
taken on the problem of health effects and, in doing so, defined a relationship between
the group and technical experts and, more to the point, begun to take a historically
situated view of their situation and task. Thus, while Dr. Charlesworth's presentation
clearly did have the catalytic effect that precipitated the "crystallization" referred to
3 Compare this description of how the change in belief occurred to the two possibilities raised by Charles
Sabel. (1993) "How is reflexivity possible? What , precisely, is the relation between reflexivity and
sociability? I do not know, and suspect I have lots of excellent company in my ignorance. There is no
agreement, for example on such basic questions as whether the reflexive self should be conceived
hierarchically -- the self, in Sen's language, as a ranking of rankings -- or polyarchically -- the self, in
Minsky's terms, as a community of "agents" or "voices" jabbering at each other until by rules that may
differ from occasion to occasion, one opinion prevail. Still less is there a settled understanding of the
reflexive self in relation to social groups. " p. 89
above, the group had, in fact, already begun to move in the direction suggested by Dr.
Charlesworth's comments.
The key to understanding the effect of his presentation lies not as much in the
information he provided, but in the sensibility or attitude to practice that he modeled.
Because this view has clear implications for the view of intergenerational ethics I am
trying to develop, I will analyze it in detail.
Two aspects of Dr. Charlesworth's presentation contributed to this reorientation.
First, his account of the history at Chalk River was a story about the development of
practice. Many of the events that had the greatest influence on the history at Chalk River
are those when people acted first and only later completed the action by tracking its
significance. What characterized practice at Chalk River was not the veracity of the
predictions that actions were based on, but the commitment of the people involved to
learn from their mistakes and to reflect this learning in their practice.
Dr. Charlesworth's description of practice layered the past on the present and
suggested a model of agency simultaneously engaged with the past and the future. This
embellishment raised the possibility that actors in the present might be able to exercise a
kind of reflexive reasoning about their situation. It created an agent with the temporal
equivalent of the reflexive self --a self that can see, for example, the past as present and
the present as past."04 Such an agent is at least potentially capable of holding a
3 The reflexive self can see "the other as self and the self as other. There are other examples of the
extension of reflexivity to temporal relationships. Michael Wheeler (1987) describes such a view in his
discussion of "prospective hindsight" where he suggests that actors in the present might want to inform
their judgments by imagining themselves at some point in the future looking back at their current situation.
Ernest Gellner (1 985)has explicitly discussed the similarity between reasoning about other persons and
other times. "In the human sphere, external experience of reduplication, contact with a second reality
behind appearance, occurs in ... two forms: through the multiplicity of persons and through the passage of
time. Let us take time as an example. A strict empiricist, nonreduplicationist, positivist attitude to the past,
for instance, is to treat it simply as equivalent to the evidence about 'what we call the past' in the present,
93
historically situated view of the present and of informing action oriented to the future on
the basis of this sensibility. Thus while the present self cannot exhaust the past or predict
the future with certainty, it can engage them and bring this into play in present action.
Let me turn first to some of the ways in which Dr. Charlesworth demonstrated action
preceding understanding. Two prominent events early in the history of Chalk River have
shaped the operators' understanding of the goals of practice and the best way to pursue
those goals. The first of these occurred in 1952 when the NRX research reactor at the
Chalk River facility had a serious accident.
The picture shows the start of our waste management operations in 1946. But the thing that gave
them the largest impetus happened in 1952 when the NRX research reactor had a rather serious
accident. That accident forced us to do a number of things which we have benefited from since.
Naturally we would have avoided them if we could, but it was operator error in that case, and we
ended up with NRX with a million gallons of contaminated water in the basement.
This created a need to act, to make a choice, in a moment whose character is
captured Dr. Charlesworth's question, "What do you do when faced with that actual
situation?" In this case, the Chalk River staff turned to what available and disposed
of the contaminated water, over a ridge, in a nearby site that they had been using for
solid waste disposal. 5 This was done on the basis of available knowledge with the
understanding that this knowledge was incomplete.
Now it wasn't with all the knowledge that we have today, but there was the base knowledge
that soils retard the movement of many chemical species. And we knew that it worked for
which alone is now eligible for experience. But we do not really believe that the past is merely the marks
of the past in the present. . . . . The past was once present, as the present and it was real. The acts of
historical personages that explain certain marks in the present are not merely, ammaries of those marks.
They 'really' existed, and they explain those marks in this philosophically 'realist' way. Their being is not
exhausted by their role as premises from which current data follow. They have a true reality of their own,
transcending their explanatory instrumentality. And we believe the same, whether we can prove it, in
connection with the independent existence of other selves."
" "And what we did was go back up over the ridge into the Perch Lake basin. And there's a rock basin.
The good property of that area is that water drains to Perch lake and then there is one stream that flows out
from the lake into the Ottawa river. This is the area, our so-called A Area. We had been using it for solid
waste up until that time , but trenches were dug and the water seeped into the soil."
some of the main ones, but there were many nuclides and many chemical behaviors, that we
didn't know about at that time.
Beyond the physical problems, this event was significant because it triggered an
examination of beliefs and of practice. In Dr. Charlesworth's words it "started us on
our learning process." This learning process changed understanding and practice in
some direct ways. It led, for example, to a revision in some of the assumptions that
had been made about the behavior of radioactive material in soils. They began to
monitor and track the waste that was dumped in the trenches. The damage wasn't as
catastrophic as they had thought. Some of the radionuclides escaped the site:
Some of those curies ... went with the groundwater into Perch Lake and I imagine those that
didn't decay on the way went out to the Ottawa River. The same goes for the tritium because the
holdup in that system is of the order of ten years transport time. So those activities that have a
half-life that means they didn't decay in a 10 year period and were mobile, are gone.
But most, it turns out, were retained. The sandy soils were a better barrier to
migration than had been anticipated.
Most, and were talking about a very large most, are within that small area where we pumped
them. They're detectable on the sands if you bring up the sands. And it turns out that sands, we
may think of them as mostly quartz and silica, have other components and the ferrous hydroxide
coat on them happens to provide a fair bit of retardation from most of the important nuclides.
This made Chalk River staff look at shallow land burial differently and to continue to
use the technique for certain classes of waste. One outcome of the accident was a
better understanding of how radioactive isotopes behave in the local environment.
Another was a change in practice.
[A]fter that first experience of seeing that retention of the important nuclides was, pretty good--
not perfect but pretty good--we continued to use that technique for dilute liquid wastes and some
of those liquid wastes contain tritium. And so, over the years, we have continued to put liquid
wastes in that area and to monitor where it was going and learn from that experience.
This pattern of planning future actions on the basis of monitoring the results of past
mistakes carried over to the planning for a new waste facility at Chalk River. The
site for this facility was selected in no small part because it was the site of another
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major accident. The release of radioactive material into the environment had allowed
staff to "calibrate" the site by monitoring the behavior of this material.
One of our other chunks of past history is way back in the fifties we were doing some fuel
reprocessing and that involved ammonium nitrate. We had our only fatal accident in our 40 plus
years due to an ammonium nitrate explosion. On a much bigger scale you've heard that it
happened in the Soviet Union as well. But we decided that we needed to destroy that ammonium
nitrate as a safety precaution. We built a plant and things didn't go right again, and, this time due
to a process upset, we dumped a fair bit of radioactivity into the ground. But let's learn from our
mistakes, and we've been tracking that plume ever since. This as a trace. All these little dots
around are bore holes around where we've gone down sampled soil, sampled water. And this is
now a very good source of knowing the long term behavior of nuclides in our environment. And
in fact right about where that square is [refers to slide]is where were going to put our first IRUS
unit with its calibrated hydrogeolgy right beside it.
This pattern of acting and then discovering the significance of the action also
occurred in an incremental fashion in ongoing developments in practice. For
instance, the redesign of the disposal trenches was driven by field observation of how
actual waste handling practices affected the concrete walls.
And one of the things our experiences with the earlier long rectangular trenches was that because
you are putting wastes into these trenches you are certainly going to have heavy vehicles running
up right alongside them, cranes and the rest of it. We observed a couple of walls crack and so
obviously they weren't designed heavy enough for that and the better way is to go to a found
system that has much better resistance to the soil pressures form heavy equipment that might be
in the vicinity.
Monitoring also pointed out the need to embellish practices with mitigation
measures. This led, for instance, to changes in shallow land burial practices
designed to mitigate the release of tritium.
As I mentioned, we still use burial for the lowest levels of wastes. This is our C area [refers to a
slide]. But experience said that our reactors generate a fair amount of tritium and some of that
gets into the wastes. And we saw a tritium plume out from these areas, so we have covered the
completed part with a polyethylene membrane and that hqd a very marked effect on cutting off
the tritium release from this area.
The interplay between action and reflection prompted more than incremental
changes in knowledge and practices. Over time, it also prompted the actors at Chalk
River to change the terms in which they understood their practice. What they
originally thought of as disposal, they came to later see as storage. I believe this
shift is the most explicit and accessible example of a deeper reconceptualization of
practice in more self-consciously historical terms. To illustrate this new perspective,
let me first show how Dr. Charlesworth described the transition from disposal to
storage, and then share some examples of how this was expressed in design and
practice.
Dr. Charlesworth framed his presentation as "a chronological story of where we
started and where we are today" narrated from the position of someone "deeply involved
in the work we're doing in Canada." The story
... starts in 1946 February. This [referring to a slide] is the first waste that was buried at Chalk
River. At the time I'm sure that people said this is the waste that was disposed of at Chalk River.
We've since accepted the position that that particular way of handling that particular waste is
storage. And so we're continuing to look at it. But it does have some properties that have run
through our experience over the years.
Note that the layering I discussed above is already evident in this opening
statement. To understand what was going on in February, 1946 you have to see how
the beliefs people held then are tied to current beliefs, which differ. Identity is
created out of continuity between beliefs, not consistency. 36 The particular moment
in time cannot be captured in terms of that moment alone. To understand the moment
you need to relate it to the past or the future, or both. At Chalk River, this dynamic is
revealed most explicitly when those who have changed their mind interact with others
who have not.
As I said, when we started out doing this I'm sure people thought of it as disposal. In fact, many
of our long term employees still refer to this as Disposal Area B. We have tried to say it's Waste
Management Area B, it's not disposal. But that indicates that that was the thought there many
years ago.
36 For a discussion of the issues attached to this see Parfit, 1984.
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This layering of the past on the present is also expressed in the physical landscape at
Chalk River. Wastes from the past stand out in the fields at the site and prompt
reflection on past events and as well as monitoring of current status of these artifacts.
And so this little bump you see out in the middle of the field [referring to a slide] is the main
vessel from NRX from that accident. And we replaced that vessel and were back operating that
reactor about eighteen months later.
Here [slide of a large concrete object being hauled by a piece of heavy equipment] coming up the
road from the laboratories is the NRU vessel pulled along the road on a skid. And it's heading
for our waste management area. And, as you'll see, we have some areas of deep sand, and it's
buried there. And there it sits today and we watch and monitor and know that we aren't seeing
activity moving away from it.
This layered picture of time was captured most explicitly when Dr. Charlesworth
described the Chalk River facility as a museum from which people, in the present, can
read the historical development of practice.
Because we used that waste management area for the million gallons of water, we opened up a
new area in 1953 and this [a slide of a field with low structures in it] is the area that has been
receiving most of our wastes over that time. I like to refer to it as a museum because it has a
number of facilities in it that trace the development of our storage activities. This area down here
[referring to a slide] was a continuation of straight burial in the sand above the water table. Here
we have a number of concrete facilities. Some small ones here. The current area of operation
back here.
The development of this historical awareness was accompanied by an effort to
develop a sensibility about the future.
And time-frames is one of our real difficulties, getting a mental picture of what short time is.
Short time is 10 years to 100 years. Long times are, of course, many hundreds of years. So we
have to calibrate in that way and treat the waste in a way that's suitable for 100 years -- if it's
going to be innocuous in that period -- or look after it in the very long term if it won't be.
The efforts to bring the past and the future into the present eventually prompted a
broader reconsideration of practice.
And some part way down our history, in re-examining what we were doing, we said, 'Well, this
looks very neat and nice. But is that really disposal? Have we done all that needs to be done?'
By the time they were able to ask this question, the
obvious answer was, 'No. This is storage.' And so that change of thinking occurred in the early
70s.
This "change of thinking" clearly had implications for the way they understood and
approached their practice. It meant placing less emphasis on isolating waste and paying
more attention to the waste on an ongoing basis.
What we mean by it is, storage does require active care. You must monitor. You must keep
surveillance on the site until you either retrieve the material, or the hazard has decayed away, or
you've done further isolating steps that allow you to say, 'We now have permanent disposal.'
This new orientation and layered historical sensibility had specific implications for
practice at Chalk River. Treating waste management as storage meant acting as if
"there's going to be another step later." This played prominently in Dr. Charlesworth's
description of what it meant to treat practice as storage.
And storage tends to be influenced by the handling requirements. You've got to take a waste
from where it is and put it where you want to maintain it and monitor it. And that movement
process is the main objective that you need to face. Because if you have now agreed that this is
storage, then there's going to be another step later. And that's going to be another requirement
for handling the waste.
The new understanding took time to penetrate practice. Efforts to redesign methods
to reflect the new orientation sometimes fell short. Transitions in beliefs are captured
by juxtapositions of the new understanding of practice on top of design details that
reflect the old beliefs.
There are some of these tile holes that have experimental fuel in them. If we were to say we've
done all we're going to do, then they would need to be watched for centuries. But obviously that
is not a commitment we should be making: to take something that is up at surface with exposed
caps and say we are fairly sure that this won't deteriorate in that time period. So the recognition
was made at that, that this is storage. But if it is storage, then we aren't going about it in the right
way. And so we started to change our designs. We did recognize this on some tile holes, and
this [referring to slide] is one of the original arrays. That thing should have a removable top put
on it. Because it was fuel elements put into these holes, and we knew that we would want to take
them out. Though these waste were recognized as needing another step later, it really hadn't
penetrated our planning process that these would need another step.
In numerous other examples Dr. Charlesworth described more fully developed
examples of what I would like to call reflexive practice. By this I mean practices that
express an embellished present, engaged with the past and anticipating the future. In
some cases this translated directly into changes in the design, as with the need for
removable caps on storage tiles stopping the practice of mounding earth over tiles
once they're filled.
But because of this recognition that we were storing not disposing, we changed the design of our
long trenches so that they had removable caps. We stopped putting sand in on top of the waste,
because what does that do? If you are committed to removing this waste at a future time, it
means that you not only have the waste, but you have some sand that you have to remove from
around those wastes and that may have become contaminated. And if you've poured a concrete
cap on top then you aren't going to retrieve those wastes easily. It's going to require that you get
at them much more easily. So we went to removable tops on the trenches and stopped the
backfilling with sand for those we really needed to get at in the future.
This reorientation also implied an effort to look for the unexpected. The sense that
you "know what you're doing" is tied to an effort to work with, rather than anticipate
problems.
The quick answer has to be of course they do if they contain volatile activities. But most
radioactive nuclides that are in there are essentially nonvolatile. Very early after the placement
of isotope generating waste, for example iodine 131, you may have small amounts of iodine that
could be vented. But that's part of making sure you treat it as storage rather than disposal, in that
you monitor to see how much does escape, to minimize it, to work with it, so that you know what
you're doing.
It also meant directly trying to influence the predictability of events.
We early recognized that the form of the waste was important. Whether you are storing of
disposing of waste the form can be important. . . [We have a] system for concentrating waste,
and then the concentrates from those streams incorporated through several types of equipment
into a bitumen matrix. Roof tar is as good a description of the mix we use, for exactly the reason
it's used on roofs. One of the main considerations that we're trying to accomplish is prevent the
mixing of water and the wastes. So if you put a waterproof envelope around it, you're part-way
there. And in fact our processing is mainly concerned with getting the right waste form. It also
means we get volume reduction which means we have less waste to handle which has its
advantages. But getting smaller volume to cut down costs isn't a good approach because you'll
find that operating a system like this doesn't save you money, but it does give you a waste form
that now is more predictable.
Finally, it included recognition of the limits of knowledge.
And one of the important items is that we want to know how the vault interior environment is
going to interact with the waste. Because that's an experience that we don't have because most
of our time scales and such have not been able to tell us how does waste diffuse when you bottle
it up for a couple of centuries. So we know quite a lot about diffusion, but we need to know what
conditions are existing in that vault.
The broader implications of this reflexive view were brought out in a comment a
CAG member made after Dr. Charlesworth's presentation.
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My assumption is that the chronological presentation ought to raise a question which is, "Given what
you now know at Chalk River, about what you didn't know in 1940 and 50 and 60, what are you doing
now to take account of the rapid acceleration and learning that we've seen historically? In other
words, if you see the pictures from the 50s and you say, 'God. How could we have done that? We
would never do that again.' Why do we imagine that in 1999 we won't think about 1989 or 79 in the
same way? And if you have that perspective, how does it alter your sense of how to proceed with the
problem of avoiding difficulties or risks, or imagining that what can go wrong will go wrong, and you
'hen have to take account of that?
Here the notion of historical reflexivity is played out in full. The speaker's sense of
the present is informed by trying to see the past as present and he tries to inform the
relationship to the future by imagining it as past.
Running through these examples of practice is an attitude of engagement. The roots
of this are in a view that the activity they are engaged in at Chalk River is, at bottom,
experimental.
We did some things--and we're still talking back in the fifties--that we thought would be
permanent. And we had a number of, we'll call them intermediate levels wastes, which we
solidified by mixing them with cement. That's a technique that was novel at that time but is quite
common these days. And having solidified that waste in drums, these drums were put into these
forms, again over the water table, but well down under the surface--and then the whole thing filled
with concrete so we have a monolith construction. We're an experimental organization so we
usually take opportunities to learn some things at the same time so, one was eventually filled
with a bitumen mixture as two ways of doing it and lets watch and see what happens. And, again
as demonstration that we are a research outfit, we built a small one up at this end filled with
bitumen and a small one down at this end filled with concrete and put special monitoring tubes in
so we could watch it. And so we have these monoliths with literally hundreds of curies of cesium
and strontium in them and they have been there for well over thirty years and our monitoring is
not detecting anything escaping from them. So thac's a good sign. But, as a I say, we characterize
all that we have done to date as storage and we will have to qualify it further if we want to make it
say that it's disposal.
They have generalized this attitude of experimentation until it has a social expression.
Consider for example the level of the implications of the kind of commitment to
monitoring described below.
In fact there's a chain of lakes down here so that hydro-geologically the site is pretty much of an
island in the middle of the Ottawa river. And so that means that we must take that into
consideration in what we do, but that also means that we recognize that a lot of monitoring needs
to be done. And so many of the little streams are monitored on afrequent basis: depending on the
particular importance of the stream either on an annual, or a monthly, or a daily basis.
This generalized attitude of research was articulated soon after this when Dr.
Charlesworth described the view of the site and surrounding area that has developed at
Chalk River and the way that what began as waste disposal has extended to include a
general program of environmental research.
As I've said our whole site is an environmental laboratory really, and so we've put a lot of effort
into studying the ecosystems that are there. And so we are watching the populations of fish as
well as their general health and so on.
The basis for this program of research is the history of waste management activities that
have resulted in a semi-regular release of radionuclides. The obligation to mitigate
releases has been extended to understanding the behavior of these chemicals in the
environment.
Through waste management activities and direct experiments we have radionuclides in the
environment and we can examine, for example, atmospheric studies of [ambient] tritium. If you
have tritium in the water, does it evaporate and spread far, or does it affect the surrounding
vegetation? Aquatic studies: what are the plants doing in the way of picking up nuclides or not
picking them up? Groundwater studies: this particular one [referring to a slide] was looking at
dispersion. As groundwater flows, how much do the contaminants disperse? Depending on the
velocity of flowing and the like and of course the soil.
From what Dr. Charlesworth described it seems like many of the people who live near the
site become involved or at least rub shoulders with this activity. In response to a question
of about whether people feel comfortable with the facility in ways that would be
expressed, for example, by fishing in the lake that has had tritium released into it, Dr.
Charlesworth replied.
Yes they do. The regional governments in our area--Deep River, Chalk River, and so on--have
banded together and put a resolution to a federal task force saying, 'I know you're looking for a
national repository, please consider our area for it.' So I think that's about as good a way of
saying that the people who are there now are comfortable. They're aware of what were doing,
many of them are helping do it and they are integrated with the activity.
Toward the end of his presentation Dr. Charlesworth returned to the idea of disposal.
Despite the reorientation to storage, the staff at Chalk River were looking to move to a
disposal system. The primary reason for this was intergenerational ethics.
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We are trying to accommodate today's needs so that they're looked after and not passed on to the
group of people coming along, the next generation. Storage age doesn't do that. Storage means
that you're going to have to do something again ... And so we are convinced that though storage
is serving us well right now, our long term objective should be disposal. And so our current
program is to move from that storage system to a disposal system.
This return to disposal as a goal is an effort to hang onto an ideal of technologically based
sovereignty that the future is knowable or predictable enough that we can complete our
actions and cut the tie to the future. It is based on a persistent belief in a transcendent
moment when we know that our obligations are fulfilled, when we will be able to
anticipate and respond to all eventualities and say, with confidence, that there is no
longer a need to watch, to interact.
Our method must be to create a model of what's going to happen in the future years so that we can
to the best of our abilities predict what should happen and what could happen.
Permanent disposal requires that we put it all together and plan for the whole system and that
includes looking at the waste form, at the engineered barriers, at the vault structure, and, of course,
the site. They work together and that's what I mean by a system.
This idea, of course, stands in direct contradiction to the body of experience he has just
finished describing. As Dr. Charlesworth himself acknowledged:
We know perfectly well that when you get around to operating a real facility we'll find that there
are things we didn't think of in advance and the first one will teach us much of what the second
one should be like. So we need to address how do we know with sufficient assurance that what
we're planning to do will be adequate for the long term.
Moreover, even the planning and modeling Dr. Charlesworth described included the
possibility of uncontrolled releases of radioactivity into the environment.
Of course, if this is our underground vault, we must have some ways of assessing what happens
when the roof starts to leak and some radionuclides get out into the aquifer and are pulled into the
well by a local resident and he uses them for irrigation, and drinking and eating, and feeding his
livestock and soon.
Thus it seems that the lessons have still not fully penetrated the planning process. The
present is only completed in the future. Thus we are interconnected with the future, we
will be the past that shapes it. The goal of disposal is an attempt to assert a "kind of
sovereignty, a self-contained isolation, a solipsistic fantasy of omnipotence. Here, to be
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autonomous would mean either to be utterly alone needing no one and nothing outside
oneself."3 7
The CAG members captured the significance of Dr. Charlesworth's presentation in the
following terms.
It's very hard to plan long term. Lots is going to change, all kinds of things are going to happen,
and you shouldn't turn your back on it [the waste] and assume it was disposed . . .And the more
you think of it as storage, the more you're going to monitor, the more you're going to worry about
it, the more you're going to worry about moving it and doing other things. You're going to plan all
that as if it's not solved.
These difficulties led them to re-express their sense of practice in terms that
acknowledged the interconnectedness and incompleteness that characterized experience
in Dr. Charlesworth's presentation and in their own emerging sense of the problems
associated with radioactive waste disposal. One member captured this sense of practice
by framing it as "engagement" which he contrasted directly with the effort to isolate that
disposal involves.
The general approach it seems to me we're using and which underlies these exclusion criteria that
we are going to talk about is the approach of separation and disengagement--that is we try to
separate ourselves form the waste and we try to disengage form the waste. It seems to me that an
alternative approach would be an approach of integration and participation. And I think that this
was covered a little bit this morning in the difference between storage and disposal. And my
suggestion might be that we think more of integrating the waste into culture and actively
participating in it because we can't see what's going to happen in the faure and we have to thin in
terms ofperpetual maintenance, rapid response times and monitoring, a much more active
approach to waste than the static fortress approach.
Another participant embellished this notion.
The notion of engagement is more than just the notion of planning for it. The notion of
engagement is to say we have to define the problem as one in which whatever we do, we do it in a
way so that we live close to this. And that puts an additional burden on us in defining the solution.
As opposed to one in which we define a solution in which we can put this away from ourselves. If
you had to redesign Chalk River now as a storage/disposal facility in which everybody could also
live and work there, I mean you would want people to feel comfortable to move nearby, fish in the
river and so on.
Thus this reflected a substantial shift in the CAG's understanding of the way in which it
should understand and act on its responsibilities to the future. The most dramatic aspect
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of this shift is the move from seeing the present as complete to understanding it as
inherently incomplete and tied to the future. This underscores the moral and political
nature of the relationship to the future even as it make it more problematic.
CONCLUSION
Each of the sections above describes a different way in which the CAG members
responded to a practical situation that had clear implications for future generations.
Together, these sections illustrate how the CAG invested their conversation with a sense
of its broader significance, a sense that I call the historical present. The historical present
is an attempt to treat the present as if you are looking at it from the perspective of
someone in the future. The closest analogy we have for this is our own relationship with
the past.
Looking at the present, as if it is the past, leads you to treat it differently. First, you
see that what is taken for granted or assumed often becomes controversial. Because
goals, questions, and assumptions play such a prominent role in shaping the discussion
they must be treated as if they are controversial. The significance of the CAG's effort to
challenge the assumptions that set the initial problem and their efforts to reframe the
goals in terms they could accept, can be understood as a contribution to the creation of a
historical present. They were efforts to treat as controversial what easily could have been
taken for granted.
Looking at the present as history (or our own history as present), it is also clear that
knowledge is corrigible, even if we cannot be certain exactly how and when it will
change. The terms in which a problem like health effects is understood today are likely
to change over time, and, in fact may change because of experiences like living next to a
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low-level radioactive waste disposal facility. In addressing the health effects issue, the
CAG brought an appreciation of this character of knowledge into play. They sought to
capture the play that occurs over time by looking at understanding in the present in terms
of the disagreements that characterize the field, as well as the agreements. These
disagreements are likely to be the source of change and give the best sense, in the present,
of how dramatic the shifts may be and in the directions in which they may occur.
Thus by looking at the diversity of beliefs that characterized the contemporary
understanding of the health effects of low-level ionizing radiation, the CAG members
expressed an understanding of their historical standing with respect to the future. This
was augmented by their effort to treat standards as emerging out of a process of change
and constantly subject to revision.
Finally, in refraining their understanding of the problem they faced from disposal to
storage the CAG expressed a view about practice. Dr. Charlesworth's presentation
brought home the fact that the basis for action is always incomplete. One of the things
that experience reveals is the ways in which action was based on incomplete theory or
information. The entire experience at Chalk River can be understood as an effort to cope
with and build constructively on this incompleteness.
Storage, or even more clearly the goal of engagement, is an effort acknowledge and
respond to this incompleteness. It defines responsibility in terms of vigilance -- the
ongoing effort to monitor, track, and look for the unexpected -- and learning -- the effort
to bring new insights and information into play in the design of new actions. 3 8 By
changing from a view that what they were talking about was disposal rather than storage,
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the CAG made a commitment to treat radioactive waste management in terms of this kind
of ongoing commitment to inquiry and to take up the institutional questions that this view
raises.
In each of these three ways, by treating the accepted as controversial, the fixed as
corrigible, and the known as incomplete, the CAG members invested their own practice
with a sense of the present as a historically situated moment. We act in the space
between a past we do not fully understand and a future to which we have moral and
political obligations, without a full appreciation of how time will color our choices. The
historical present is an effort to express concerns about our relationship to the past and
the future in the way we treat the present.
3838 Especially by recasting action so that it promotes the kind of discovery and reflection that are critical
for learning. This is called second-loop learning or deutero-learning. See Argyris and Schon 1996 for a
discussion.
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Chapter 4
Common Sense
In Chapter Three I gave an account what the CAC accomplished and described its
importance. The significance of their achievement is underscored by the experience of
the DOE that I reviewed in Chapter Two. There, despite a strong preference for formal
methods of decision-making and the resources and authority to proceed, the analysis of
intergenerational ethics focused, in the end, on the critical role of public participation in
developing a legitimate response to intergenerational obligations.
This conclusion is consistent with the CAG's experience. The group's ability to
address concerns about future generations hinged on their ability to have a particular kind
of conversation. The significance of this commitment to conversation, I have argued,
should be not understood solely in terms of the explicit reasoning with regard to
intergenerational obligations that it facilitated, but can itself be understood as a response
to these obligations. The CAG's achievement is doubly significant because it did not
require a highly specialized and orchestrated cast, but was wrought out of the plain cloth
of common sense and the ordinary life of a group of citizens, with the help of a
facilitator, and the foresight of the Authority.
The emphasis that the DOE's analysis put on public involvement raises a question
about the CAG. The group's accomplishment was a specific event that emerged out of
the interaction of a particular group of actors who responded to a unique set of historical
circumstances. It is not possible to disregard these contingencies in assessing their
achievement. The question is whether, while recognizing the specific historical character
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of the events, some aspects of the CAG's experience might be generalized in a way that
could improve the odds that their achievement might be replicated?
I believe it is possible to make this leap, and safer if it is grounded in a detailed
understanding of practice. Thus, I will first provide an analysis of the conversational
practice that was critical to the CAG's success. Then I will comment on how this practice
might be understood as responding to concerns about democratic legitimacy. I conclude
with a discussion of the general implications for practice.
REASON GIVING AND CONVERSATION
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the CAG's conversation was the central
role that reasons played. Reasons provided a kind of common ground that enabled
participants to compare different kind of claims. For instance they provided a ground on
which claims about personal welfare could be compared with claims about the broader
interests of the people of the State of Maine.1 They also provided a ground on which the
CAG members could investigate what lay behind such claims, explore new possibilities,
and to test the claims they were making. Let me begin by tracing the role that reasons
and reason-giving played in the CAG's discussions. I have highlighted some aspects of
This character of personal welfare as a reason is discussed in Scanlon (1982). "ifn particular,
contractualism can account for the apparent moral significance of facts about individual well being, which
utilitarianism takes to be fundamental. Individual well-being will be morally significant. . . not because it
is intrinsically valuable or because promoting it is self-evidently a right-making characteristic, but simply
because an individual could reasonably reject a form of argument that gave his welfare no weight. This
claim of moral significance is, however, only approximate, since it is a further difficult question exactly
how 'well-being' is to be understood and in what ways we are required to take account of the well-being of
others in deciding what to do. It does not follow from this claim, for example, that a given desire will
always and everywhere have the same weight in determining the rightness of an action that would promote
its satisfaction, a weight proportional to its strength of 'intensity'. The right-making force of a person's
desires is specified by what might be called a conception of morally legitimate interests. Such a conception
is a product of moral argument; it is not given, as the notion of individual well-being may be, simply by the
idea of what it is rational for an individual to desire. Not everything for which I have a rational desire will
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this in Chapter Three. Much of the discussion about citizenship, for instance, related to
what were and weren't acceptable discursive practices. Moreover, the groundrules were
proposed and accepted as a set of rules that would help people talk to each other and that
would support the "debate of ideas" that CAG members saw themselves creating.
The Importance of Conversation
The importance of conversation was reaffirmed periodically. The debate about
changing groundrules to limit the number of members of the Authority who could attend
meetings is a good example. Two reasons were given for limiting participation. One had
to do with the difficulties involved in reaching consensus: the more Authority members
present, the more difficult the process would be, and the more pull the Authority would
exert on the conversation.2 The second rationale was that it gave a false image of the
group and contributed to its external legitimacy in a misleading way.3
In deciding to sustain the existing arrangements, the group examined and reaffirmed
its sense of what was valuable about the process. One of the members who had raised
this concern initially, later clarified his objection. In doing so he stressed the importance
of conversation.
Want[ed] to hear from the Authority. I want every member on the Authority to be here, and I think
they should be able to be here so they can explain their side of things. But when it comes to sitting around
this table I think there should only be one Authority member at the table.
be something in which others need concede me to have a legitimate interest which they undertake to weigh
in deciding about what to do." pp. 118-119.
2 "The reason I brought that point up is, if we're going to be reaching consensus that would change the
numbers in trying to reach consensus."
3 "I think the problem was it seemed to make the numbers increase and give the appearance that there were
more so-called citizen advisors than Authority members and that's been a trouble to people who are worried
about a dump in Maine."
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Another member endorsed the Authority's full participation, pointing out that the
unimpaired ability to participate in the conversation was central to the way the CAG
operated.
The way we have the groundrules set up if there were only one person here, only one member of the
authority would be able to speak and I see the Authority as resource people who could help us out very
much if we have an issue that needs to be explained. And I would think that the more members we had who
are able to speak, the better off we would be in terms of getting information. I don't see that its detrimental
to have them all sitting around. Unless we decided to change the rules if they sat as observers that they
could chime in at any point they wanted to.
This view was endorsed by others. At the same time, questions were raised about
how the sheer number of Authority members might distort the way the group was
perceived externally.
"I think the probk::i was it seemed to make the numbers increase and give the appearance that there
were more so-called citizen advisors than Authority members and that's been a trouble to people who are
worried about a dumn in Maine
At this point, the facilitator tried to capture the tension that has been raised. In doing
so he highlighted the character of speech as an act and the contribution these acts made to
the development of understanding. Curtailing the participation of Authority members
would also reduce opportunities for this kind of face-to-face communication.
My concern is to balance both considerations. We definitely want to influence the Authority so the
more of them who are here to hear the reasoning [group responds, "Yes."] and the passion that people bring
to certain issues the more the effect will be positive [another "Yes"]. We don't want to give an impression
that citizens have been speaking if they haven't been. But the goal is to balance the two.
Another member concluded discussion of this issue by endorsing the importance of
talk, and pointing out that participation would bind members of the Authority in ways
that other mechanisms might not.
What we want is a dialogue, and that means we have to be talking to somebody. And that also means
that when you finally get finished that there's no getting around the fact that they heard what you said.
They can't say, "Well I didn't get that report of the committee. It's not going to do me much good to talk to
Phil about what we do if these people don't listen.
The importance of conversation was even endorsed by parties who saw themselves at
odds with the substantive issues the CAG was trying to address. Their decision to
participate acknowledged the political importance of discussion and underscored the need
to organize the discussion so that participants who held strong beliefs would not feel they
had to check them at the door to participate. This position is clear in the following
statement.
Yes, when we left last time I took the sheet home and I read the goals and I saw they've been
changed. I wasn't too happy with the first two goals. I'll send around the Maine Citizens Against
Nuclear Dumps creed. We believe that there's absolutely no way you can produce a nuclear waste
dump that will last through the life of the isotopes that will be put into them. There are virtually
no laws that force states to look at this nuclear dump after 100 years. There is no insurance that
we could ensure the nuclear isotopes for the life of the isotope or the hazardous half-life of the
isotopes. We've come up with this creed in 1986 after a very long, prolonged, debate over who
we were and what we were, and what type of people we want our future generations to view us as.
So we will bow out of as far as any goals set down as far as siting nuclear waste dumps. However,
we do want public participation. We want to be part of the dialogue here. We do agree with the
third statement, "to understand and share information and illuminate viewpoints and differences
about this important issue with interested groups and citizens, in order to help the Authority and
the people of Maine reach the wisest and fairest decisions" and we would like to add, "for the
people of Maine." 4
Even as the speaker objected to what he understood to be the subject of the
conversation -- siting a radioactive waste disposal facility-- he acknowledged a set of
conversational norms. He didn't just assert his beliefs, he also described the reasons why
he held these beliefs. He did not see any way to meet the custodial obligations
radioactive waste disposal implied that were technically and institutionally feasible.
These beliefs led him to propose a broader standard for making choices: " what type of
people we want our future generations to view us as."
4 The CAG had three goals and the last was changed to reflect this proposal. "To advise and make
recommendation to the Maine Low Level Radioactive Waste Authority which would result in the safest
possible management of Maine's radioactive waste in the state of Maine; To assist the Authority in
evaluating siting policies and in assessing possible incentive and compensation packages; To understand
and share information and illuminate viewpoints and differences about this important issue with interested
groups and citizens, in order to help the Authority and the people of Maine reach the wisest and fairest
decisions for the people of Maine." Citizens Advisory Group to the Maine Low Level Radioactive Waste
Authority, Ground Rule. No date.
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The need to achieve a balance between strong views and the commitment to
conversation proved to be important and was reaffirmed again and again in the
conversation. The following exchange between a CAG member and the facilitator
illustrates the balance that the CAG struck around the issue. It depended members
having both the right and opportunity to speak their minds on the issues they thought
were important and, if they continued to dissent, to have their views reflected in any
opinions the group reported.
I'd like to make it very clear. I'm not here to help site a dump. I never have been; I've made that
clear from day one. I think we haven't looked at the political reality that a dump isn't going to be
sited in the State of Maine, nor for that matter most anywhere in the United States of America.
. I have my ideas which I've expressed before, on what I think should happen to nuclear waste,
which I assume I'll be able to say later, but I'm not here to site a dump. I am here to try to see that
it gets contained and does the least harm, and further more to ensure that it doesn't go into our part
of the world.
FAC - I think both Phil and you Nancy have been very clear about that from the very beginning
and I think the message has gotten through. And again Bill, if you feel the way you do, it seems to
me you should withhold endorsement of anything called a consensus from you standpoint on
exclusion. Or make it very clear that your concern is you not be assumed to be endorsing the
selection of a site in the state by somehow giving the best advice you can at this stage. And that's
perfectly appropriate. We will not necessarily have complete agreement, if you feel you cannot
sign on without implying a commitment to that. So I don't think you're not doing what's being
asked if you say, 'Don't put me down for any consensus on exclusion because I read that to imply
that I'm supporting selecting a site.' And I think you need to constantly ask and raise that concern
and it will be noted in the record of what's discussed.
This prompted another member to test the idea that this kind of conversation with
people who hold very different beliefs should, perhaps, itself be understood as a goal. It
provided a way to test whether the members could build sufficient common ground to
move forward.5
5 See Cohen (1993) on the broader importance of this point. "What lies in the intersection of different
moral conceptions is not simply a set of policies or a system of norms with which political conflict and
competition proceed. Nor is it simply a determinate set of moral principles. Instead, the consensus extends
to a view of persons, of what counts as an advantage, and of which practices are paradignatically evil (e.g.
slavery, religious intolerance, and racial discrimination). In short, what lies at the intersection of different
views is a (restricted) terrain on which moral and political argument can be conducted, and not simply a
fixed and determinate set of substantive points of political agreement. P. 279 (emphasis added)
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As the Authority it's your responsibility to make a decision, not us. You realize that; I think
it's important for us to realize that. As far as I'm concerned, I don't care if we make a single
recommendation, I don't know if we should, I don't now if we can, but I assume that's part of what
this process is about. And if we don't we're telling the authority, a hell of a lot. And so as far as
I'm concerned, this has been a very constructive morning because we've just mirrored the reality.
And I assume one of the reasons we're put together is to mirror reality and see if indeed 1:
differences are bridgeable. I think that's got to be.
Thus engaging in conversation was held up as something that had significance.
Expanding the scope of "meaningful disagreement" finding a way to continue the
conversation was important, even if it did not immediately lead to an agreement that
satisfied instrumental interests. 6 This was important because it opens the possibility that
we can assess qualities of the discussion independent of the outcome, and treat this
discursive process of testing differences as having a substantive significance.
Reasons Promote Understanding
Getting at reasons wasn't always easy. Participants did not always describe their
views in these terms. Translating demands into statements about reasons was a problem
that consistently demanded the attention group members and the facilitator. The
following exchange illustrates the kind of transformation that needed to be encouraged:
from assertions to statements that were understandable. Here the CAG member tried to
assert a belief and was prodded by the facilitator to share the thinking that lay behind her
belief.
CAG member - Of course my primary reason for being here and our concern is that you'll
look at Washington county. We don't want you to.
Facilitator - And what we're asking is, 'What are issues that go into that judgment that the
whole group might be informed about over the next year as we have meetings?'
CM- The concern is, 'We don't want a nuclear dump in Washington County. That's our
concern.
FAC - I hear it loud and clear.
6 On the notion of "meaningful disagreement" see Davidson 1985.
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CM - Good.
FAC - And the question is, 'How can you share your reasons for that most effectively with the
rest of this group?' We need to try to create an agenda so that the topics that people want to talk
about get the air time that they want.
This kind of solicitation of reason was made against a backdrop of comments that tied
reason giving to the kind of conversation members wanted. The statement below is
typical. It gives a reason for reason giving: reasons help others understand what you're
trying to say:
I'd just like to ask for the rationale behind the suggestions [in this case to change exclusion
criteria] as well as the suggestion itself. [The meardng of this request was clarified soon after.]
When people put forward suggestions now or in writing, could they explain the rationale, put
forward the rationale. Why are you concerned? Is it for this reason or that reason? In some cases
it will seem self-evident to the proposer, but it might help the others who don't necessarily have the
same frame ofreference to hear you make that statement. 7/27
This tie between reasons and understanding was underscored by one of the
Authority's consultants who described how much more accessible and compelling
criticisms and proposals were when they were accompanied by reasons.
That's [i.e. the reasons] exactly what I'd like to get. Maybe I didn't say quite enough about
the process of developing the methodology, but as we're currently structured here. We, the
Authority's consultants, will ultimately write [the siting] document and we want to try to
incorporate the advice and opinions of this group to some hopefully greater extent. But it will
certainly help if the bases for the proposed exclusions, that you propose, are all spelled out. One it
will make them more convincing and two much easier to use and understand and recommend.
because you're right, many of these things involve tradeoffs. There isn't any one right absolute
answer.
I am going to turn now and examine the role that reasons and reason-giving played in
substantive discussion. I will draw on examples from the discussion of exclusion that
CAG members worked on with the Authority's. These were initial screening criteria that
would be mapped on a state-wide basis and used to determine areas that were
inappropriate for a siting facility. In general, they were factors that could affect the
performance of the facility -- like location in a flood plain -- or were tied to public
115
resources --such as water supplies -- which were deemed necessary of protection. Thus,
by listing something as an exclusion criteria, the Authority and the CAG were giving it a
special kind of significance. The rationale behind the significance might be technical or a
suggestion about public priorities.
Reasons played a prominer.t role in this discussion. CAG members used them to test
the significance of criteria as they were proposed, to explore critiques and to open new
interpretations. In this section, I will follow a piece of the discussion of exclusion criteria
to illustrate some of the roles that reasons and reason-giving played.
Reasons Opened Proposals to Scrutiny
Reasons were used to explore the tie between rationales for action and the kind of
substantive problems that might be involved in managing radioactive wastes. In this
case, the implications of cleaning up an accident are examined.
What I wanted to mention was, I can think of a half-a-dozen different reasons to exclude
heavy population areas ranging from, 'If the facility leaks a lot of people could be affected,' to 'If
we have a smaller population, there will be fewer resources to oppose siting a facility,' to 'A
smaller population requires less of an incentive package.' I think that when you think about these
different exclusion criteria. . . it may be productive to think about it in those terms, and maybe it
will even come up with a different, different extents or different reasons within that same area. . .
One of the biggest problems of the state has always been to clean up the water supply of the local
people after the discovery of [contamination]. So I think its important to say, 'Have a municipal
water supply,' rather than an area that has no hope of a municipal water supply. I mean something
of that nature might bring areas with some kind of population into it rather than out in terms of
population exclusion. If some area gets its water from a distant supply, that makes local
contamination less of a problem.
Thus articulating reasons the reasons behind a proposal opens it to scrutiny. The
speaker demonstrates that behind a given proposal like, "Exclude areas with significant
populations" lie, first, a number of possible rationales and, second possible alternative
proposals. Being explicit about the former, allows participants to compare the
acceptability of reasons. A rationale like, 'If the facility leaks a lot of people could be
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affected," sounds plausible. But the rejoinder that "fewer resources to oppose siting a
facility" opens the ambiguity implicit in the rationale.
Note that, whereas the requirement to provide reasons cannot prohibit people from
using justifications strategically, it does exert an influence on the kind of proposals that
can be made. I may favor excluding population centers because I live in one, or because
I think it will just be too difficult or too expensive to get a proposal accepted and that
rural areas will be more politically feasible and cheaper. Nonetheless, the requirement
that I provide reasons limits me to proposals that I can justify on grounds that other will
publicly acknowledge as acceptable.7 The discussion has to proceed as ifthese are the
justifications supporting the proposal, and this will prune and shape the proposals I can
make considerably.8
Reasons open counterintuitive possibilities - The discussion of population criteria
soon took an unexpected turn. The conversation led one speaker to think about
population in a different way, which he immediately tried out on the group.
I just wanted to add. . . that when you think about exclusions, and especially the population
one, and people begin to allude to that there are as many reasons for having it close to a
population, because of more scrutiny, more observation, better monitoring, more facilities in case
there is a problem, such as water.
He explored what it would mean to treat population as a resource, rather than a sink
for potential harm. This is important, he pointed out, if you consider what would be
involved in managing a facility. By opening this rationale up to the group, the speaker
offered a new way to look at population, and a new test of its acceptability.
7 These mixed cases are interesting and explored at length in Elster, 1991. The shaping affect that the
requirement to give reason publicly exerts is discussed in Cohen, 1989.
8 It could even be that by articulating these acceptable justifications I may, over time, convince myself and
come to view them as my own, changing my understanding of the problem in the process. This change in
belief could either happen rationally, through a mechanism such as dissonance reduction, some mix of the
two as illustrated in Pascal's wager.
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Reasons help get at what is tacit. - This new possibility sparked another member to
use reasons to get access to tacit assumptions that might be shaping the discussion in
ways that the group should examine.
I thought I'd throw this out here, especially because I was sitting here thinking about what
Fred was saying, the comment about putting it near an area where there are people. A lot of these
criteria. . . are there because of an assumed failure. They assume that the site is going to be a
failure, so that there's got to be somewhere somehow, it if comes to pass, there's got to be some
confidence zone built into this, and thereby that will affect the criteria. because if you didn't have
significant levels of confidence that you could build a facility that "safe"--lets not get into that,
what that is--but if you didn't have that, you'd hardly want to put it anywhere. People who have no
confidence whatsoever -- and its their prerogative to have that total lack of confidence -- but it
isn't very scientific to have that without telling the reasons why.
This prompted another member to point out the assumptions that the speaker was
himself drawing on assumptions.
I think the doctor has convinced himself of the first point, but I'd say it was bad science to
believe that anything about the likelihood of this device could be characterized as having a
confidence level. That's a statistical [term] [and] to use the term in connection with this one time
event is nonsense.
This "Aha session" was truncated when another member picked up the first point
and developed it. He pointed out that what looked like assumptions might really be
guesses about how acceptable the design would be. If the group could differentiate
these attributes, they could enrich their review sites by carrying out the preliminary
review on the basis of criteria that were understood to be contingent on the
acceptability of the facility's design. This would also permit the CAG to explore
unresolved questions about the interplay between siting and design.
A thought for as we start thinking about siting, it might do well to think of two different types of sites.
One site is the designer may come up with something you feel really confident and comfortable with, and a
quite different site is, 'We really don't think much of the design and. . . it doesn't look very good. And
you've really got to put it out in the boonies. And it's really going to be terrible." or "I think it looks really
very promising,' then maybe it's "Let's think of the transportation distance."
Another member picked up this notion of fear tied it back to exploration of socio-
economic criteria, in particular population, in which the group was involved. He
suggested that the group should try to get at reasons, like fear, that underpin attitudes
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toward these criteria. Only when these connections had been made could the group
test the consonance between the way reasons were operating at a micro-level and
their more general views about the attitudes that should guide the siting process.
I'm probably getting out of my area a little bit, but the conunent that was just made, I think if we're
going to use socio-economic, we ought to focus on the ways in which it will impinge on the technical siting
criteria that I think are the most important. I think that's a good measure of this. When I hear socio-
economic, what it really means to me is political and psychological. And I think the issue is, will the
decision be made with an attitude of fear towards the site, as a psychological phenomenon, or will it be
made with an attitude of responsibility and practicality to a task that got to be performed for the people of
the state. That's what I think we have to be looking at when we define socio-economic criteria.
With this comment, the discussion of population exclusion criteria had begun to
provide a way for the members of the group to examine their more general attitudes
toward siting. Population exclusion was important because it made these tacit
judgments accessible and provided a way to test intuitions.
But the first question is whether and if we do, what's the appropriate population level. And everybody
sort of looked at that population thing, and wondered, "Why are we worried about population? If it's
supposed to be safe, why does it matter how many people its next to? If it's not safe, why is it better to
have only a few people at risk rather than a lot?"
This consideration allowed one member of the Authority to develop a new view and
test it with the group.
You just took the words out of my mouth. As one member of this Authority, I don't see . . . I'm
bothered by this criterion about population density. If the thing is going to be sited properly and engineered
properly it could be right out here. there's a lot of open land out here. It could be in the environs of
Bangor or somewhere near Goreham. I don't really like this 'out of fear.' I don't think it needs to be out in
fields protected by barbed wire.
This view was immediately subjected to two new tests: sincerity and impartiality:
Let me ask you where do you live.
Cape Elizabeth
One of the people trying to site a dump in township 30 was from Cape Elizabeth too.
I wouldn't mind, we have a lot of land in Cape Elizabeth
The discussion of the population exclusion ended with the following exchange. It
captured the consensus that was emerging and clarified the rationale that supported it,
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noting that it did not prejudice subsequent decision making toward either rural or
populated areas.
I guess my thought on it is that perhaps it would a bad idea to have population as a preliminary
exclusionary category
You mean put it in more pop or less population?
Oh I think there's pros and cons to both. Clearly, on one hand you don't want to put something in
Manhattan where, if you start from the presupposition that the thing is potentially dangerous, there's the
consideration of hurting 6 million as opposed to 2. On the other hand when were talking about public
safety .. .out of sight out of mind is not a good starting point for society to deal with its problems. My
proposal would simply be that we don't use population as a preliminary exclusion criteria.
These examples illustrate some the character and internal significance of reasons and
reason giving. First, it is important to note simply that reasons played a role. More
specifically, reasons provided the group with a way to explore and test the acceptability
of proposals and rationales and to access tacit assumptions and judgments that might be
shaping their inquiry. Moreover, reasons provided a way to test the acceptability of these
tacit biases and influences relative to broader standards ofjudgment, like fairness, and
views about the appropriate basis for public action. Did population criteria reflect a bias
toward rural areas? Was it, on reflection, fair to put people at a greater chance of being at
risk because they lived in a rural area? Did such a bias even reflect the group's sense of
what would be necessary to manage a facility responsibly?
Reasons allowed the group to compare options and examine the interplay between
criteria at a much finer grain and in a more nuanced fashion, than if they had to rely on
simply accepting or rejecting proposals. For instance, they found a way to carry sites
forward on the basis of two independent sets of criteria, that reflected contingent
judgments about facility design. Reason giving helped them get access to unexamined
assumptions and opened counter-intuitive possibilities. The rationale behind the group's
judgment about the population criterion began in an exploration that reversed the logic
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the group had accepted and asked whether populated areas should be preferred. While
the speaker may not have actually believed this himself in the end, his ability to
experiment was critical in the path the discussion took. It demonstrates that the
contribution of reasons extended beyond helping people understand each other (as
important as this is). The discussion of reasons provided a bridge to beliefs about the
broader significance of the process and the basis for choice.
PLAY AND JUSTIFICATION
In this section I want to explore the tie between reason-giving and the ideally
improvisational character of conversation that was hinted at in the preceding section.
This tie turned out to be important, not only because of the new possibilities it opened,
but because the exploration of acceptable grounds for justification drew on many
localized tests that were invented and tried out in "on-the-spot-experiments." 9 Testing
required inventing. Improvisation contributed to the development of'judgment and the
understanding of acceptable grounds for advancing proposals. It provided tests that were
intuitively accessible easily associated with proposals.
In order to get at these characteristics of the conversation I trace the give-and-take of
one excerpt. This episode began with an examination of a proposal Maine Yankee made
to the Authority. The utility requested that the site of their power plant be exempted from
the exclusion criteria and reviewed on a different basis.' 0 This prompted the CAG
9 Schon, 1992 pp. 124-125
1 As the Maine Yankee representative put it: "Maine Yankee's main concern with the criteria is that, the
way they're written, some of them directly affect Maine Yankee from being considered as the site, and we
believe that technically and in terms of political acceptability Maine Yankee has considerable advantages.
In our letter what we're recommending is that the Authority begin to address questions and concerns about
Maine Yankee as site. We believe that, in terms of acceptability, Maine Yankee may be the only site that
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members to try to enforce the norms of public justification that they observed, and by
doing so, expose the proposal if it was merely self-interested, and could not be justified
on grounds they could accept.
Though the conversation began with the effort to get at Maine Yankee's reasons, it
soon took some unexpected turns that demonstrate the interactive and emergent character
of the discourse.
When CAG members first responded to Maine Yankee's proposal they subjected it to
a series of tests. They looked for reasons that might support it and reasons that would
argue against it. New tests emerged from this discussion prompting another round of
scrutiny.
The first member to speak was willing to take the proposal at face value, if it added
up from the CAG's perspective. He found, however, that the proposal failed to
adequately take account of the future. It failed to acknowledge that the physical
environment itself was likely to change over the time frame involved.
I agree with a lot of Lee Anne's reasons as why Maine Yankee would be a good place to
dispose of it. I'd add another reason, it would save Maine Yankee a lot of money. But I would say
that all these reasons add up fine, except there's one thing that concerns me. I'm convinced that
there's something to this greenhouse effect and the resulting raise in the sea, and Maine Yankee is
just about at sea level and I'm convinced that the chance of its flooding in the future is very high.
And if it wasn't for that worry that I have, I would support Maine Yankee as the place to put it.
But I'm convinced the place is going to flood and you don't need a flooded nuclear waste dump."
could win local community approval as well as statewide referendum approval and we think that that's a
very important consideration that the Authority needs to think about."
" This rationale was seconded by another CAG member soon thereafter. "I've worked as a geologist for a
number of years and I've taken a great interest in the rise and fall of the sea, and I want to back the
gentleman over there. I think that within the life of some of these radionuclides, the Maine Yankee site will
be flooded. The east coast is falling. The greenhouse effect--which I think is a very important criteria to
think about-- is going to cause the ocean to rise. I don't think Maine Yankee is very far above sea level. I
think it would be a dangerous site if flooding is a dangerous aspect."
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This was followed by another test. What kind of precedent would be set by accepting
Maine Yankee's proposal? Would other people want exemptions from the exclusion
criteria? Wouldn't they want their proposals to receive special treatment?
The Department [of Coastal Resources] also has objections to the proposal. In principle we
object to excluding something from exclusion criteria, we're opening up a can of worms there for
other exclusions. Secondly, for whatever reasons Maine Yankee was sited, it was not sited for the
protection of the marine environment. It's very close to the shore. For reasons that have already
been stated about the potential sea level rise, I think there are problems there. Maine Yankee
actually was located where it is because of the abundance of water for the cooling system. So the
department would I think have some problems with having Maine Yankee considered as the
disposal site.
After some debate, the group resolved to alter its agenda and take up the Maine
Yankee's proposal in detail. This prompted one member to try to shift the discussion to
another level. He thought the Maine Yankee proposal raised questions about the
exclusion criteria themselves.
This is an instructive occasion in several matters and I'd like to bring to your thought the fact
that this shows serious shortages and shortfalls in the exclusion criteria.
To explore this he created a hypothetical situation.
It might help our thinking if we didn't concentrate on Maine Yankee alone as a structure that
could contain our radioactive waste. Try this on. Suppose that the Seabrook II were under
consideration for these wastes.
This led him to ask whether the whether sea level rise was the kind of question the
group should be facing:
And I think if you turn that over in your head, I think you will get to the fact that whether the
sea level is rising or not, Maine is saturated with water pretty well every year ... [W]e're told, and
Phil says its common knowledge , that the concrete structures won't begin to last for any part of
the lifetime of this problem of disposing of these nuclear wastes. So it isn't any problem if
Seabrook is going to be inundated by the sea. Long before that the structure would have fallen
back into sand and gravel and rock, if you believe any of the stuff that's before us. Nancy's
package was very instructive about that. . . .
Concluding that their focus may be misplaced, he went on to suggest an alternative
line of inquiry that focused on what he viewed as the weak link in the chain.
So that's what I think you ought to examine: [the durability of] concrete structures, nuclear
reactor containment buildings or what you will, placed where they're most stable. Not saying that
you can walk away and leave them forever, but saying you're going to be back there in 50 years
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rebuilding this thing, just like our bridges. The concrete in our bridges, as you must know, falls
apart in a very short time. So will these things. You have to presume that that's probably the
case.
The next speaker built on the Seabrook excursus, but took the insight that the group
might be talking about something temporary in a new direction by introducing a new test.
The group should be concerned about the political demands it faced. He asked whether
the group might want to consider the Maine Yankee site as offering a different, and
potentially valuable, option that should be evaluated with respect to the new criteria
suggested by his proposal.
I just wonder whether in terms of a monitored site over short term, where ocean rise and some
of these other criteria will not impinge, whether this will satisfy the federal government and buy us
20-25 years --whatever it is -- in order to find out what's going on in this industry and get past the
dismantling of some of these plants. We'd have a much clearer idea if we could get a reliably
monitored site that would satisfy the feds.
This generated concern by a different member that the introduction of these new
criteria might pervert the process and the group's effort to move the debate forward on
sensible grounds. He proposed yet another test: the findings should be defensible to
anyone who looked at the results of the process froi outside. Moreover, he suggested
that there was only one way to respond to this test: consistent application of scientific
criteria. This proposal was a defense against what he saw as an intrusion. Drawing a
strong tie between the CAG's deliberations and science allowed him to draw a line
between good practice (which was associated with good science) and bad. Good science
remained an archetype. Bad science was illustrated by the behavior of the Department of
Energy in a different siting process.
One particular site, Hanford Washington, came out relatively poorly on virtually every criteria used, at
least in formal scientific sense by the DOE, yet it was included in the final three sites. People who looked
at that process said that probable reason was nothing hydrological or geological, but that the DOE had a
sunk investment in an existing nuclear facility.
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Maine Yankee's proposal, in his view, was the first step down the garden path. It
risked perverting the process and the sense of what constituted acceptable grounds for
belief that the group was working so hard to construct. This was too fragile and too
valuable to put at risk in his view. He proposed strict grounds for developing the
exclusion criteria.
It seems to me that if you're going to be in the business of developing exclusionary criteria,
then you're in the business of developing exclusionary criteria. We've talked about geological
criteria and hydrological criteria. I can't see any grounds at this juncture for considering Maine
Yankee's request because it simply doesn't deal with the kinds of considerations we're looking at
in making exclusionary criteia. at least from my point of view if were going to look at
exclusionary criteria and develop them systematically, I think we have to look at the
considerations and variables we've focused on to date . . . To the extent that we begin to move in
the direction of Maine Yankees proposal, we're beginning to engage in what I would call bad
science and becoming party to the same kind of shenanigans the DOE was engaged in the Western
US.
An Authority member circled back to some earlier pieces of discussion to tie
questions about the Maine Yankee site to broader question about whether the group was
talking about storage or disposal. This choice had implications for the tests the group
was putting proposals to. It might, for instance, shift the line between bad and good
science.
I want to respond to Charlie and . . .and I'm trying to absorb all this stuff. And listening to Dr.
Charlesworth, the Canadians have come to the conclusion that there is no such thing as disposal, it's only
storage--either long term storage or short term storage. To me it makes good sense, if its retrievable, and
that's the thing I have to ask Maine Yankee, if the sea comes up or whatever happens, can you get it and put
it somewhere else? That buys you the kind -of time that Charlie's talking about and I don't think it's bad
science as long as its retrievable.
This demanded an examination and clarification of the institutional standards that the
group had to respond to.
Right but do the Fed regs? Aren't they really about long term disposal?
Well they're primarily based on that and I'd have to go back and look to tell you the truth before I
answer that .... Although the regs may change in the future and the approach as to storage versus
disposal may change.
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Now the group faced a problem. They could not discuss proposals without relating
them to criteria, but the proposals raised questions about whether the criteria themselves
made sense.
So you see the dilemma then that we're building on here. That Nancy first pointed out and your
question raises and Pete's comment builds on. These are supposed to be exclusion for site
selection for disposal. What the Maine Yankee letter raises is, if you want to think about storage
rather than disposal, do you want to have different criteria or do you want to think about the
criteria differently? If I understood it right Ev, the criteria you were first writing were for a
facility that would be disposal, long term disposal facility. they weren't for storage.
Other members picked this up. It's a way to "deal with the political reality." Another
asked about the interaction between site and technology. "If we have engineering
controls, why not give some on site characteristics?" This would enable them to take
advantage of the fact that it's "a good site politically. The people of Wiscasset have lived
with it." This led to a rereading of technical information and another test. Will the old
activity mask problems associated with the storing the waste and make it difficult to
attribute responsibility?
I've got two more reasons why we ought not to use Maine Yankee as dump. I believe if we used it as
a dump it would be an above grade concrete container. And I think what Nancy handed out, showed that
these above grade things tend to be the most risky because if you have a leak its going to tend to be a leak
onto the surface of the ground that's going to expose people to more radiation. So that's one reason why,
the design is one of the leakiest. Second reason. When I have my automobile repaired, I always go to the
same garage. The reason I go to the same garage, is so that they can't argue that a pervious garage did a
lousy repair job. Now we've got this problem here. If yo- put waste at this nuclear power plant, if
somebody's exposed, if this waste starts migrating and somebody's exposed and tries to sue. It's a lovely
thing for Maine Yankee's got a nice protection because nobody can determine whether the stuff that is
migrating is from the waste storage or from the original power plant. And as long as you can confuse the
issue as to who's responsible, nobody has to pay. And the poor person who's being exposed to this stuff
really can't get it. And it's nice legal protection to keeps things confused, And you need to keep the storage
which is state owned, separate from the power plant. So that when something starts to leak ,you know who
to blame, because otherwise you won't know who to blame.
12 The Maine Yankee representative replied, "1 0cfr61 says you can't put a low level waste facility at a place
where it would be masked, where you can't monitor it properly. And the operable word is could. The
NRC, if you could show that you could set up monitoring that you would know what came from the waste
facility and what came from Maine Yankee, they might approve that. But that is something you'd have to
figure out, how you can monitor it, what kind of system you could put in.
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The new topic of monitoring prompted another line of exploration. If you're talking
about a storage facility that's going to break down then, you have to worry explicitly
about how you're going to move the waste and where the money to pay to move it is
going to come from. Now the group had to confront questions about institutional
continuity that became problematic when they were extrapolated into the distant future.
By law 1 Ocr6l states that the State of Maine only has to be responsible for the nuclear waste dump for
100 years. However this facility must have engineered facilities that should last for 500 years to keep
people out. Now who's going to be there to make sure this process is done. And if after 50 years or 100
years they decide the Maine Yankee site is no good and they want to move the waste, there is no
mechanism for getting monies now to move it then. See we're dumping this whole thing into our future
generations lPps. There has been no mechanism to provide for our future generations when this happens.
Think about this.
The discussion circled back even further to reexamine a claim about the risk
associated with an above ground facility. The speaker offered an alternative
interpretation of the technical material the group had received. In doing so, he related the
technical criteria to broader standards of responsibility.
David invoked the paper the that Nancy had passed out to say that the riskiest structures were
these above grade concrete things. I read that differently, and I think it may be an important
difference. That paper says that of course these things will fail, just like all the other methods.
And the difference is that if you have it above grade that's the only way I see you have any chance
to collect the leachate and keep it from going into groundwater, surface water, and the air and keep
it under control. Given that we're a humid environment, I think that recommends this process to
us all the more David.
At this point the group had gone back and forth and their sense of the problem had
already changed once. They were wrestling with the two issues. The first concerned
whether there was merit, on their terms, in keeping the Maine Yankee site available for
consideration. This had moved the discussion to another level. How were they to know
what grounds should be acceptable? How were they to balance statements about real
political problems:
There's no way in the world politically that you're ever going to have a referendum on some site
that the people involved aren't looking at Maine Yankee as an alternate site. That's just simply
what the reality of any final referendum vote will be. It's this place versus sticking Maine Yankee
with it and making them responsible and people feeling they have a responsibility.
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With statements about the technical aspects of siting:
[I]t seems t me that what were doing is adding insult to injury, if we know that one of the prime
considerations has to be water and the effect it can have on the environment if its contaminated.
And we turn around, hPowing that full well, and then make a decision to locate the waste at a site
where there's probably as high a probability as you can find, at least in terms of the geologic
characteristics, I'm not talking about the engineering or, but in terms of the geologic
characteristics, it's and extremely risky proposition. Now if I had a third grader tell me that that
was good science, I'd even flunk them. It's not good science. . . I thought we were in the business
of following criteria that are scientifically based. As I read what Maine Yankee has here it has
little to do with science.
This was complicated further by arguments the Maine Yankee site might be
technically acceptable, if not ideal.
Exclusion criteria are for final disposal. I think that between that time that interlude between the
Maine Yankee solution and the final solution, the world is going to change an awful lot.
I think my own opinion, and I think most technical people would agree, is that in terms of storage,
relatively short to intermediate term storage, it's reasonable to depend more on the engineered
barriers than it may be for long term permanent storage of certain types of waste that are very long-
lived.
To resolve these issues, the group had to transform the discussion once more, and
confront the question ofjust what they were they talking about. Only then could they
make sense of questions about appropriate criteria and how to balance technical and
political considerations. To close the discussion the group had to reach agreement at two
levels simultaneously:
Closure at one level came with two comments by the facilitator. The first captured
the refraining that was in progress:
Something's happened in the last several months and Nancy's pointed it out. Which is, if people
really have the view that what we should be thinking about is short term storage, and if we buy the
view that we heard expressed several meetings ago that, 'Forget disposal,' or 'Disposal's very very
hard to plan long term. Lots is going to change, all kinds of things are going to happen, and you
shouldn't turn your back on it and assume it was disposed. . . . And the more you think of it as
storage, the more you're going to monitor the more you're going to worry about it, the more you're
going to worry about removing it and doing other things. You're going to plan all that as if its not
solved.
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While the second clarified the implications this new perspective had for how the
group went about its work:
Again. I think it's that notion of refraining the task around storage that I think has emerged in a
different way from where we were before. And to pretend that it hasn't and to blithely go ahead in
writing criteria and mapping process and so on would be to ignore the sense of the group that that
distinction is crucial.
The debate over whether political concerns should prevail over technical or scientific
was then resolved by a member who pointed out this was not the issue, and that the group
had already answered the question. They had decided to pursue the "best workable safest
solution" and this set the grounds for deliberation. To change the basis for their
discussion now would put the group's identity and sense of purpose at risk.
It looks to me like what's happening here is Bruce is arguing good science and bad science and
the gentleman from he Teachers Association is arguing politics. And we're kind of looking at a
choice of whether were going to look at this scientifically or whether were going to go with the
political solution. Which is what this group was kind of criticized for or a lot of people were
skeptical about when it was first set up. This is the decision we have to make in giving our advice.
But I think part of our job and part of the reason we're here for the Authority is that we're
supposed to come up with the best workable safest solution, not political, and then the job
becomes to sell this and give the voting public credit for some intelligence. And let them choose
whether that's the best solution or not. But If we cop out now and go with the political solution
we're not going to get anywhere and the whole point of our being here is lost.
This example illustrates two characteristics of reason in the CAG context. First, it
was very grounded. CAG members explored broader ideas by reacting to specific
proposals rather than discussing moral and political commitments in abstract. In this
case, the Maine Yankee proposal provided the grounds on which to reassess their
commitment to waste disposal and to reexamine what the exclusion criteria were based
on. The future figured prominently in the discussion and triggered some of the major
turns. The other characteristic I want to highlight is that reason is interactive. The CAG
members built off each other's comments and improvised new tests until they finally
reached a settled judgment. The open 'conversational' rules of the forum permitted this
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kind of improvisation to go on, and the facilitator kept track of the focus so that members
were free to indulge in the creative interplay.
Justification and Validity Claims
I want to now try to make two points that will capture much of what I think is
important about these examples and will provide a bridge to an argument I want to make
about broader significance of the process. The first is that what was going on here was
not solely or even predominantly a strategic interaction. The discussion was
characterized by the efforts of the participants to make sense to each other, even if not
always to agree.
This was apparent in the prominence that reasons were given when people described
what was important about the way they talked to each other. It was also clear in the
actual dialogue. Maine Yankee's proposal may have had instrumental intent, for instance,
but, once the proposal was opened to debate, the ground shifted to try to review the sense
of the proposal. Even when political considerations were introduced, they were backed
by reasons that related the proposal to a goal of responsible action.
It is also apparent that the discussion was not strategic if we consider what seemed to
be at issue throughout. It seems clear that people were trying to say what they meant,
trying examine how what they said stacked up against the facts as they are known or
disputed, and trying to explore how their proposals stacked up against the standards and
principles that they acknowledged as pertinent. 3
" These are three of the validity claims described by Habermas, respectively truthfulness, truth, and
rightness.. See "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in Habermas. 1976. Pp. 1-68
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The second point I want to make is that the participants kept an open mind to some
degree. There was almost always some possibility that the participants' beliefs would be
shaped by what others said. For some issues this was more problematic, but in these
cases it also provoked a strong counter-reaction. On certain issues, some parties just
seemed to be immune to evidence, argument, reasons, or any legitimate form of
persuasion. The health effects issue was a prominent example of this. The recalcitrance
of some participants on this issue undercut the commitment of other dedicated CAG
members.' 4 But the point I want to make is that, on other issues and in other ways, there
was often some flexibility or slack in what people believed. Participants demonstrated at
least a bit of openness and willingness to change their mind. The criticisms just serve to
underscore the significance of this factor.
Truthfulness - Let me now take up the first, point in more detail. I'll begin with the
most elusive: that members in general tried to say what they meant. This was, in fact, a
constant issue. In chapter 3, I described the strong censure that was brought against state
agency representatives for suggesting that they might say something that is different from
what they believed as individuals. This was certainly part of what was at issue with the
criticism of people getting paid to say something. Whenever truthfulness was
questionable it generated a strong response. The vigor with which the Maine Yankee
proposal was debated was generated in part by suspicion that they weren't being
forthcoming about their reasons for making the proposal.
14 Both Bob Dunning and Nancy Holland mentioned, unsolicited, in interviews that this was their biggest
criticism of the process.
Truthfulness had an interesting meta-expression when the Governor's advocate came
to speak to the CAG about Maine's efforts to negotiate a regional compact with other
states.
After he had made a presentation about what the state was doing, a member asked
whethei the primary focus was on out of state options. Were the Authority and the CAG
just there to create a favorable position in these external negotiations?
"If the chances are good of setting up a permanent, or semi-permanent site out of state, is our role
then, this group, to give the State of Maine a good bargaining position then? is that our primary
role?
It was critical at this point that the CAG receive a good answer. The members' sense
of the integrity of the process was on the line. It mattered to them, and gave sense to
their efforts to maintain internal integrity, that the process mattered outside, that it was
not corrupt or a sham. Fortunately they answer they got was good enough:
I should clarify. If we had perfect hindsight, ten years from now we would know exactly what the
best and most economic use of your time would be. We don't have that kind of hindsight. at the
moment we're proceeding down two parallel tracks that are inconsistent tracks. One is shipping
waste out of state . . . and the second is building a facility in Maine to take care of Maine's waste
only. Obviously those two are incompatible. No one knows today, least of all me, whether my
60% guess about a compact being likely is optimistic or realistic. Consequently I think the real
function of this group, from what little I understand about it, is to provide the kind of input to the
siting process for a facility here in Maine, on the assumption that there very well may be a facility
here in Maine. You have to suspend disbelief and operate on that assumption. Is that a useful
response to your question?
The advocate, perhaps sensing the importance of the issue to CAG members, returned
to stress the significance of the CAG's efforts later in his presentation.
One problem with concurrent discussions of siting here in Maine for a Maine facility and
discussions out of state with other folks about an out of state compact is, its important to
remember that we are perceived by other states very differently in general from the way we
perceive ourselves. and we all believe that Maine is making a good faith effort to comply with the
federal law. but across the country the people that I talk to have this vague feeling that Maine is
sort of going through some motions. Forgive me. I just wanted to say that what you do in a
group like this and what the Authority does generally is very important. it really is, people take
notice of it across the country.
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A CAG member commented in similar terms about how the CAG's sense of their own
activity was affected when the Authority failed to treat them with respect.
When the CAG's voice, when we did arrive at a consensus or a position on some issue, and when
it wasn't taken seriously or that recommendation wasn't adopted by the Authority I know that we
felt very shortchanged and very bad. That happened more later in the process then early on."
Veracity - The veracity of statements was always at issue as well. When one member
suggested a reading of background material on above ground vaults for storing waste, he
was challenged by another member who had read it a different way. As regulations were
clarified their sense was often tested as well: "I know this is the law, but does it make
sense to me?" "What were the reasons that the regulation was made?" "Do they fit with
our circumstances and our understanding of how to best fulfill our responsibilities?" "If
not, can we change the regulations or apply for an exemption?" This kind of reflection
clearly occurred as the group's sense of the problem shifted form disposal to storage.
They looked for examples that would help them make these assessments. "What do we
know historically about the performance of similar facilities or the behavior of materials
under the natural conditions of interest?" "What do we know about how the climate
might change?" "What is the relationship between the available sources of evidence on
the health effects of low-level ionizing radiation, and the kinds of exposures that would
be associated with a low-level disposal facility?"
Rightness - Throughout the process, CAG members continually tried to inventing
tests of acceptability and to subjects propositions to those tests. "Is it fair or responsible
to transfer responsibilities to future generations without provided some support to help
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them fulfill those responsibilities?" "Have we identified those resources like aquifers that
we are certain future generations will need?" "If water supply is one of the things most at
risk, are we making sure we put this facility in a place where there is an alternative?"
"Are we acting on the basis of fear?" "If so, :s that an appropriate basis for a citizens
group with the responsibilities we have to act on?" "Does this proposal meet with the
revised sense we have our contemplating as storage rather than disposal?" "Does this
mean we want to locate the facility where people will be interested in it and want to
monitor it?" "What implications would that have for the consideration of technical
criteria?" "Does it makes sense to put the facility in a place where people who would be
exposed in an accident would have difficult pressing liability claims?" These examples
illustrate some of the ways in which the CAG members tried to test proposals against
moral, ethical, and political standards.
This whole process was facilitated by the prominent role that reasons played. The
commitment to carry on the discussion on the basis of reasons is perhaps the best
evidence that their participation should be characterized as an effort to try to make sense
to each other. The commitment that participants displayed in their preparation for the
meetings -- reading technical reports, preparing summaries, putting packets of
information together for other -- is another indication.
Keeping an Open Mind
Now for my second claim, that participants were to a limited, but not negligible,
extent open to a "dialogic modulation" of their "relevant understandings." 16 This is
certainly consistent with the way some participants described their attitudes toward their
" Bob Dunning interview.
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own beliefs. In his reply to a question about whether the Authority had discussed the
Maine Yankee proposal referred to above, an Authority member described the mix of
practicality, openness to learning, acknowledgment of the pace of change, and realism
that made up an "open" mind:
We've discussed it, but we haven't ... I can give you my personal opinion, which is that I don't
close any option. As far as I'm concerned we study everything. I'm not going to start throwing
things away, because technology's 6ianging, things are changing all the time. We're in a learning
process just like you folks are. You know every time I come to one of these meetings or listen to
Dr. Charlesworth or one of these people I learn something else. I don't know where its going to
come out. It's too early for me to say, 'I'm not going to consider this.' I'm considering everything.
That's my own personal opinion.
I have examined in detail several situations in which the beliefs of the group as a
whole, or their sense of the problem changed. The revision of goals and articulation of
what this meant for participants as citizens certainly involved a sorting out of beliefs, if
not a "modulation." The most dramatic example was the shift from seeing the problem
they faced as waste disposal to seeing as storage.
Beliefs often changed over extended periods of time and change was often going on
at several levels simultaneously. Consider, for instance, the way the shift in attitudes
toward exclusion criteria was layered on top of the shift from disposal to storage that was
occurring in response to Dr. Charlesworth's proposal. Participants changed their minds
when Dr. Charlesworth spoke. Yet they had to confront this shift all over again in the
more specific terms that came up in the discussion the Maine Yankee proposal and the
exclusion criteria. Even beliefs about the Maine Yankee proposal per se, 'modulated'
several times before any sort of equilibrium was reached.
16 Michelman. 1988. pp. 1526-27
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The central dynamic in these modulations was captured in a comment the facilitator
made about how the understanding in the group seemed to have shifted in a discussion of
"buffer zones." As he put it:
We've turned the thing a half turn. This is not where we started the conversation. This is why we
have these conversations to make comments that lead to useful insig.s.
His description suggests an equally important, if more elusive, account of how beliefs
change through "tinkering" in the context of conversation. Belief, agreement,
understanding are often just a little more problematic than is acknowledged. It's not just
a matter people meaning what they say and saying what they mean. One of the ways that
I discover what I mean is by saying it. I try things out, experiment with meaning, see
how other people react to what I've said. I may surprise myself when I hear what I've said
or listen closely to the response it generates.
The other side of this coin is that I never really know if I've said what I meant until
someone hears it and reacts to it.17 Because both of these questions are up for grabs at
the same time and being resolved simultaneously, the line between them is not so neat.
Questions about what I said and what I meant overlap.
These sources of ambiguity create room for people to play with their beliefs. If I am
not so sure of what I mean, or if the commitments that I hold are a little bit more
ambiguous than I acknowledge, there may be some room for me to be influenced by
others or to experiment with new beliefs.18
Consider the examples above. The broader pattern of the conversation rarely followed
a script or pattern. The responses to the Maine Yankee proposal built on each other. The
1 Michael Piore personal communication. Davidson. 1985.
18 On the latter point see James March's discussion of the importance of a "technology of foolishness. In
March 1973.
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participants interpreted their own conversation. They identified scenarios like Seabrook
and themes "masking" to get at what they thought was significant and to explore its
meaning and implications simultaneously. In the case of the exclusion criteria, the
exploration of fear as motivating action developed out ofjust such an invention.
These conversations may be best understood as following a "felt path" from one
statement to the next, and the next, and the next.'9 The participants in the conversation
react to each other and explore the problem before them with "on-the-spot experiments."
In reacting to the Maine Yankee proposal for instance, one of the participants responded
initially by playing with the idea of going along with the proposal, except for his concern
with rising sea level. He later came back with a different experiment, this time the using
a metaphor--automobile repair--that he used to conduct a thought experiment about the
Maine Yankee proposal.
Similarly, the exploration of ideas that eventually led to the rejection of the
population exclusion criteria, began when one member experimented with turning an
accepted belief around. 'We've always assumed that putting this thing near people would
be bad. What would happen if we turned this assumption around and said we want it near
people? Would there be any benefit in that?' In tracing these conversations it seems clear
that, at least some of the time, the participants weren't entirely certain what they meant or
believed. If you want people to be willing to tinker with their beliefs, this ambiguity
looks more like a virtue than a vice.
COMMON SENSE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REASON
In Chapter One I highlighted the status of intergenerational ethics as a problem about
democratic legitimacy. Intergenerational problems raise difficulties about the grounds on
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which environmental issues were being resolved--particularly that the might be resolved
in a way the excluded the interests and perspective of future generations.
In the chapters since then I have focused primarily on the way in which
administrative bodies interact with the public. The focus on public involvement sternmed
from a desire to develop a legitimate interpretation of obligations to the future. Yet
public involvement is often understood to contribute to legitimacy because people get to
speak for and pursue their own interests. How can such a public dialogue be understood
to respond to the kind of deep concerns about legitimacy raised by future generations?
I cannot give a complete answer that question here, but I would like to show that it is
plausible that this kind of dialogue between citizens could generate enduring
commitments with a base of legitimacy as deep as constitutional reason. The way I
would like to demonstrate the plausibility of this thesis is draw an analogy between the
kind of conversation I have been describing the CAG as being involved in and the kind of
conversation that is at the center of at least some views of constitutional interpretation.
There are other areas in which democracy is seen to have this deliberative character. I
will focus on Frank Michelman's account of constitutional interpretation because it
emphasizes the tie between conversation and enduring commitments.
In Michelman's discussion of constitutional interpretation the key, as I understand it,
to democratic institutions being able to "generate" enduring commitments and act as both
a "faithful agent" of the past and a "spontaneous agent of the future" lies in
" certain beliefs we must hold regarding ourselves, our social relations, and specifically (as it turns
out) our capacity for dialogic self-modulation." 20
1 9Schon. 1992. P. 124.
2 0 Michelman 1988. p. 1521
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Thus, at the center of maintaining democratic commitments to the past and the future lies
a question about our ability to participate in a particular kind of conversation.
Let me look briefly now at the characteristics a conversation must have to serve this
task. First, the participants have to behave as if they are in conversation with each other
and with other groups who are absent or who may have been excluded from the
conversation. They are trying to understand the claims that are being made and to assess
the force of these claims. To the extent that they focus on the need to understand these
claims and to be open to new claims becomes the focus of their interaction, bargaining is
likely to seem less appropriate to their task and arguing or deliberation more so.2 1 Any
real process, and we are talking on both sides of this analogy about real rather than ideal
processes, will doubtlessly involve elements of both communicative and strategic action.
The critical point is that two kinds of action were open to the actors involved, that the
actors could distinguish between them, and that they favored the effort to reason in
certain kinds of circumstances,
I have just shown at length how a substantial part of the interaction in the CAG fit
with a deliberative account of practice. In Michelman's discussion deliberation is
distinguished also by the possibility that people will change their minds on some things. I
have shown in detail how the conversations that the CAG had included numerous
instances where people changed, reshaped, and otherwise tinkered with their beliefs.
Indeed the process was to some degree characterized by experiments by individuals and
the group as they tried to figure out what their beliefs were.
21 See for instance Elster, 1991 "Because the goals is to create a legal framework for the indefinite future,
the requirement of impartial argument is very strong. Interest-group Pluralism doesn't work when some of
the parties are generations yet unborn. The special setting works in the opposite direction." pp. 4-5
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The center of this notion of deliberative conversation is the idea that this conversation
must be governed by a
"set of prescriptive social and procedural conditions such that one's undergoing, under those
conditions, such a dialogic modulation of one's understanding is not considered or experienced as
coercive, or invasive, or otherwise a violation of one's identity or freedom."2
This raises a big question for the CAG proceedings and any administrative process
seeking popular authorization for decisions. There is no way to say for certain that such
conditions prevailed in a given case. Some characteristics of the process suggest this
might have been the case, however.
First, people continued to participate and treat the process as if it mattered. I have
focused on the constitutive phase of the process because so many of the relationship were
open and being settled at the same time the group was addressing substantive issues. The
process went on over several years, however, and participation was voluntary. This
commitment had to mean something. If anyone's identity and freedom were being
violated on a regular basis, they could simply have stopped coming.
Second, the process didn't require people to change their beliefs to participate. If they
wanted to dissent or not to change their mind, their beliefs would not be masked by
majoritarian voting procedures. I have shown some examples earlier in this chapter that
demonstrated how this tension was handled in the group.
Third, the facilitators who organized and moderated the discussion worked at the
pleasure of the participants. They were subject to censure and termination by group
members if they tried to control or direct the discussion in an unacceptable way. There
were changes in who facilitated, but these were due to external interference rather than
22 Michelman, 1988. p. 1527. These conditions are often discussed in terms of an ideal process or set of
conditions. See Cohen 1989, and Habermas 1990 for discussions of conditions for ideal deliberation or
communication.
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internal dissatisfaction. The biggest change came when the contract of the original
facilitation team was not extended after several years of work. This was not at the
request of the members of the CAG, but was due to actions that originate in the state
legislature and cast the issue in terms of cost. CAG members still express their
displeasure over this change.
Finally, and I believe most importantly, the rules of the process upheld the rights of
the participants to comment on the process itself. They could, and did, comment on the
rules that were governing the discussion, on possible sources of outside interference, and
on the conditions on which the discussion was proceeding. In Chapter Three I described
the most prominent example of this, the effort of the group to rewrite the goals along
lines that individual members could agree with and accept as self-given. As part of these
goals, members adopted the composition of the group as one of their responsibilities.
They could address concerns about exclusion by inviting new members.
To illustrate how concerns about the process were addressed internally, let me show
two exchanges between a member and the facilitator. In the first, the member was
concerned that the way the process was structured, participation might prevent him from
later so no to the whole proposition of siting a facility in Maine. The facilitator
responded to his concerns by clarifying the process and the opportunities that available to
him.
I want to comment on process. It strikes me that this is where we put our heads in the noose.
Adopting a consensus on exclusion criteria really puts us in the bag, and I'm unhappy with what
you have, worse than that I don't see a way that this process can be amended to accomplish what I
think we ought to do. We will quibble about amendments to this, and I read about what Maine
Yankee supported as amendments to the criteria. The criteria I think are accessible. But that's not
what's wrong with it. What's wrong with it is that you are defining in this process what's not
acceptable and you're not saying that everything else is. That's the outcome of what we come to.
I'm not paranoid of course, but I believe that if we make an exhaustive list of criteria for exclusion
we will exclude the whole state. You're not prepared to do that. You'll say that's ridiculous, but
probably that's what we need to do. Therefore I'm unhappy with it.
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You're not the only one who has that concern. I hope that no single step we take at the beginning
precludes an outcome saying there's no acceptable site. . . . If we had a consensus on an
intelligent set of exclusion criteria for further data gathering to proceed, it doesn't preclude the
possibility that when the next round of data comes in, and when the next proposals come in, you
will say, "You haven't convinced me that any of the remaining area make any sense." . . . So I
would hope, I think this is a cnicial point, that nobody feels that by looking at this document,
figuring out the best improvements we can make, that they've somehow bought into a site having
to be selected in Maine. Because I don't think its meant to do that.
In the second example, concerns were raised that control of process was being used
to shape substantive understanding. The facilitator responded by clarifying the
opportunities that were open to the member, and inviting him to express his critique in
positive terms by helping to shape the agenda.
I had a concern last month and I still have a concern this month. And I've talked with Patti [a
member of the facilitation team]on the phone a number of times concerning this. I'm still very
concerned about the controlled focus of the presentations. Will they create a mindset that nuclear
waste isn't dangerous and maybe ... it's good [out] there in the country where it might last for a
couple of hundred years or whatever. Watching the sites that have failed and some of them that
haven't failed yet, but with a good possibility might, never really gives or allows for a total
coverage of any of the negative aspects of this whole process. I'm still very concerned about that.
Well one, we would certainly entertain anybody's addendum to the summary of the meeting. If
there are comments you didn't get to make during the meeting about anything that you saw. I
think those comments might also be directed to the Authority, since the Authority has made a
decision about a set of consultants and if you feel the consultants are not adequately representing
the full range of possible views, you should tell it to them directly and to the authority and we will
do our best to stretch those presentation so that-and I believe that the consultants can do this -- so
that they bend over backwards to present all the views that might be out there on different issues.
At least three things are significant about these exchanges relative to the question of a
non-coercive "set of social and procedural conditions." First, just having the ability to
comment directly on the process as part of the process, is in itself a benefit. Like their
ability to ask questions of and interact with consultants, this gave members the
opportunity to actively participate in shaping the discussion, rather than having to rely on
critique or indirect measures. It also gave every member the right to directly address
other members, and draw their attention to issues of concern.
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Second, unlike many public processes, there was someone to address the comments
to, someone who had a responsibility to respond to concerns about process and substance.
The facilitator's legitimacy with the group was tied to his ability to resolving these
procedural questions to everyone's satisfaction. Finally, members had the ability to
reshape the process to meet their concerns, by structuring the agenda and influencing the
selection of consultants.
When you combine this set of rights, with the ability the group had to shape the
agenda, add new members, identify consultants, and themselves supply information to the
group, the CAG members had practical ways of addressing most of the threats that might
distort or undermine the process. The key to making this work was that these rights were
complemented by a team of people working to make sure that concerns that members
raised were addressed. While this does not constitute proof that non-coercive social
conditions prevailed, it does constitute a practical response to these concerns, and one
that provided an active role for participants in upholding these conditions and ensuring
that they had a "fair value."
The final condition that Michelman sets for a politics capable of generating
commitments that can meet the test of democratic legitimacy and be accepted as self-
given law is that the participants "Listen for voices from the margins" and "cherishing all
moments as potentially transformative."2 3 Let me take these points in order.
There are a number of ways that the CAG responded to this. In trying to understand
the health effects issue, for instance, they worked to make certain that they were aware of
marginal voices on the issue, and tried to understand the full diversity of views. I have
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23Ibid. pp. 1537; 1523.
cited numerous examples where they tried to test the acceptability of decisions by testing
them against different perspectives, including that of future generations.
The CAG also tried in a number of ways to recognize the transformative potential of
the process. The key to reformulating goals was to treat the questions and assumptions in
the rules and institutional commitments as potentially controversial, and to take
responsibility for the goals and internal norms on which the process would proceed. The
shift from a disposal to a storage orientation was also a recognition, brought home by Dr.
Charlesworth's summary of the experience at Chalk River, that at any moment the world
might no longer be what it used to be. Finally, the internal expression of engagement, the
commitment to participate in a conversation, demanded that people be open to at least
some change.
In setting and responding to these kind of demands, the CAG members -- with the
help of the Authority and facilitators -- became, like Michelman's constitutional judge,
agents of the past and future. They responded to a real threat to democracy and to future
generations posed by a "forgetfulness that gradually corrupts the composite body. . . a
coming to take for granted as 'given' and inevitable what in fact is the product of human
action."24 They worked to ensure that "their civic order [was not] beyond their choice or
control and, therefore, beyond their responsibility."25 They did not "poach on the public
spirit -- or the public-serving habits -- of others," or leave the polity "to heirs," where it
might "reverts to rovina (ruin) for 'heirs quickly degenerate from their ancestors." 26
In their best moments as citizens I believe they became "co-founders of the civic
order in which they liv[ed], which they sustain[ed] and augment[ed] and pass[ed] on to
24 Pitkin 1984. pp. 276-277.
25 Pitkin 1984. The quote is from Machiavelli's Discourses 1: 10 (G22); 1: 2 (G197).
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future generations." In their effort to "see themselves and each other in association
accurately, they recognized that what .. .sustain[ed] their civic order [was] not some
posthumous power of an original patriarchal Founder over them, but simply they
themselves in their shared commitments and interactions." As they "bec[a]me co-
founders of the order with each other, with the original founder(s), and with all the
generations ir between," they expressed their commitment to the past and to the future by
"taking responsibility for and exercising choice about the order in which they live and
into which they initiate the next generation."2 7
FUTURE GENERATIONS AND CONVERSATION
I believe it is possible to draw some inferences for practice from the experience of the
DOE and the Maine CAG. In this concluding section I present four recommendations for
groups facing a decision with intergenerational implications, particularly in the kind of
administrative context I have been discussing. These are: 1) Addressing concerns about
future generations requires an appropriately shaped dialogue; 2) People need a model of
how to speak to the future; 3) Agencies and citizens need help in organizing and
managing such conversations; and 4) Intergenerational dialogues should draw on and
develop the reason and common sense of citizens.
Addressing concerns about future generations requires an appropriately shaped
dialogue.
In different ways, the DOE and Maine experiences each emphasize the importance of
administrative agencies engaging the public in a deliberation about values where long-
26j j 1 
.27 Pitkin 1984. p. 278
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term choices need to be made. In the DOE case, the agency, with the help of the
National Academy of Public Administration was able to identify a set of "Principles of
Intergenerational Equity" that coupled the conceptual literature on discounting and
uncertainty to the practical demands that the DOE faced.
These principles were viewed, by the same people who developed them, as
incomplete. Their meaning and application were understood to hinge on the ability of the
agency to engage the public in a discussion of principles in the context of the particular
cases in which the agency was attempting to apply them. Only in the context of such a
discussion about practice could the principles and their practical force be fully
understood. The NAPA panel emphasized that this discussion should be carried on in a
way that would be perceived as open and generate trust.
The DOE project gave a distinctive turn to what it meant to restore trust and to the tie
between trust and legitimacy. They understood the importance of the discussion in terms
of its contribution to their ability to capture the values that the public saw as pertinent. By
demonstrating their ability to understand and act on these values, staff would restore trust
in the agency, and in the legitimacy ofjudgment. The CAG experience points to a
different basis for trust and legitimacy. Here it was the precisely the way that the process
contributed to the participants ability to act as agents of reason and to become the authors
of an experience that provided a basis for legitimacy.
This distinction is important because it ties directly to what is to be understood by an
appropriate dialogue. I fmd the richness of the CAG experience and its ties to broader
ideas about democratic practice more compelling. Acting on this model means seeking
the open discussion and free play of reason that enabled the participants explore siting
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issues in a broader moral and political context. It was the ability of the participants to
become authors of their own experience that grounded its status of as a legitimate moral
and political act.
This, then, is the proof we must find in practice. The problem is that, while these
characteristics can be cultivated, they cannot be built. This does not mean that nothing
can be said about practice, however. Take the administrative actor in the case, the
Authority. Three aspects of its involvement were critical and generalizable. First, the
Authority members initiated a process with open rules and boundaries. They opened the
process by going out and looking for participants. The belief that no one was being
excluded, together with the open internal rules, contributed to the suspension of disbelief
that got people to the table in the first place. Once there, the open rules were critital.
Even with an effort to be open the Authority's initial framing of the task was perceived as
coercive. It is only the open rules that permitted the CAG members to reshape the
process and in doing so to become its authors that restored the legitimacy of the process.
As the CAG members became authors of their conversation, they also took responsibility
for its broader implications, including the tie to future generations.
The second thing that the Authority did was have enough sense give up control of the
process to the participants. If the Authority had tried to assert control over the
conversation when the CAG members staged their "revolution," they would not only
have undermined the legitimacy of the process, but the also undercut the sense of internal
responsibility and discipline that contributed to the prominence of practices like reason-
giving. If the conversation had continued at all, it might well have shifted to self-
interested bargaining.
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Finally, the Authority members treated the process as if it mattered. It was critical that
participants believed that their efforts meant something. The only way to sustain this
belief was to act continuously and consistently as if the efforts indeed did mean
something. The Authority members did three things that contributed directly to this sense
of authenticity.
First, the Authority members themselves participated. They listened. They offered
their views. They shared their uncertainty and ignorance. They asked and responded to
questions. They even showed a willingness to change their minds on occasion. The CAG
process became, in fact, one of their primary venues for learning about the substantive
issues involved in siting and exploring the implications of different policy options.
By participating they were able to demonstrate respect for the CAG members directly
by listening to them, showing they could be influenced by what was said, and by
supplying justification for their views. To the extent that they demonstrated themselves
to be bound by these norms, they were also the beneficiaries of them. The Authority built
(or detracted from) commitment to the process and perceptions about its legitimacy each
time they acted on (or failed to act on) recommendations made by the CAG.
Finally, the Authority provided financial support for the process. This contributed in
two ways to the development of a conversation with the "appropriate character." The
technical support contributed directly to the participants sense of their own competence
and feeling that they could reason about the complex issues that were involved. Second,
the Authority's support of the facilitation team was critical. The team's ability to keep
both the prospective flow of information that allowed participants to prepare and the
retrospective summary that sustained their faith that their views were being treated with
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respect, moving contributed directly to the way the CAG members, in turn, treated the
conversation. I will comment more on the role of the facilitation team below.
People need a model of how to speak to the future.
A common response to concerns about representation of future generations is to
suggest the use of contemporary advocates or agents. The CAG experience does not
undercut this advice, but certainly alters it in an important way. CAG members' ability
to address intergenerational concerns, hinged on their collective ability to avoid
becoming involved in an advocacy process. Introducing an advocate might have triggered
a kind of Gresham's law in which advocacy drives out reason-giving and deliberation.
On the other hand, it was extremely helpful at a number of points to have someone who
was practiced at speaking about the kind of temporal and ethical relationships involved,
and who could model these practices in ways that made them accessible to the other
participants.
This suggests a different kind of role for an agent that would draw on her expertise as
an interlocutor rather than as an advocate. This would emphasize on the way in which
the agent is able to ask questions rather than press demands. Two brief examples
illustrate the role.
Arguments that bear a family resemblance to John Rawls' veil-of -ignorance figured
throughout the discussion.28 These tropes highlight the ignorance with which we
sometimes reason about the future, as in the following example.
We have been hearing a lot of talk about 100, 500 years. I'd like to try to bring that into
perspective. Let's look back at what happened 500 years ago Does anyone know what year that
was? 1489. Columbus hadn't even found this continent yet. 500 years it's an awful long time to
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21 1971 pp. 136-142
isolate nuclear waste that's going to be around for I 000s of years. So you can throw around 100
years, 500 years, 10,000 years but we have to put this in perspective now.
What the speaker accomplishes by pointing out the information we lack about the future
is to construct a special kind of perspective that helps us to reason about whether the
commitments we are making are reasonable. This kind of logic could be generalized and
developed. An agent who brought this kind of experience to the group could deepen the
exploration of issues and help the group to probe the significance of points that are raised
in their discussion. The following example, this time by the facilitator, modeled another
form of perspective taking that helped the group capture the significance of Dr.
Charlesworth's presentation.
My assumption is that the chronological presentation ought to raise a question which is, "Given
what you now know at Chalk River, about what you didn't know in 1940 and 50 and 60, what are
you doing now to take account of the rapid acceleration and learning that we've seen historically?
In other words, if you see the pictures from the 50s and you say, 'God. How could we have done
that? We would never do that again.' Why do we imagine that in 1999 we won't think about
1989 or 79 in the same way? And if you have that perspective, how does it alter your sense of
how to proceed with the problem of avoiding difficulties or risks, or imagining that what can go
wrong will go wrong, and you then have to take account of that?
These examples illustrate the kind of role that an agent for future generations can play
in a conversational setting. The group drew on other specialized logics at other times, but
failed to tease out their full implications. For instance, they verged on a notion of
"primary goods" at several points, but failed to capture or fully develop the significance
of what had been said.2 9 By articulating these kind of devices and helping others to
articulate and develop ones closer to their own experience, an agent for future generations
could offer substantial help to a group looking to address the future in the context of a
conversations.
Agencies and citizens need help organizing and managing such conversations
150
Underlying much of the discussion of the Maine experience has been an argument
about facilitation. The role of the facilitator was critical in the process. It seems extremely
unlikely that the process could have gone forward without the constant help and attention
of the facilitator. This claim is supported indirectly by the later experience of the CAG.
When the legislature pulled the plug on the facilitation team that had been helping from
the beginning, the group tried to find another facilitator.3 0 This demonstrates how crucial
they thought the role was.
In the view I have been presenting, a prerequisite for addressing future generations is
establishing an appropriate dialogue. Contributions to this development can be
understood as substantive contributions to intergenerational ethics. The facilitator played
a pivotal role in helping the group establish its identity and the sense of authorship that
distinguished their conversation. Let me highlight a couple of important contributions.
The presence of someone from outside the Authority was critical to the suspension of
disbelief that was necessary to get the conversation started. It was important that
someone other than the Authority was running the conversation, who, even before the
first meeting, could respond to concerns individuals had that, by participating, they might
be hoodwinked or coerced into supporting something they did not believe in.
Once the conversation began, it was critical to have someone in a central role whose
identity and legitimacy were tied to the quality of the discourse in a direct and accessible
way. This played out in two ways. First, the facilitator tied not only his legitimacy but
his right to continue directly to popular authorization. This gave the participants the right
and responsibility to police any behavior they found unacceptable.
29 i.e. things people are likely to want whatever else they want. Rawls (1971) pp. 62; 90-95.
Moreover, this commitment was not only a negative constraint on unacceptable
behavior. It extended to affirmative responsibilities to ensure that the guarantees made to
participants had fair value: that people got a chance to speak and be heard, that their
concerns were taken seriously, and that they got the support they needed to participate in
a meaningful way. By opening these speech opportunities and making them meaningful,
the facilitator diminished the importance of other kinds of speech acts that might have
undermined the discourse.
The commitment to openness was tested almost immediately by the "revolution" that
the CAG staged when they rewrote their goals and first developed the sense of authorship
I have been stressing. Let me recap this transition briefly because it highlights the
facilitator's internal role and the tie to the group's sense of purpose and legitimacy. First,
remember that the transition began not with a clear challenge, but with one of the CAG
members raising some somewhat inarticulate doubts about the way the process was
going.
On that particular point ... I would argue at great length. The type of containment we've seen
here is entirely irrelevant. Murphy's Law is going to work on every one of them and I think you've
admitted that . . . that you don't know how long it's going to take to watch these: a thousand years
or a hundred and ten. I certainly would dispute you're saying that it is very clear they will have
something to do with the nature of the site that might be selected. I think they have no bearing at
all.
The response demonstrated respect and an affirmative responsibility to help the
participant clarify his concerns..
What would in your mind have the most bearing on the selection of sites?
This helped the member focus on what was bothering him. There are assumptions
underneath that discussion that he didn't feel were being adequately explored.
3 Participants have all kinds of theories about why this happened. The important that for this story is that it
initiated by an exogenous group. The reason that the legislature gave was expense.
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I think you have not demonstrated, and we're a long way from being convinced, that there is safe
way to dispose of this. You're asking us today to make assumptions.
While he now has articulated what he is concerned about, he still hasn't framed it in a
way that makes its broader implications clear. Again, the facilitator helped clarify.
Let me come back to that. I'm glad you raised it. The Authority has to operate as if there might
be a need to site a facility, because the state law and the federal law require them to do so.
[Participant -Then the state law and the federal law had better convince us that they are safe.]
The question I think for the group is, 'Can you operate in the light of the Authority's request to
seek advice on siting criteria, while holding your view that it would be preferable not to have a
facility or a need for a facility at all?'
This was opened the way for this participant to finally identify the option that he thought
was being foreclosed and that is limiting the discussion.
I think we're saying "none of the above" might be our choice. And also you reassured me, when
you first spoke, that we may say exclude. And you didn't say only one area. We might say,
"Exclude the State of Maine."
But the more significant effect was the channel it opened for another member to raise the
question of whether the CAG ought to set its own goal.
On your last question, I'm not yet certain I can participate in the siting evaluation or preference
criteria or anything of that, but I do think it may be an appropriate time when we come back to try
to decide for ourselves just exactly what the goal of this citizens body is.
What made this transition work was not just opening the discussion up to what the CAG
members wanted to say. It was the interaction between the citizens and the facilitator.
Moreover, it was the facilitators effort to help them understand their concerns by stating
them clearly and making their implications explicit. This is what I mean by transforming
prohibitions against restricting speech into an affirmative responsibility to make speech
opportunities meaningful.
Beyond this the facilitator played a variety of roles that were critical to making the
conversation unfold as it did. I have already highlighted the important managerial role
that the facilitation team played. Earlier in this chapter, I illustrated the role the
facilitator played in enforcing the norms of reason-giving that developed and in helping
participants to articulate the reasons behind their views. In the section above, I
highlighted another aspect of the facilitator's role: modeling good discursive practice.
This particular example helped the group capture the significance of Dr. Charlesworth's
presentation. The point is more general though. Throughout the conversation the
facilitator exercised a kind of non coercive influence by modeling ways of listening,
confirming understanding, and testing ideas, including specific intergenerational tests,
that were critical to the conversation developing in the manner it did.
Finally, I think the facilitator would be in the position to hold the group accountable if
they failed to identify or explore the intergenerational implications of the actions they are
proposing. The participants in the Maine case were responsive enough that the
facilitator's role was more to help them refine and extend their insights rather than to
provide substitutes for their lack of insight. Still the facilitator could raise general
questions like, "How do you think someone in the future will look back on if we choose
to do X and things don't work out?" of "How would you feel if someone in the past had
done something similar to you." These kinds of questions draw on sources of authority
that would not conflict with other roles that the facilitator played in the conversation.
Intergenerational dialogues should be draw on and develop the reason and common
sense of citizens.
Finally, the Maine experience addresses a question about the competence of citizens.
The kind of deliberative conversation I have been describing is often thought to be
reserved for specialized forums and for individuals who have years of special training.
The Maine case demonstrates that citizens, with help, can reason about complex technical
and moral issues. The help should not be understood in the traditional sense of revealing
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knowledge to someone who doesn't understand. As the interaction with Dr. Webster
clearly demonstrated the CAG members were a presence and a source of agency
throughout the process.
Still, the help they received played a pivotal role in developing their competence, in
dealing with the technical issues and as interlocutors. The ongoing commitment of time
and resource contributed to their knowledge and confidence in their ability to discuss
technical issues. Without this confidence in their ability to take on technical questions,
the group could not have probed the moral and political implications of choices as deeply
as they did. They might well have been reduced to the kind of reporting on values that
characterized participation in the DOE case.
The help the group got from the facilitator also factored prominently in their ability
to deliberate about the issues before them. The facilitator's ability to organize the
discussion and manage the flow of information was critical in this regard. I've already
commented on the way it affected practice. Even more important was the contribution
that the facilitator made to the deliberative competence of the parties. First he helped
them sort out their ideas and explore implications. Moreover, the provided an affirmative
guarantee of the procedural commitments to openness and non-coercion that underpinned
the commitment of the participants and their willingness to give reasons and try to reach
agreement on grounds everyone could accept. This directly contributed to the ability of
the CAG members to participate and to participate in a deliberative way. Finally, the
facilitator assisted the parties by modeling discursive practices and keeping an ear open
for reframings and new points of agreement.
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The CAG members ability to reason was also critical in transforming their
participation in the CAG into an authentic moral and political act. Their effort enabled
them to address concerns about future generations from an autonomous and legitimate
basis. This authentic act unfolded through members' ability to find ways to open
proposals and their own assumptions to scrutiny, to improvise tests, and to constantly
invent ways to explore the implications of what they were doing by relating it to the
future. They found countless ways to vest questions like "What happens if we extend this
into the future?" or "How would this look from the future?" with practical force and
meaning. The collection of tests, tropes and devices of representation they devised and
applied, constituted an affirmative response to the problems of intergenerational ethics
that the CAG faced.
Their ability to act on this reason hinged not only on the help that they received, but
on institutional rules that provided an opportunity to reframe goals and reshape the
agenda. When the CAG members became organizers of the conversation and authored
the goals of the process and the terms on which the dialogue would proceed, they took
responsibility, individually and collectively, for their internal behavior and for tying their
conversation to broader political concerns. Without the flexibility these rules provided,
they would not have had the opportunity to act on their own sense of what was important
nor to take responsibility for the substance and the basis of their actions. Thus,
understanding the Maine experience demands that you look at the procedural
opportunities that were open to citizens, in relation to the help they received and to the
capacity for moral and political reason that CAG members brought into play.
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COMMON SENSE AND CONVERSATION IN A RESEARCH SOCIETY
I'd like to conclude with a comment on the relationship between citizens and the
future. One the lasting impressions of the CAG process is a slide Dr. Charlesworth
showed. It's a picture of a group of people at Perch Lake. In the foreground you see a
small group taking samples from the lake. They're tracking tritium or something. In the
background another group is doing something more traditional, fishing or maybe just
riding in a boat.
This image left a lasting impression that experience at Chalk River has merged these
two sorts of activities. Keeping track of the where the tritium is has become as much a
part of daily life as keeping track of where the fish are. It's not that the risk is so
dramatic. It's the constant need to monitor and the penetration of uncertainty into daily
life. This uncertainty has become part of what defines their relationship to the future.
It's possible to imagine any of the choices that the DOE faces or the choices about a
site for a radioactive waste disposal that the CAG faced in Maine, leading to similar
consequences. Someone in the near or distant future out taking water samples from a
lake in central Maine or monitoring a stream in southwestern Washington. Keeping track
of the tritium will have become part of their daily routine, a habit.
This is the world that we are creating for the future, and it is hard to know for better
or worse. What is clear, however, is the obligation to keep these habits from becoming
unthinking. We must preserve the ability to treat the past as controversial, to sort out its
moral and technical implications, and to bring them into play as we make choices in the
present. The interpenetration of the technical and the natural has made this obligation
almost as constant and continuous as checking the tritium in Perch Lake.
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It's easy to imagine that, rather than settle the issue, the choices that the DOE will
make about clean up plans or that might have been made about a site in Maine will be the
first in a series of choices that will unfold over time. Each of these choices will have the
similar technical and moral depth and deserve the same sort of scrutiny, if not for the
same period of time, that the CAG gave to the question of choosing a site. Thus the need
for the kind of moral and technical and technical deliberation that the CAG engaged in is
becoming continuous.
I have underscored the kind of imperative that moral and political questions create for
this kind of conversation. Intergenerational ethics is one of a class of problem that lends
this character to practice. The kind of science associated with uncertainty and open-
ended computer models(which may be the best tools available, but remain themselves
untestable) itself creates a need for this kind of discursive scrutiny on an ongoing basis.
This is emphasized by Funtowicz and Ravetz in their comments on the implications of
"post-normal" science for political practice.
"It is important to realize that the need for enriched input is not merely the result of the external
political pressures on science that occur when the general public is concerned about some issue.
. . When problems do not have neat solutions, when the phenomena themselves are ambiguous,
when all mathematical techniques are open to methodological criticism, then the debates on
quality are not enhanced by the exclusion of all but the academic or official experts. Knowledge of
local conditions may not merely shape the policy problems, it can also determine which data is
strong and relevant. Such knowledge cannot be the exclusive property of experts whose training
and employment inclines them to abstract, generalized conceptions. Those whose live and
livelihood depend on the solution of the problems will have a keen awareness of how general
principles are realized in their 'backyards.' It may be argued that they lack theoretical knowledge
and are biased by self-interest; but it can equally well be argued that the experts lack practical
knowledge and have their own forms of bias. . . Let us be quite clear on this: we are not calling
for the democratization of science out of some generalized wish for the greatest possible extension
of democracy into society. The epistemological analysis of post-normal science, rooted in the
practical tasks of quality assurance, show that such an extension of peer communities . . . is
necessary for the effectiveness of this new sort of science in meeting the challenges of global
environmental issues."
1 Funtowicz and Ravetz. 1991. Pp. 149-150.
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These questions bring together moral and technical issues about our relationship to
the future. These demands create the need for a kind of democracy that is deliberative at
a local level. This raises the salience of the institutional legacy that we are creating for
future generations. By exploring a new institutional form, through the attitudes they
manifested toward each and the future, and by simply demonstrating that it is possible for
people to talk to one another about complicated moral and technical issues, the CAG
members made a substantive contribution to this institutional legacy, and to the ability of
future generations to cope with the kind of uncertainty that is increasingly common.
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